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The Social/HMO Demonstration evaluates the feasibility
。f expanding Medicare Supplemental Insurance benefits t。
2cover a limited amount of reF and community based long-term
care (LTC) services provided under a comprehensive HMO
benefit package for capitated Medicare beneficiaries. The
policy research question addressed by this study is whether
adding an Expanded Care Benefit (ECB) to the capitated HM。
benefit package offered by Kaiser Permanente (KP) changes
utilization patterns and costs of rCF’ services , and the
probability of becoming Medicaid eligible. This study
provides descriptive information regarding this policy
research question.
The research goal of this study is to measure the
extent to which collective rCF use rates and expenditure
patterns for S/HMO members are consistently the same ,
greater or less than baseline data of Risk HMO Medicare
members who do not have the S/HMO ECB. The purpose of such
measurement is to determine if an empirical basis exists for
postulating an rCF utilization and expenditures outcome
effect which is influenced by the S/HMO ECB.
utilization and financial data are collected from all
SNF and rCF level nursing homes in Multnomah County for all
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in KP between June 1 , 1986
and July 31 , 1988. Eligibility data are assembled on all
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in KP during the same time
period who were residents of Multnomah county. Nursing home
use rates and rates for related expenditures are determined
for all nursing home residents (1 , 331) by their eligibility
status in KP during the time of each nursing home stay. Days
3in an ICF are censored by transfers between Cost , Risk and
S/HMO enrollment status. Rates are standardized by the age
and gender distribution of research population members
(19 , 261) to adjust use rates for differences in age cohort
distribution of Risk members and S/HMO members. Risk rates
and S/HMO rates are compared and differences in utilization
and expenditures are evaluated. Conclusions about such
patterns are used to formulate hypotheses for testing and
confirming descriptive observations.
Findings show that overall S/HMO member rates are less
than Risk member rates for five of the six Research
Questions addressed in this study. Specifically , the
probability of admission to an ICF is substantially greater
for S/HMO members than for Risk members. However , S/HMO
members remained in ICFs fewer days than Risk members , over
the two year study period , as measured by age adjusted rates
for ICF days per member year of eligibility during the study
period. Difference in the mean length of ICF stay is
statistically significant between Risk and S/HMO.
The rate of total payments received by nursing homes
for S/HMO ICF residents per 1000 S/HMO members was
substantially less than that for Risk members. The rate of
spend-down to welfare status was substantially lower for
S/HMO members than for Risk members who became ICF
residents. Higher proportions of S/HMO members were
discharged from ICFs to home than were Risk members , which
is consistent with S/HMO Expanded Care Benefit objectives.
4Findings infer that a case-managed , HMO based Expanded
Care Benefit can be expected to reduce ICF days used and
related nursing home revenues for S/HMO members , and is
likely to reduce S/HMO member need for Medicaid assistance
to pay for nursing home debts. This observation is
encouraging regarding the prospects for adopting S/HMO as a
partial solution to the LTC policy problem in America.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION , BACKGROUND INFORMATION , RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT
This country is in the midst of re-examining the
role of public programs in carrying out inter-
generational obligations. [1]
INTRODUCTION
The social problem addressed by this study is that many
。lder Americans suffer catastrophic damage due to financial
burdens resulting from use of nursing home services which
are not paid for by entitlements or private insurance.
Demand is growing for changes in national health policy
which expand entitlements that protect the elderly, and
。ther disabled persons , against the prospect of financial
ruin resulting from their out-of-pocket payment for
long-term care services. ’'One of the most serious gaps in
。ur health care system is the failure on the part of both
the public and private sectors to afford any of our
generations protection against the devastating costs of
long-term illness. 11'[2]
However , resistance is extant among policy makers and
in the private sector as well , because the commitment of
resources needed to close this gap is potentially large.
웰ld， major changes may be required in our health care
2system in order to make it financially reasonable to adopt
meaningful , entitlement-based, long-term care benefits , or
some combination of entitlement services and private
insurance or managed care programs involving long-term care.
There are concerns about adopting such policy.
Policy-makers have been extremely wary of
extending long-term care benefits , in fear of
replacing informal services with costly formal
。nes ... Because long-term care typically includes
skills and services that are interchangeable with
informal care ... the potential for shifting
responsibility is large ... lt seems reasonable
that provision of long-term care will require
substantial cost-sharing ... and careful screening
。f eligibility for services by a sophisticated
case manager. [3]
Another reason for being cautious in adopting policy
which requires inter-generational transfer of resources , is
that the future capacity for increasing this mandate is
uncertain. Many technologically advanced nations are
experiencing concurrent inflationary expenditures for health
related services and escalating need for such expenditures ,
due to aging populations. Such trends are associated with
changes in: social policy to provide for needs of aging
cohorts in their population , the expanded infrastructure
developed to attain goals of such policy , and ability of
productive sectors within their populations to support
public and private financing of such services.
Several cross-national studies have been done t。
document patterns of change in health care costs among the
3twenty-five nations participating in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These studies
are used to project the effect of escalating cost patterns
。ver the next few decades. All 25 nations share a common
concern about their ability to sustain the present level of
inter-generational transfer of resources needed to support
social and health policies already adopted beyond the next
decade. Projected costs , related to adoption of such social
policy in America , portend a very high burden for younger
citizens who would pay for long-term care of their elders.
While social and. health policy achievements are many ,
。ver the last three decades , most of these nations soon will
be confronted by a marked decline in aged-dependency ratios.
This ratio is that portion of the population contributing
to the gross domestic product (GDP) divided by the
population not contributing to the GDP. The changing
aged-dependency ratio results from declining birth rates and
increasing proportions of unemployed persons , of whom the
aged are an increasing component. While no devastating
change is projected regarding this socio-demographic
condition prior to the year 2010; thereafter , the impact is
catastrophic , given other entitlements and encumberments of
government , and barriers to entrepreneurial growth which
confront the private sector. Hard choices will exist for
policy makers and individual citizens alike , in most of
these 25 nations , regarding expansion of entitlements ,
4especially present health benefits. Specifically ,
setting aside significant differences among
c~untries ， it appears likely ... that by the~year
2030 OECD countries will be faced on average with
total healthexpenditures some 30 per cent-higher ,
[than in 1986] and per capita health expenditures
some 20 per cent higher as a result of population
aging. At current levels of expenditure [1986] ,
this represents an additional burden of 3 percent
。 f the GDP. However , this presumes that all other
potentially cost-inducing factors are held
constant ... it could require significant allocations
from other competing goals and a political
willingness to provide the mechanisms which will
accommodate such a shift in priorities.[4]
what can the United States learn from other nations ,
whose declining aged-dependency ratio precedes ours and
whose social policy is more expansive regarding long-term
care benefits , regarding policy solutions?
In most Scandinavian countries , the United Kingdom , the
Netherlands and in some Canadian provinces , where long-term
care is almost exclusively delivered by the public sector ,
extensive screening programs exist to ensure use of
resources which adhere to social policy goals , and which
minimize poor public interest use of such resources.
Specifically , complex issues are negotiated regarding
family capacity for care-giving , use of personal finances ,
alternative methods of managing dependency , community
。ptions for placement , and differences of provider opinion
regarding use of medical services. Social policy in Denmark
establishes multidisciplinary assessment committees t。
5negotiate such complex issues. However , OECD investigations
suggest that policies for financing and delivery of long-
term care services are fraught with conceptual as well as
ethical difficulties; effective oversight is problematic
without carefully devised incentives for cost-effective use
。 f public and private sector funds.
Furthermore , such LTC and other health policies about
chronic illness must be coordinated with those in the acute
care area for the non-elderly population. Many OECD
countries have pursued social policies regarding care of
their aged which places the medical model of health service
within the context of a broader gerontologic policy model.
In America , some scholars of geriatric care policy ,
such as Duncan Neuhauser , advocate that care of the elderly
should not start with the medical model , but rather with a
social support model under which medical care functions in a
supportive but subsidiary role. It is his view that
capitation reimbursement schemes and Social/Health
Maintenance Organizations provide an opportunity t。
accomplish that , even if not fully realized.[5]
This notion has been espoused over the last decade by
health care analysts , such as Carroll Estes , who are
concerned about the future role of academic health centers
in America. She advises medical schools to pursue training
。 f medical students in community-based settings where the
。 rientation toward elderly persons and long-term care
6eschews the traditional medical model and shifts to a
broader goal than medical treatment; one which encompasses
socio-cultural , behavioral and environmental realities for
chronically ill and dependent aged persons. [6]
Christine Cassel , Chief , Division of General Medicine ,
School of Medicine , University of Chicago , also advises a
shift in teaching which emphasizes that treatment goals
involve quality of life aspects which are as much or more
relevant to the patient ’ s welfare , than abnormal laboratory
findings or any specific diagnosis. [7]
Adoption of such concepts by the community of formal ,
health care givers means that long-term institutional care
providers will be expected to pro-actively coordinate
traditional nursing home services with non-institutional
community based care. Achievement of such concepts may
require financial incentives which encourage discharge
procedures that ensure continuity of social , psychological
and health care needs of elderly residents. Such concepts
may produce living arrangements for the elderly which have
yet to emerge , and which may formally link providers of such
living arrangements with the current nursing home model. [8]
The challenge ,' then , is to find solutions to the
current and impending demand for long-term care needs
without enlarging the health care related public financing
crisis which now besiege many nations , including America.
What kind of policy changes are likely to move us in that
7direction? Theodore Marmor perceives the sweeping reforms ,
which he believes necessary for America ’ s health care
system , are unlikely because pluralist politics permit only
incremental movement of social welfare policy here. But , he
also believes that many key constituents of America ’ s health
care system accept that such change must come. [9]
If other nations in OEeD can manage to formulate ,
adopt , and internalize such national policy regarding
long-term care of dependent elderly , so can the United
States , even with its heterogeneous cultures , divergent
state governments , and inharmonious public-private sector
health care partnerships.
Indeed, a few trial projects exist in both public and
private sectors regarding long-term care services which
reflect social policy adopted in many other nations , and
which incorporate some of the ideological changes , social
policy objectives , multidisciplinary based managed care
procedures , and financial goals discussed above.
These trial projects contribute information needed t。
guide policy formulation about social and health policy
related to care of elderly persons. Policy adoption and
ensuing implementation must also be guided by experiences of
such trial projects. Mazmanian ’ s view of incremental change ,
as the cornerstone of America ’ s public policy adoption
process , is embodied in these trial projects.
This trial project process has moved the HMO concept
8into the mind-set of government and some politicians , as the
solution of choice for containing growth in health costs at
an acceptable level and widening the scope of benefits t。
better protect individuals and government pocket-books. That
private organizations had successfully established todays
HMO model ’ well before the term "HMO" appeared in
legislation , is also part of that incremental change
concept. It is in this context that the research for this
dissertation occurred.
A goal of this study is to contribute to incremental
movement toward public and private domain adoption of
。perationally sound policy solutions which improve access t。
certifiably needed LTC services for this nation ’ s elderly ,
at an affordable price.
The policy context within which this contribution is
pursued , involves expanding Medicare entitlement linked
Supplemental Benefit schemes for limited LTC insurance
protection against early stage expenses for LTC , which are
privately financed. Improved access to and coordination with
most health and many social services is also part of that
benefit scheme , which pursues creative home-care
alternatives to ins'titutionally provided services.
The hoped-for contribution of this study is that policy
makers and private organizations will be better informed
about the emerging outcome of one trial project with strong
potential for nurturing policy changes which encompass LTC
9needs of beneficiaries without losing sight of looming
inter-generational burdens to be borne by today ’ s youth.
That trial project is the Social/HMO as implemented by
Kaiser Permanente (KP) , Northwest Region , as one of four
sites selected for this legislatively supported project.
The S/HMO combines efforts of public and private
sector organizations to shield the aged against shorter-
stay costs of long-term care institutions and formal care
provided in the home as an alternatives to and preventive
measure against needed long-term care services which are
institutionally provided by Intermediate Care Facilities ,
known as ICFs. The S/HMO concept seeks to minimize personal
expenditures for such services by maximizing authorized uses
。f S/HMO ’ s limited Expanded Care Benefit through managed
care concepts adopted by KP and the other three
demonstration sites. While seeking better methods for
accessing LTC services by the elderly, this trial also tests
use of financial incentives designed to encourage cost
effective choices regarding LTC services. Such choices are
negotiated between patient or patient ’ s family , Center for
Health Research case managers , attending physicians , and
。ther providers within and outside of KP. This model
conceptualizes financial outcomes which do not exacerbate
inflationary trends in the health services industry.
The consolidated, prepaid S/HMO model has been
looked to by many policy-makers and providers as a
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rational way to deliver managed , integrated health
and long-term care (LTC) services (Callahan and
Wallack , 1981: Rivlin and Wiener , 1988) ... The SHMO
was designed to expand prepaid coverage of
community and nursing home care in a controlled
manner and to link these expanded LTC services
with a complete acute care system. [10]
At the KP S/HMO Demonstration Project site , the HMO
component of this project had been in operation for over 40
yea호s. Therefore , the basic goal of the trial has been
focused on designing and implementing LTC services under the
Expanded Care Benefit package (ECB). Congressionally
mandated waivers to Medicare and Medicaid laws/regulations
were granted to allow and encourage integration of
alternative LTC services with all Medicare entitlement
benefits. The first trial project period was from 1985
through 1988. That is the time line within for which data
was collected in support of research undertaken for this
dissertation study. Two Congressional extensions have been
granted since then , ending in 1995.
Studies are needed which inform policy makers with data
about comparative differences in use of LTC services by
persons having and not having various forms of fiscal
protection against costs of LTC , of which the S/HMO ECB is
。nee Such information is not available from the S/HMO sites
at this time , although much is known about other outcomes
from the S/HMO studies. No literature is available which
makes this specific comparison between S/HMO and Risk
Medicare Beneficiary use of ICFs.
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Therefore , the research task of this study is t。
collect data about , and describe differences in , ICF
services used by both trial project S/HMO members and other
KP Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in KP under HCFA
contracts for fixed capitation reimbursement. such Medicare
beneficiaries are known as I’Risk" members. S/HMO members are
enrolled under such risk agreements , but HCFA capitation
reimbursement for S/HMO members who are certified as
eligible for ICF (or SNF) level nursing home care is at 100
percent of the institutional rate cell rather than 100
percent of the average adjusted Medicare rate in the county
。f residence for Risk beneficiaries.
The purpose of identifying descriptive differences
between S/HMO and baseline data for other Risk members , is
to show how Risk beneficiaries with an ECB use ICF services
compared to how other Risk beneficiaries without any ECB use
ICF services , during a portion of the initial waiver trial
period. Observed differences are presumed due to , at least
partially, case managed ECB. Such observations could
provide a base of knowledge sufficient to undertake studies
which confirm that persons with S/HMO ECB choose and use
insti tutiona1 long-'term care services in a way that differs
from persons who do not have such benefit options. Research
findings of that nature are central to policy information
needed from the S/HMO Demonstration Projects. It was not
known whether such differences existed prior beginning this
12
study. Views differed among S/HMO investigators about how
ICF use might differ between Risk and S/HMO members.
Another task of this study was to provide descriptive
information about possible affects of the ECB on the need
for and extent of Medicaid assistance with payment of S/HM。
member costs incurred from residing in nursing homes. Risk
spend-down experience is compared with that of S/HMO t。
infer possible affects of the ECB on preventing or deferring
welfare status.
Such descriptive observations are synthesized int。
policy recommendations conceptualized for use with S/HMO
trial project outcomes , pending other confirmatory studies.
These recommendations therefore are used to formulate
recommendations for follow-up research needed to confirm
descriptive findings of this study.
BACK딩ROUND INFORMATION
Background information is presented next which attempts
to place the work of this study into an overall policy and
。perational context at the time of the study period (July 1 ,
1986 through June 30 , 1988) , from which KP members were
selected in order to identify and evaluate their nursing
home utilization. This is followed by a description of the
s/HMO program at this site. Chapter II presents conceptual
issues related to the purposes of this study, noted above ,
from which six research questions are derived for guiding
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the research methodology pursued. Demand for nursing home
care in America results from several situations which
interact to produce inflationary growth in expenditures.
Such inflationary trends may be partly related to the
institutional bias of social policy programs legislated for
health care. In America , the predominant public policy for
financing nursing home services is Medicaid. The operational
solution emphasized by Medicaid in most states is
institutional care rather home or foster home care. For
those elderly whose informal network of support is missing ,
alienated , or incapable of caring for them on a continuous
basis , institutional care may be the only choice.
State policies on Medicaid and on Supplemental Security
Income for the aged vary greatly, which translates int。
significant differences between states regarding publicly
funded access to LTC. Compression of state and local
government budgets causes increased pressure for ways t。
reduce public financing of LTC; one method is to reduced the
number of people who become eligible recipients of Medicaid.
This is occurring at a time when the number of elderly in
need of such support is increasing.
It is not a credit to the social policies of America
that some elderly, most of whom have been financially
self-sufficient over their life course , conclude it in
abject poverty because LTC costs exceed their savings and
。ther assets. This situation occurs because neither private
14
insurance nor public policy has created a system of
financing which spreads the risks of LTC costs across a
large population base , as with most other health care costs.
There are numerous issues associate with this lack of
social and health policy for LTC services; some of these are
presented, below. They include demographic trends , effects
。f inflation related to LTC services , the supply of nursing
home beds , Spend-down trends and state policies on Medicaid ,
and trends in nursing home utilization. These issues provide
the policy context in which this study commenced , as well as
a basis for conceptualizing the circumstances from which
research questions arise , in this study.
It is well known that people age 65 and older consume a
highly disproportionate amount of health care services. They
comprise about thirteen percent of the population , yet one-
third of all national medical and hospital care expenditures
are for the aged. As the proportion of young to old changes ,
so will the demand for allocation of limited resources shift
to the elderly. Inter-generational transfer may become a
serious burden on the nation ’ s working population by the
year 2010. [11]
As inflationary rates of institutional LTC continue t。
increase faster than the All Urban Consumers , All Items
Indexes , Consumer Price Index (CPI) , the issue of how t。
finance those services becomes more acute , and the matter of
more effective management of LTC services more pressing.
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Nursing home expenditures continue to grow at a rate
exceeding that of the CPl. In 1988 , it is estimated that all
long-term care costs for the elderly totaled $42 billion
including formal and informal care costs , which was about 9
percent of the total health care expenditures for the year.
In 1987 , nursing home care for the elderly totaled 32.8
billion which was over 20 percent of total health care
expenditures for those age 65 and over for that year.
Of this amount , 57 percent was paid privately
(excluding private long-term care insurance) ,
36.3 percent by Medicaid , 3.4 percent by other
government programs , 1.8 percent by Medicare , and
1 to 2 percent by private long-term care
insurance. Nursing home costs have been raising
steadily at an annual rate of about 10.5 percent
... From 1988 to 2018 , total nursing home cost are
expected to grow from $33 billion to 98.1
billion. [12]
Some nursing home residents become dependent on
Medicaid after spending down their assets to a welfare
eligible level. Over half of all nursing home occupants are
reportedly not poor upon admission to a nursing home , but
become so in less than one year.
Medicaid recipients who reside in nursing homes
(skilled nursing facilities , intermediate care
facilities and' intermediate care facilities for
the mentally retarded) account for [seven] 7
percent of total [Medicaid] recipients , but
generate over 42 percent of the [Medicaid]
program costs. [13] People who reach age 65 have a
30% to 50훌 chance of spending some time in a
nursing home before they die. Between 1966 and
1982 , nursing home costs increased at an average
annual rate of 15훌 ••• Seventy percent of all
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single people admitted to a nursing home go broke
within three months: 50% of couples are
impoverished within six months after one spouse
is admitted. [14]
In 1990 , Medicaid paid for 45.5 percent of all nursing
home care and was the largest third party payer of long-term
care. In 1985 , Medicaid paid 50.4 percent of all nursing
home costs. (Op. Cit. [12] , p. 28) States are struggling t。
reduce expenditures for nursing home services and this
decline in percent of total nursing home cost paid by states
suggests they may be succeeding. There are many approaches
to that process.
State governments often adopt a policy of restricting
licensure for existing beds and prohibit construction of
added beds as one means of suppressing utilization of
nursing homes. Development of a national policy on
availability of beds is complicated because demographic ,
cultural , social customs , geographic proximity of families ,
the local economy , and other trends cause great variability
in choices for LTC between geographic regions in America.
The range in supply of nursing homa beds/l000
population over age 64 among all states in 1985 was from
26.2 beds /1000 resIdents in Florida , age 65 and over , to 90
beds/l000 , in Minnesota. [15]
In 1986 , nationally , supply of nursing home beds ,
excluding those for the mentally retarded , was 1.5 million ,
averaging 51.7 beds/l000 population age 65 or more. Within
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this aggregate pool of LTC beds , there were 33.7 SNF
beds/1000 population age 65 or more , 14.1 ICF beds /1000 ,
and 13.8 uncertified nursing home beds /1000. In the western
states , there were 42.3 nursing home beds/1000 age 65 or
more , of which 34.3/1000 were SNF and 3.8/1000 were ICF; the
remaining were uncertified. [16]
The proportion of 工CF’ to SNF beds in Oregon is unique
among the western states in which SNF beds predominate. In
Oregon , there are far more ICF’ beds than SNF beds and , n。
doubt , this is related to the state and federal contract for
pass-through of Medicaid funds.
In Oregon an aggressive program has been in place since
1980 to reduce the number of nursing home beds per 1 , 000
population over age 65. The Oregon State Health Plan
established in 1980 an overall goal of 40 beds per 1 , 000
population age 65 and over , which was intended to reduce the
supply from 50.3 beds per 1 , 000 (range by county was
25/1 , 000 to 99/1 , 000) .
The State Health Planning Council ’ s policy objective ,
。f 40/1 , 000 population , which also happened to be the goal
proposed by the National Governors Conference 1980 , was
conditional in that' the Council acknowledged that goal could
1I ••• onl y be reached if it is approached hand-in-hand with
the development of alternative services. II [17]
A 20 page chapter of that document was developed
regarding ’'Alternatives to Institutional Care For The
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Elderly and Disabled. 1I A primary solution to attainment of
that goal was shifting Medicaid placements from nursing
homes to other community facilities , such as Adult Foster
Care or Residential Care Facilities.
By 1985 , there were 16 , 068 nursing home beds in free
standing facilities , having an average occupancy of 89.3
percent , in Oregon. The statewide bed availability rate was
then down to 45.1 beds /1000 population age 65 and over.
Additionally , there were 293 hospital based nursing home
beds in Oregon. Of the 173 certified nursing homes in
Oregon , 109 were licensed to operate ICF beds.
Oregon has pursued alternatives to nursing homes for
Medicaid eligible persons during the last fifteen years ,
beginning with the Senior Health Improvement Project (SHIP)
funded by a federal Models Project Grant (90-A-1606) from
the Administration on Aging , Department of Health Education
and Welfare. It developed Placement Information Base (PIB)
criteria for assessment of Medicaid applicants in order t。
identify persons who could be placed in alternative care
sites. This helped attain the 1980 ratio or 40 occupants
/1000 persons.
Thus , in 1985 , the State of Oregon represented an ideal
environment in which to implement the S/HMO Expanded Care
Benefit , since residents of the state were already
conditioned to the idea that COD삐unity based care was a
reasonable alternative to nursing home care.
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Demographic changes are well documented about growth
rates among age cohorts of 65 and over. The demand for
nursing home care is expected to continue increasing ,
because the proportion of elders over age 75 is increasing
faster than the general population. Age cohorts 65 to 100
have almost tripled since 1900; those over age 75 will
comprise between seven percent of this nation ’ s population
by 2000 AD. and , " ... in 2030 there will be as many people
。ver age 75 as there are today over age 65."[18]
As a percent of the total population , those over age 75
are expected to increase from 5.0 percent in 1990 to 7.7
percent by 2030 , while the total population over age 64 may
increase 18.3 percent in 2030.
The 1983 report of the U. S. Senate Special Committee
。n Aging senate projected the inter-generational transfer
dependency ratio of non-aged working to non-working aged t。
increase from 18훌 in 1980 to 21훌 in 1990 and to 33훌 by 2025.
That is , under such forecasts , by the year 2025 there will
be one , non-working elderly person for every 3 working
persons in America. Some estimates suggest 2.5 to 1 is more
realistic. [19]
Predictions vary regarding elderly citizen needs for
chronic care services , at the point where aged-dependency
ratios are a serious threat to the well being of this
nation ’ s economy. Researchers at the Urban Institute and
Duke University " ... project that in 2020 , the disabled
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elderly population could be as low as 10 or as high as 14
million; in 2060 , it could be as low as 14 or as high as 24
million. " [20]
One demographer at the National Institute of Aging
estimates that by the year 2080 , the number of persons in
America , age 85 and over , could be 72 million rather than
the 18.7 million estimated by the Census Bureau; currently,
there are 3.3 million. [21]
Furthermore , due to the relative increase in persons
age 85 and the over , the proportion of disabled is projected
to increase from 23.7 percent in 1985 to 28.6 percent in
2060 , within the elderly population. Projections vary
because of differences in how chronic disability is
defined , and because of differences in assumptions about
mortality rates. If disability rates decline as rapidly as
mortality rates , there could be 20 percent fewer disabled in
the year 2020. Table I represents one of many projections of
age cohort distribution across the next fifty years.
A correlation between age and increasing use of nursing
homes is clearly documented. As one study indicates , It ••• age
is a very important factor. Among those 65 to 74 years old,
the occupancy rate is less than 2 percent. It raises t。
about 7 percent for those age 75 to 84 , and then jumps to 20
percent for those 85 and older." (Op. Cit. [18])
Another study indicates 1.2훌 。f those age 65 to 74 , and
5.9 percent of those age 75 to 84 , rising to 23.7 percent
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TABLE I
POPULATION ESTIMATE THROUGH 2045
(000) (000) (000)
YEAR/AGE 65 - 74 75 - 84 85 -)100
1990 18 , 035 10 , 349 3 , 313
2000 17 , 650 12 , 318 4 , 926
2025 33 , 188 18 , 125 7 , 011
2045 31 , 202 23 , 260 14 , 874
(Bureau of Census , Series p-25 , Nr. 952 , 1983 , Table 6)
among those age 85 and over. [22]
There is agreement among demographers , in spite of
differences over assumptions , that the absolute and relative
number of disabled elderly will increase and corresponding
demand for long-term care services will increase ,
dramatically. Brookings Institute has developed a
sophisticated system for making and updating projections of
the elderly population using long-term care services. The
Brookings Long Term Care Financing Model includes many
assumptions about personal income and other factors thought
to affect demand and ability to pay. Findings suggests a
stronger statistical relationship between: level of income
(less or more than $10 , 000) , disability , and long-term care
services needed/used. [23]
This model makes a range of assumptions about induced
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demand resulting from a variety of private and public
insurance programs. It considers the effects of relaxed
financial eligibility for long-term care or expanding
benefits , based on the Canadian experience and Channeling
Demonstration Projects , which suggested that more community
based services did not reduce demand for nursing home beds.
A central research question in this dissertation study
is whether or not nursing home use changes when induced
demand for community based services is introduced , under
case managed conditions. Findings to this question are
presented in Chapter V.
In the year 2018 , just 25 year ahead , their 1990
prediction estimates the range of elderly persons using
formal Medicare home health services as 5.88 million (low)
to 7.88 high and baseline as 6.36; the low estimate for
institutionalized nursing home residents is 3.03 to 5.02 and
baseline is 4.02. That represents an increase of over 75
percent from current nursing home use: 1I ••• the number of
elderly using nursing homes during the course of a year is
expected to increase from 2.3 million in 1988 to about 4
million in 2018. II (op. cit. [20] , pp. 8 , 21)
The proportional increase of elderly in the total
population is projected to raise by 61 percent. The Urban
Institute baseline projection for nursing home use in 2020
AD is 4.32 million , and about 20 million additional persons
in the c。짜mnity needing formal and informal care giver
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assistance.
。f the 1 , 491 , 400 residents living in 19 , 100 nursing
homes , nationwide in 1985 , 1 , 325 , 800 (88훌) were 65 year or
。lder. The largest age group of nursing home residents was
age 85 or more (45훌 )i the next largest was age 74 to 85
(39훌 )i in age cohort 65-74 only 16훌 。f all residents.
In a study by Weissert , a method of predicting nursing
home bed demand was developed , based on levels of chronic
dependency among the elderly , as measured by Katz ’ g
activitiesof daily living (ADL) scale of dependency.
Weissert projected in 1985 , using 1977 and 1982 bureau
。f census population forecasts for age and sex , that the use
。f nursing home beds may double by the year 2000. this data
reportedly is similar to that observed in the longitudinal
Framingham study. [24]
The 1985 national aggregate ratio of residents per 1000
population age 65 is shown in Table II , below, as a
reproduction of Weissert ’ s estimated rates. These ratios
provide a frame of reference for ratios produced in Chapters
v through IX in this study. The above ratios also are
consistent with those computed by the Office of Actuary ,
u.S. DHHS based on1977 NCHS data. [25] Nursing Home
utilization rates also are a function of frequency of
admission and average length of stay for each admission.
Seventy-five percent of nursing home discharges are alive
(although about eight percent go immediately to hospitals t。
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die). Table III is derived from Weissert ’ s projections for
nursing home occupants per 1000 population age 65 and over.
TABLE II
NATIONAL RATIO OF RESIDENTS/1000 POPULATION
IN NURSING HOMES
AGE GROUP NURSING HOME OCCUPANCY
65-74 12.5/1000 (AGE 65+)
75-84 57.7/1000
85 + 219.4/1000
65 + (AVERAGE) 46.1/1000
(MALES - 29.0/1000; FEMALES - 57.7/1000)
TABLE III
PREDICTED NURSING HOME AGE BASED USE RATES
Age Cohort
65-69
70-74
75-79
80-'84
85+
Nursing Home/population
10/1000
21/1000
45/1000
98/1000
217/1000
During the last three decades nursing homes have become
increasingly the solution used for resolving problems of
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chronic dependency when volunteer home support is not
available. lip’rom the end of the 1960s to the early 1980s the
number of residents in nursing homes more than doubled , from
790 , 000 to almost 1.4 million."[26l
The pool of LTC consumers could swell significantly if
the capacity or willingness of the informal system to care
for the very old is altered by changes in social , cultural
and economic customs. Factors which reinforce this concern
include: increased divorce rates , smaller families , lack of
proximity to family members , age of siblings who may care
for their elderly parents , and unavailability of females due
to their joining the work-force. While there are theoretical
counter arguments , many indicators exist which suggest that
the proportion of older people requiring formal LTC support
systems will expand continuously over the next several
decades.
A primary cause of expanding demand for ICF services is
due to the growing number of females over age 85 who live
alone without access to family members or other informal
groups who might support them.
As discussed above , policies of the 1970s and 1980s ,
regarding suppression of nursing home beds , drove the rati。
。f SNF and ICF beds from 53.4 in 1978 to 52.5 in 1989 , in an
effort to cut costs. In Oregon and Washington , Colorado and
Wisconsin, the rate decreased by at least 17 percent , which
may have serious consequences in the face of above
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projections. This diminished bed supply has led to a marked
rise in other facilities providing services to the less
severely disabled including board and care , assisted living
facilities , congregate housing , and continuing care
communities in these states. Such trends are following in
。ther states.
The Brookings Institute projects that the number of
elderly using paid home care services will raise by 60
percent in the next 25 years. Another study projects that by
2030 , 46 percent of all elderly will live alone , compared t。
38 percent in 1990 (op. cit. [20] , pp 10 , 18) Given
predicted increases in chronic disability and decreasing
estimates of old persons with family or other support
systems , it is apparent that demand will increase for paid
personal care services which are provide in the home or
。therwise in evolving community based facilities.
Managed care systems are leading the way in providing
paid services in the home to this growing proportion of
disabled population living in community, but private
insurance programs are following this path of solutions t。
both bed shortages and cost containment for those elderly
whose care can be managed in non-institutional settings.
Cost projections , related to the above trends , are
staggering. Between now and 2018 , nursing home expenditures
alone are expected to triple from over $42 billion to $120
billion in 1987 dollars , and triple again by 2048 to $350
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billion dollars. The range of assumptions for these 2018
projections , is $66 billion to $145 billion.
Concurrently, the ratio of working age population t。
all estimated disabled elderly decreases; over the next 75
years it is estimated to drop from 21:1 to 9:1. (Op. Cit.
[20] , p. 14)
This above overview of socio-demographic issues related
to LTC needs helps explain why governments and private
business at all levels are seeking methods of reducing
current and impending expenditures for LTC services. The
prospective tax base for publicly financed support and care
。f the elderly is expected to diminish. Business does not
wish to channel funds needed for capital growth and
。wnership earnings into expanded health care benefits , or
increased taxes. Per capita expenditures for acute care can
be expected to increase significantly in the foreseeable
future , in addition to LTC due to the above changes in
social characteristics of Americas population.
Lack of private insurance or entitlement benefits for
financing LTC resul~s in an increasing demand for Medicaid
as the number of very elderly increases. "A major barrier t。
development [of LTC insurance] has been the lack of
information on which to base utilization and cost
estimation."[27]
Trial programs such as S/HMO represent potential
methods for shifting some of the burden from government t。
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the private community. The urgency of obtaining information
from S/HMO , and other trial programs cannot be overstated.
Many public programs have experimented with
alternatives to institutional care in an effort minimize the
public financing burden of nursing home care.
If private insurance carriers and direct service
provider organizations are to pick up an increasing portion
。f nursing home expenditures , it is important for them t。
become knowledgeable about utilization rates.
Hopefully , data from this study will be useful t。
private organizations interested in developing and marketing
LTC benefits. Exactly when , if ever , market products by
private insurance carriers will become widely available is
uncertain. However , meaningful efforts are being made by
private organizations to understand, and prepare for that
event. [28]
By June , 1990 , approximately 1.6 million
Americans had purchased long-term care
insurance ... The market for long-term care
insurance resembles the market of Medicare
Supplemental or ’'Medigap" insurance in the 1970s ,
which varied greatly in value and coverage ...
[among the many issues complicating the marketing
。f such coverage , one is especially troublesome
about having some uniform criteria about] ...How
insurers determine whether policyholders are
impaired in their ADLs and thus eligible for
benefits ... another is how they link impairment t。
medical necessity. [29]
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation is sponsoring trial
projects which encourage public and private ventures in
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promoting LTC insurance which emphasize in-home care , case
management and personal asset protection to policy holders.
Because LTC insurance is relatively new , and
because it does not have tax-deductible status an
an employee benefit under IRS rules , relatively
few employers nationally built LTC into their
benefits packages. Of these that have , virtually
all have acted as group sponsors only , while
their participating employees pay all the
premiums. An innovation of the [Connecticut
partnership for Long-Term Care , implemented in
1992] State ’ s LTC policies is their
asset-protection feature: This enables policy
holders , who exhaust their paid insurance
benefits , to tap into Medicaid without spending
all of their personal wealth. [30]
The demonstration project referenced above is a ten
year trial. Connecticut sees it as a way to contain Medicaid
costs. Insurers see it as a way to promote LTC policies.
Employers see it as a way to decrease concerns of employees
。ver care of a disabled spouse , or parents.
Although pressure exists for Congress to require
minimum policy benefits , guaranteed standards of access t。
benefits and non-cancelable terms , great variation exists.
Coverage for long-term disabilities , Alzheimer ’ g
disease and other dementias has grown briskly in
the last five years , to an estimated $3 billion
in annual premiums. About 2.7 million people ,
most starting in their late 60 ’ sand 70 ’ shave
bought policies. Depending on age and what is
covered , the cost may be $1000 to $4000 , a year.
About 8 percent of large and medium sized
employers sponsor long-term care [benefits] , and
18 percent more intend to do so by 1995 ...
Industry executives and Congressional health
policy aids doubt that sweeping long-term care
measures will be enacted soon. [31]
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As insurance carriers , and medical care provider
。rganizations which operate under fixed payments or
capitation arrangements , progress toward large scale
marketing of prepaid , long term care services for
chronically dependent older Americans , it is likely they
will seek information about the effects of alternative
services on the utilization of nursing home services.
While the literature on such utilization information is
expanding generally , very little is available regarding a
specific subset of the general Medicare population;
specifically Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in HMOs under
capitated "Risk" Contracts. The absence of such LTC
information makes information from this study of potential
interest to such health care organizations. Future research
and actuarial studies seeking to create and market a LTC
benefit may be interested in knowing effects of prepaid,
Expanded Care Benefits on institutional care.
The foregoing summary of experience in nursing home use
rates provides background information against which t。
compare findings in this study. A summary of factors likely
to affect those rates over the next few decades , emphasizes
the need for production of information presented by this
study. This background information suggests the policy
context for this study is complex and dynamic.
A summary is presented next of the specific research
environment in which this study is conducted, i.e. , at one
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。f four sites (Kaiser Permanente , Northwest Region) , where a
Social Health Maintenance Organization Demonstration Project
is operationalized. Salient aspects of the S/HMO
project are presented first.
RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT
The S/HMO Demonstration Project represents an
incremental movement in social policy which embraces many of
those notions about care of the aged practiced by OCED
nations , and which are advocated by leadership at some of
this nations academic medical centers with a history of
forging change within the medical community.
Most health care research evaluate what exists. The
S/HMO is an operationalized program of research t。
demonstrate what can be done to bring consumer , provider ,
government and private sector interests together to test the
financial feasibility of adding a privately financed
long-term component to entitlement benefits which risks
shifting of informal services to formal care , yet which
eng흘를es the 후렐tient’ s social sunnort RVAt~m rn T~~;';~~←a
home based care when possible.
S/HMO is a complex program which is implemented in a
sophisticated organizational structure servicing a fully
diversified cross-section of the Medicare population in
Multonomah county by a staff which is experienced in
multidisciplinary team care. It is a formidable undertaking
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to do a comprehensive research analysis of all effects of
the S/HMO Expanded Care Benefit (ECB). In part , the research
process is complicated because it is difficult to separate
possible effects of ECB from other contractual health care
services provided to each Medicare beneficiary at this site.
This study pursues one small step in that process.
The specific policy issue addressed in this study is ,
will use of and expenditure for ICF services change , given
this ECB.
The research process includes identifying and evaluat-
ing differences in ICF use rates , and related expenditures ,
between two Risk contract Medicare beneficiary groups , one
。f which , S/HMO , has a trial benefit (ECB) covering long
term care services not covered by Medicare , and the other ,
Risk , does not. ECB allows limited home care services as a
substitute for nursing home care , as well as nursing home
services not covered by Medicare , as well as additional
pharmacy services. A complete outline of S/HMO benefits is
presented in Appendix A.
The conceptual model presumes that beneficiary and HMO
staff make rational choices about uses of the Social/HMO
Expanded Care Benefit so that out of pocket payments t。
nursing homes by the beneficiary are minimized, without
denying nursing home services when reasonable alternatives
to nursing home admission do not exists.
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in the S/HMO pay to KP
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a fixed monthly amount adjusted annually by KP , in addition
to other charges for Medicare Supplemental Insurance
Benefits. The Health Care Financing Administration makes
monthly capitated payments to KP for entitlement services
covered under Medicare , Parts A and B.
In this study , the measure of difference in ICF use
rates and expenditures is between S/HMO and non-S/HMO Risk
beneficiaries enrolled in the same HMO during the same time
period , cared for by the same providers. Non-S/HMO use rates
are the baseline since they are the result of rational
decisions by persons without LTC insurance , beyond Medicare
entitlements and Supplemental benefits , to use out-of-pocket
assets for ICF care. The policy issues is , do persons with
ECB use more ICF services , or less ICF’ services , than those
who do not have ECB?
This study does not create a statistical model suitable
for generalizability of specific quantitative findings
regarding effects of ECB on 工CF services. Study outcomes are
based on the empirical experience of one S/HMO site.
However , trends and overall observations may be transferable
to other S/HMO sites. Findings or/and recommendations
provided may be adapted to fit operational and research
conditions unique to other current and future S/HMO
locations.
A graphic and narrative summary of the overall SHM。
experience at the KP site is presented in Appendix A. All
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such information was prepared by the S/HMO research staff
and not by this investigator. Permission to use same is
granted by the Project director.
The Center for Health Research (CHR) provides an
environment especially amenable to research on issues
related to utilization of health care services. At least a
dozen reason are cited for conducting research which
explains utilization outcomes observed; several models for
doing so are identified. "In general , none of these models
adequately predicts differences in or explains a great deal
。f the variation in medical care utilization."[32l
ICF services are no exception to this view; they are
much studied yet little agreement exists on models in the
literature explaining why people with similar health
conditions and similar socio-economic attributes have such
varied long-term care utilization experiences. One area
where findings are consistent is that there are two basic
use patterns in nursing homes; those which are termed short
stay and those termed long stay. However, even here
definitions are inconsistent. Some see short stay as under
90 days , while others see it as six months or even less than
。ne year. Most agreement exists about any stay in excess of
。ne year as a long-stay resident. All studies advise that is
is necessary to recognize and even treat these as distinct
groups of nursing home users. In this study that is
accomplished by creating an overall data set and two subsets
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in which long-stay residents are removed , successively. This
was described earlier in Chapter III.
Considerable literature exists regarding the S/HMO ECB
provider-consumer model and certain outcomes of the overall
and site specific Demonstration Project. Some of these are
summarized in Appendix A, in a list prepared by the CHR
staff.
However , almost no studies report on differences in ICF
use rates between the capitated members enrolled in the ECB
model for S/HMO and other IIRisk ll members enrolled under
capitated contracts between HCFA and HMOs.
Capitation was allowed for HMOs by Congressional policy
when it passed prospective payment legislation in the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982. Prior
to 1982 , an operationalized model for the TEFRA legislation
was implemented in 1980 by the CHR as a Medicare
Demonstration Project known as Medicare Plus. That project
terminated in December 1984. The research sequel was S/HMO ,
called Medicare Plus II (Plus II) , which began in April 1985
and it included the ECB , which had not been operationalized
anywhere in the nation , before then. Plus II has had tw。
extensions , currently running until 1995.
Kaiser Permanent (KP) , Northwest Region , contracted
with HCFA to enroll new Medicare and convert existing
Medicare members , including those from the 1980-84
Demonstration Project , into TEFRA defined capitated
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contracts beginning in April , 1985. These KP enrollees are
identified as Risk or Medicare Plus members in this study.
Some aspects of the ECB are discussed next because they
are central to understanding the differences between Risk
and S/HMO eligibility status of Medicare beneficiaries in
this study. S/HMO member rCF use rates are compared to Risk
group member baseline rCF use rate and expenditure data , in
。rder to determine if differences exist. The conceptual
notion in this study is that the ECB can be expected t。
correlate with differences in rCF use rates , if there is a
difference in such use rates. The research task is t。
determine if there are differences and if so , to establish
patterns of differences between the baseline and trial
groups.
One essential component to the S/HMO ECB is case
coordination , or case management , of S/HMO members at high
risk of needing LTC services covered by the ECB. Several
methods were/are used to identify such members.
Upon enrollment in S/HMO, and annually thereafter,
questionnaire data was obtained from each S/HMO member
asking for a self assessment of their health status ,
dependency requirements , and other socio-economic and
demographic information. ADL criteria were used to screen
S/HMO members into levels of need for LTC services , similar
to those adopted by the State of Oregon for categorizing
Medicaid applicant ’ s social and health dependency status. N。
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means tests are administered , under any circumstances , t。
S/HMO members. If the initial screen qualified them for LTC ,
a second evaluation was done using a Comprehensive
Assessment F’。rm (CAF) to establish an initial member care
plan.
That is , if a S/HMO member met the LTC high risk
criteria , they were assigned to a case coordinator wh。
managed the ECB thereafter , using a computer based r응cord of
their needs , ECB services arranged , and measure of changes
in status under the care plan goals. Non-CHR staff m없!bers
did hospital , HHA and SNF utilization review regarding S/HMO
member entitlement services , just as they did with other KP
Risk members. Oversight was the responsibility of S/HMO
staff for services not covered by Medicare Parts A, B or
basic supplemental benefits. Coordination of ECB and
entitlement benefits was a joint responsibility of CHR and
。ther KP staff.
S/HMO members who met the qualifying criteria for
receiving LTC were offered a range of benefit options and
the choice was negotiated by the case coordinator. A monthly
expenditure cap was established, although it could be
exceeded, with senior management approval. Not all nursing
home eligible clients chose to receive services at the time
。ffered because they had and preferred to use their informal
support networks. [33]
In addition to the screening system just described ,
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。ther KP staff participated in identification of s/HMO
members who qualified for ECB services. Physicians or other
licensed care givers notified the case coordinator when thee
admitted a s/HMO member to the hospital , or to the KP Home
Health Agency , or an SNF’, rCF or other care location which
they facilitated , even if that member had not be identified
as qualifying for ECB services. Upon such notice the case
coordinator initiated the initial screen and if appropriate
a CAF assessment and care plan was implemented.
There is considerable integration of skilled
medical system services with paraprofessional or
long-term care types of services: 37홈 。f persons
eligible for ECB services had some care charged
to their Medicare benefit. Medicare accounts for
about one-fifth (21훌) of reported costs. The
level of Medicare involvement in nursing home
service packages indicates that even the limited
short-term nursing home benefit available under
SHMO ’ s expanded care contributes significantly t。
the ability to serve this population. A study of
data from Kaiser Permanente SHMO site found that
58훌 。f nursing home admission under the expanded
care benefit were fore convalescence or respite
and designed to keep patients in the community or
prepare them for return to the community after
hospital admission ... The case manager coordinates
and utilizes the informal care giving that is
available [by integrating medical and formal care
services]. When a patient has no informal
supports , more formal services in the home may be
needed ... the last resort is nursing home
placement. SHMO data indicates that only 12홈 。r
the total [S/HMO] membership had no informal
support system ...To date , SHMO experience
indicates that function- ally disabled and
medically complex geriatric patients can be
maintained for long periods in their own homes ,
even when their informal support systems are not
strong. [34]
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Strong motivation existed for early identification of ,
and follow-up intervention by case management for , S/HMO
members meeting ECB criteria , because HCFA reimburses the
HMO at 100훌 。f the institutional capitation rate for all
S/HMO members determined to be in high risk status.
。therwise， capitated rates are 95홈 。f the Average Adjusted
Per Capita Cost for the county of residence of the members ,
under the TEFRA HMO contracts.
What is missing from these reports , regarding rCF’ care
used , is whether use rates and expenditures were different
for S/HMO members than for other Medicare beneficiaries and
especially those under capitated TEFRA HMO contracts. That
is the contribution of this dissertation study.
What is not included, however , is whether Risk members
paid more , the same or less out-of-pocket costs than S/HMO
members , for formal home-based care giver services and
whether the combined rCF (and AFC , RCF or convalescent
facility) and in-home formal care expenses were different
for Risk members than for S/HMO members. This latter
consideration is recommended as a future research project.
The next chapter presents conceptual and operational
issues relevant to the debate about whether and how t。
provide long-term care benefits to the elderly population.
CHAPTER II
POLICY ISSUES ADDRESSED BY THIS STUDY
As we brace ourselves societally for increased
demand for health care due to increases in the
elderly population , it becomes more important ,
in fact critically important , to search for
better ways to provide hospital care , physician
care , and long-term care. [35]
There are several policy issues which give rise to the
research questions asked in this study. The overarching
policy concept addressed by this study is , to what extent
will increasing requirements for chronic care be met by
private insurance , or joint public and private insurance
programs , which expand Medicare linked supplemental benefits
to include long-term services?
In recent years a variety of solutions to this policy
problem have been proposed, such as that set forth by the
1990 Pepper Commission. But , uncertainty remains about many
aspects of such solutions , such as whether or how to place
the burden of initial costs for institutional long-term care
(LTC) on the private domain or on public financing programs ,
and how should the burden of costs be shared for those
unfortunate few who become very long-stay long term care
nursing home residents.
Policy solution options include expanding entitlement
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benefits , or creating public programs which encourage
intended to motivate and assist informal care givers with
care-giver tasks necessary to maintain a chronically ill ,
severely dependent , frail elderly person at horne. The
complexities of policy decisions regarding this policy
problem are extant.
Uncertainty about interaction between policy decisions
regarding formal , and especially institutional long-term
care and policy decisions regarding informal home-based
care , is central to the debate about solving the overall
policy problem of very limited entitlements for America ’ g
elderly regarding the continuum of services needed by
chronically ill and severely disabled dependent persons ,
most of whom are at the end of their life cycle.
The growing public support for a wide variety of
alternatives to institutionalization indicates
that the initial policy issue is not whether home
health services are less costly, but how these
services should be organized and financed for
maximum efficiency and effectiveness. Whether a
shift in medical care utilization patterns can be
accomplished, thus reducing need for nursing home
beds , remains to be seen. [36]
Several trial programs , such as the Channeling
Demonstration Project and On Lok , have been conducted which
experiment with a variety of options to determine whether
community-based programs defer or prevent institutionalizing
chronically ill and dependent elderly. Some have assessed
the apparent cost effectiveness of case management t。
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coordinate community services with other levels of care.
Most have resulted in better care of elderly patients and
better understanding of how to provide these services , but
have not been encouraging from a cost effectiveness
standpoint. [37]
One demonstration project , known as the Social Health
Maintenance Organization, or Social/HMO (S/HMO) has enlarged
。n the knowledge base from other demonstration projects and
applied managed-care procedures to long-term care , which
were developed for integrating acute care , home health
agency , SNF’ and ambulatory services. Thus , integrating
chronic care services into existing managed care practices
for members enrolled under capitation contracts with HCFA ,
and other purchasers of HMO benefits , has brought something
to the policy solution which others did not.
Specifically, the S/HMO is able to interact with all
components of a comprehensive health care system to arrange
services , covered by the member ’ s benefits , in a cost
efficient way while adapting those services to the member ’ g
needs. S/HMO addresses the overarching policy question by
expanding existing capitated HMO benefits to encompass
various forms of home and community-based services , allowing
for short-stay (100 days) nursing home care , beyond Medicare
SNF entitlements , including Intermediate Care Facility (ICF)
stays. Long-term stay nursing home care is not covered.
The S/HMO Expanded Care Benefit (ECB) is case managed
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and includes an on-going process of actively identifying
frail elderly , from among the S/HMO membership , who may
qualify for nursing home care , and therefore the ECB , as
determined by standard , comprehensive assessments of their
dependency based on dysfunction in activities of daily
living. Members who qualify for nursing home care are
further assessed for family or other network capacity t。
support the elderly member ’ s needs and a plan is negotiated
to arrange for supplementary services required , if any for
home based maintenance and health services. [38]
Is the S/HMO Demonstration able to produce outcomes
which differ from other projects? Most projects have led t。
increased use of formal services for community-based care
without significantly decreasing institutional care , and at
a significantly greater cost. Their use of a LTC benefit may
have differed , somewhat from the way S/HMO conceptualized
the use of an ECB.
Specifically, the targeted use of the S/HMO ECB is t。
help functionally impaired members remain in a home
environment , who otherwise might not succeed at that without
the availability of formal care givers to provide community-
based personal anddomestic services essential to remaining
at home , in addition to skilled provider care. Such services
do not have to be tied to an episode of illness to qualify
for them. Of course , many many persons wh。 만ualify for the
ECB also required hospital and other entitlement covered
44
benefits. Decisions are made by case managers regarding
allocation of Expanded Care Benefits between community-based
services rendered in the home care and non-Medicare covered
institutional chronic care services.
The [S/HMO] goal was to stimulate members t。
utilize their existing informal care network s。
that they could remain in their own homes and
avoid nursing home placements as long as
possible ... this benefit was designed to serve
。nly the more severely impaired portion of the
population... Since this benefit is renewable as
long as the patient continues to be eligible for
services and remains at home ... the combined
annual maximum is $12 , 000 [less 10% copayment]
and the SNF/ICF coverage is not renewable in a
calendar year unless the member has been out of
an institution for 60 days ... The community-based
services often support the member ’ s primary
caregiver and provide needed respite ... In this
way , an important goal of supporting the informal
care system rather than replacing it with formal
services is achieved. (Op. Cit. [38] , p. 12)
The applied research question , targeted by this
dissertation study , asks whether S/HMO members who qualified
for the ECB used more or less ICF services than might have
been expected had they not had an ECB? It also acknowledged
that there may not be any difference.
If the research outcome was that fewer ICF services
were used by S/HMO than Risk members , it could be inferred
that S/HMO ECB was a force leading to diminished use of ICF’
services due , at least in part because formal , community-
based care deferred or prevented the need for ICF Care.
If the research outcome was that more ICF services were
used by S/HMO than Risk members , it could be inferred that
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S/HMO ECB was a force contributing to increased use of ICF
services while expanding home-based care options.
If no meaningful differences were observed in ICF use
than it could be inferred that little interaction existed
between community-based care programs and ICF care
requirements.
Any of these findings would also serve as directional
information for use in hypothesis-based tests needed for
further confirmation of findings from descriptive research
which this study is intended to accomplish.
Numerous applied research questions follow from this
。perational concept of integrating a chronic care benefit
with other HMO services. Those of interest in this study
were published in 1988 (Op. Cit. [36] , pp. 62-63) as well as
in more recent literature by referenced authors. They are
rephrased into the following policy issues. If the ECB goal
。f stimulating members to use existing informal care-giver
networks was attained , did it also reduce use of ICF
services? If the goal of supporting informal care givers
through ICF respite care was effective , did that affect ICF
rates? If the goal to defer long-term nursing home stays was
met , did it reduce expenditures for nursing home care? If
increase use of community-based care was stimulated by ECB ,
did it reduce the likelihood of becoming a welfare dependent
nursing home resident? Was it likely that a residual effect
。f the S/HMO ECB was to reduce Medicaid costs for S/HMO
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members?
Although data regarding ICF’ care was reported so long
as it was covered by the ECB , such data was not maintained
after a member consumed their ECB. Conceptually, there were
dichotomous outcomes for ICF rates and little agreement
existed among S/HMO staff about which outcome was most
likely. If the incentives of the ECB were effective it could
eliminate those enabled to remain at home , thus leaving
those with no option as long-term permanent nursing home
residents. That could push days-used rates higher. If the
benefit worked ideally , few members would use ICFs other
than as a respite for informal care givers.
The role of ICF services under the S/HMO chronic care
benefit concept was not clear. This study provides some
descriptive information intended to help clarify that role.
This study addresses a few policy issues raised in the
literature about the likelihood that the S/HMO Expanded Care
Benefit influences member use of ICFs in a way that would
not occur in the absence of an ECB.
One of these issues is related to the S/HMO policy
。bjective to keep disabled and dependent elderly at home.
Another is related to possible effects of S/HMO policy on
short-stay and long-stay or permanent placements in ICFs.
"It can be posited that one reason for including ICF’
coverage within a community-based services program is t。
provide an additional resource to help people stay in their
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。wn home." [39] Information was presented at that time
(1988) which supported that notion.
[However] ... the proportion of expanded care
benefit costs consumed by ICF care is not
insignificant , even though most of the members
served are served in their own homes ... The
。bserved pattern of use of institutional LTC
contrasts sharply with the patterns observed from
national data regarding individuals not in SHMOs.
The pattern displays more frequent short-stay
admissions to nursing homes , and probably less
frequent permanent placements ...About half of the
institutional admissions were discharged to their
homes and another 47 died while in the
institution. Only 66 of the discharges were
assessed as resulting in relatively permanent
placement placement. What remains to be analyzed
is the relative cost of care in those different
groups~ (Op. Cit. [39] , p. 20)
No data was available about non-S/HMO captitated Risk
HMO member patterns of ICF use , against which to compare
S/HMO patterns , reported above. This research issue is
addressed by this dissertation study.
Although different admission patterns of long and short
stay patients were reported , neither cumulative days of stay
nor costs were reported. This study describes days of stay
differences including proportions of long- and short-stay ,
and puts these observations into relative context by
comparing S/HMO rates with a meaningful baseline (Risk) ,
which until now has not been done. This pattern of long and
short stay is reported elsewhere in the literature.
Nursing homes in the united States and Australia
both served two different groups of persons and
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each group had a distinctive utilization pattern.
The larger group consisted of persons who enter
and leave within a short time (70훌 within one year)
using a smaller proportion of nursing home days.
The other group was made up of persons who remained
for an extended period (until they died or were
near death) and used a larger proportion of nursing
home days ... short-stayers constituted 58% of
nursing home admissions ... long stayers constituted
42훌 ••• the average length of stay for short stayers
was 1.8 months , and they were generally discharged
within a year. On the other hand , the average
length of stay for long-stayers was 2.5 years. [The
above stay patterns are for SNF and IeF residents ,
however] ... 98훌 。f Medicare covered [SNF] persons
left within one month ... The two main
characteristics of long-stay nursing home residents
were mental deterioration and Medicaid coverage.
The long-stay residents probably remained in a
nursing home because they could no longer sustain
themselves in the community. The Medicaid coverage
could have been the reason for or the consequence
。f their long stay. [40]
This issue has important implications for policy
formulation regarding long-term care benefits. Terms of
debate about the most efficacious but affordable solution t。
spend-down , and reduction of Medicaid costs , center around
this phenomenon of short-stay and long-stay nursing home
patterns. The central policy notion is that the private
domain cannot easily insure against long term stay costs ,
but who should insure against front-end costs , and for what
。bjectives is at issue. If traditional insurance methods are
used it obviates the role of government in holding down
escalating prices covered by first-dollar and co-pay money.
"In fact , in the absence of strong regulations , the
incentives in a front-end benefit private market would
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encourage rather superficial home-care benefits and the
diversion of expensive expensive home-care beneficiaries t。
nursing homes." [411
Cost comparisons between Risk and S/HMO are limited t。
those for nursing home revenues. Data , needed to include
comparison of community-based care for both long-and short-
stay groups , was not obtained, nor was such data for Risk
members. The original intention of this study was t。
partially fulfill that objective by comparing
community-based care cost differences for Risk and S/HMO wh。
became recipients of Medicaid funds following ICF stay, in
addition to ICF’ and SNF’ care costs.
However , the policy issue regarding differences in
Medicaid expenditures is partially addressed. That issue was
raised but not answered in prior literature on S/HMO , at
least in a relative sense , where S/HMO is compared to a
baseline of community experience. In this case , that
baseline is the Risk group of KP members studied.
Presumably, capitated Risk members would provide the
ideal baseline against which to measure S/HMO rates if ICF
use , since Risk members had nearly all benefits of S/HMO
members except ECB , and some enhanced drug benefits. T。
answer the above questions , use rates/expenditures for S/HMO
members are compared with those for Risk HMO members. Rates
are also used to answer research questions raised about
whether the S/HMO concept offers new hope for ameliorating
prospects of spend-down and dependency on Medicaid as the
inale of one ’ s lifetime experiences.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Designing a randomized experiment should never
preclude the simultaneous design of fallback
quasi-experiments which will use the same data
base as the randomized experiment. Measures
should be collected that will improve our
inevitably partial understanding of any selection
process which results because the random
assignment has broken down. [42]
The research methodology experience of this study is ,
in many ways , as important as observations produced and
conclusions drawn. This is so , because such large scale
research is complex , opportunities for making costly errors
abound , and project management concepts which have been
tested and debugged may contribute as much to successes of
future studies as use of statistical procedures which
correctly infer findings.
Project management problems were encountered from start
to finish in this project; the way in which these problems
were addressed contributes to development of planning
recommendations for future research projects which could
build on data used for this study.
Lack of large project research experience by this
investigator resulted in less than full understanding of
these research methodology and project management problems.
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SETTING LIMITS ON THE RESEARCH PLAN FOR THIS STUDY
This study collects baseline data on nursing home use
rates and patient revenues which are used to produce
descriptive information needed for performing exploratory
analysis of differences between Risk and S/HMO Medicare
member use of ICF services , during the study period.
Observed differences , if any , and related analysis are used
to formulate tentative policy recommendations about
advancing the S/HMO-ECB concept as an effective and widely
affordable method for protecting elderly persons against
asset depletion caused by front-end expenses for formal LTC
services. Such recommendations require further , confirmatory
research as justification for adopting legislation and/or
committing private organization resources which embrace
S/HMO as part of a new national policy on LTC. This is a
descriptive study limited to hypotheses generating findings.
Hypothesis testing with inferential statistics could
result in more meaningful if not generalizable statements
about possible causal relationships between ECBs and IeF use
rates/expenditure rates. But , baseline data about Risk
member use of ICF was unavailable for comparison with S/HMO
member use of ICFs.
S/HMO nursing home data is juxtaposed with Risk member
nursing home data because the latter represents how
capitated HMO members resolve LTC needs in the absence of
LTC insurance or an ECB , beyond what entitlements and
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Medicare Supplemental benefits provide. This points out tw。
assumptions in this study. First , it is presumed that S/HMO
member overall use of ICFs would be similar to that of Risk ,
if they were enrolled as Risk members. That presumes they
come from the same population as Risk members , relative t。
descriptive parameters which might affect ICF use. Second ,
this study presumes that if S/HMO member use of ICFs is
substantially different from that of Risk , then having an
ECB and associated managed care processes must influence
member ’ s decisions sufficiently to alter how ICF services
are used.
These assumptions , in the context of policy issues
discussed in Chapters I and II lead to a series of research
questions , presented next. They also underscore the
underlying reason why this study is exploratory in nature:
there is no basis on which to hypothesize that S/HMO use
rates are different from those of Risk members because there
was no baseline data available for the latter. The research
plan for this study did not assume that S/HMO rates were
different than those for Risk. Such assumptions would have
been required for hypothesis testing procedures. As tw。
biostatisticians at Stanford University have recommended:
Researchers should be encouraged to realize that
。ne does not go to trial until considerable
preliminary evidence is in hand , much of it is
quantitative in nature. Extensive exploratory
data analysis and meta-analysis on related issues
prior to going to trial are essential to plan
effective strategy and to define a critical
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effect size. Statistical hypothesis testing is
。ften premature , done at a stage when cost-
effective planning is not possible. [43]
Thus , production of such baseline data for use in
developing such models is an important research task of this
study. This chapter reviews the research methodology used t。
carry out the tasks of research in this study. The flow of
this lengthy discussion is organized into steps (one though
nine) , which are underlined to denote successive stages in
the research plan use to accomplish this study. An original
。bjective of this descriptive study was to identify ways t。
。rganize and use the extensive information needed for this
kind of research project.
The first step in the research plan of this study was
to clarify the conceptual framework of policy issues , and
the policy problem addressed by S/aMO , from which research
questions in this study are derived.
The second step in the research plan was to establish
exactly what research questions needed to be answered in
。rder to expand on knowledge about S/aMO as a suitable
policy solution for the problem(s) identified. One
established, those questions would guide development of the
research plan and ensuing research methodology.
Six research questions were selected from policy issues
discussed in Chapters I and II They are:
Research Question I: Are there differences between Cost ,
Risk , and S/aMO eligibility groups regarding the number of
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ICF’ residents per 1000 research population members during
the study period?
Research Question II: Are there differences between S/HMO
and Risk member ICF days in residence during the study
period per member year of eligibility?
Research Question III: Are there differences between S/HMO
and Risk members regarding the means of total payments
received by all nursing homes in which each resident lived
for all periods of stay before , during , and after the study
period through June , 1989 , per 1000 study period members?
Research Question IV: Are There Differences Between S/HMO
and Risk Research Population Members Regarding the
Probability Of Receiving Medicaid Funds To Pay Nursing Home
Bills?
Research Question V: Are There Differences In the Proportion
。f S/HMO and Risk Members Who Were ICF Residents During the
Study Period , Who Also Were Medicaid Recipients Within One
Year Following The Study Period?
Research Question VI: Are there differences in Medicaid
payments received by nursing homes for members residing in
ICFs during the study period per 1000 research population
members?
In respective Research Questions I-III , the dependent
variables are: number of ICF residents in the study period;
number of ICF days in the study period; total payments
(dollars) received by nursing homes before , during and after
the study period, through June , 1988 for members in ICFs
during the study period.
Step three of the Research Plan required determination
。f the study period because that would identify the research
population data for whom historic data would be needed. The
study period of nursing home utilization selected was July
1 , 1986 through June 30 , 1988. Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled during one or more days of that time span , and wh。
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met other criteria defined below , constitute the universe
for this study , hereafter called the research population.
The decision to choosing a twenty-four month study
period was made upon reviewing several organizational and
。perational issues discussed next. Organizational issues
involved policy changes affecting membership size and use of
the Expanded Care Benefit for ICF services.
If the study period started too soon after March , 1985 ,
then neither Risk nor S/HMO members would have had time t。
develop patterns of nur홉ing home use which might be
influenced by their HMO eligibility status. Start-up began
after March , 1985 , for both TEFRA Medicare capitation Risk
contracts and S/HMO Medicare Demonstration Project. By July,
1986 , results of initial marketing efforts for new S/HMO
members was mostly completed, as was initial conversion of
Cost members to Risk or S/HMO status. The research
methodology problem , posed by this unstable period of
eligibility status , was whether the high proportion of Cost
conversions to Risk status in some way biased use rates. A
method of analysis was developed to consider that matter ,
discussed later.
One organizational decision affecting selection of the
study period was that after July , 1988 , S/l쩌o marketing was
expanded beyond Mu1tnomah County to include Washington and
Clackamas Counties. This would have increased the number of
potential nursing homes from which data must be gathered. It
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would have increased the size of the research population
substantially without an immediate corresponding increase in
S/HMO members use of ICFs , thus producing a confounding
relationship between rate numerator and denominator.
Another organizational issue related to policy changes
regarding use of chronic care benefit of 100 days of
coverage beyond the Medicare Part A and Supplemental Benefit
Plan) for ICF and SNP’ care , which could influence use rates
for S/HMO members. Beginning in July , 1988 , a succession of
limits were implemented by S/HMO , regarding the extent t。
which the S/HMO Expanded Care Benefit could be used for
payment of nursing home expenses. These were needed t。
emphasize the S/HMO objective regarding use of ECB funds ,
which was for home and community based LTC services
principally and to avoid , if possible , reliance on ICF
services to compensate for a member ’ s loss of capacity t。
function independently. In January of 1989 , use of ECB for
SNF and ICF services was substantially restricted , compared
to the uses of ECB during the study period. These issues led
to selection of July 1 , 1988 for a study period ending date.
Such policy changes also reflected an important dimension of
KP ’ s organizational objective for the S/HMO program.
Medicare Plus II made a conscious decision t。
adhere to strict eligibility criteria [regarding
nursing home certification (NHC)] , a decision
that was guided by the demonstration site ’ s
principal focus , learning , to underwrite a long
term care benefit ... [Also] During the first tw。
years of the demonstration , there was a loophole
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in Oregon ’ s NHC criteria which qualified a person
as NHC if helshe was incontinent , but was
。therwise functionally independent and healthy.
In January 1987 , at HCFA ’ s request , the NHC
criteria were revised to be consistent with the
State ’ s (Oregon) new interpretation of the
incontinence criterion. [44]
An operational issue influenced when to commence the
study period. Some time was needed for the case manager
process to become an established and effective component of
the S/HMO program. At the same time , KP expanded its use of
geriatric nurse practitioners to make nursing home site
visits for level-of-care recertification on all members. By
mid-1986 , they performing routine patient assessment and
updating orders for all ICF patient care in Multnomah
County , sometimes on a monthly basis , or quarterly.
Although Risk patients were not case managed , the nurse
practitioner program assured that both Risk and S/HMO
members in ICFs and SNF’s in Multnomah county were closely
monitored for appropriateness of utilization. This suggests
that utilization review differences could be ruled out as a
likely cause of differences in use rates between Risk and
S/HMO , if differences were found to exist.
Given the above considerations , the two year study
period selected seemed to offer the best opportunity t。
measure whether differences occurred in the use of ICF
services between S/HMO and Risk members , because S/HMO
members had a relatively high freedom of choice to select
nursing homes as a location for satisfying their LTC service
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needs , during that time. Once the research population was
defined , then sampling estimates could be undertaken.
Thus , the fourth step in the research plan involved
selection of residents needed to answer Research Questions I
and II. The research proposal presumed that random , or
stratified random sampling would be used to carry out that
process. Estimating sample size required knowing or having a
basis for estimating variation of the parameter values.
Variance in days in nursing home , or mean lengths of stay ,
was not known for the Risk Group.
The adequacy of existing information to properly
estimate variability in mean LOS for Risk members in IeF’s ,
and therefore sample size , was in doubt. Data regarding
national studies of nursing home use , which were published
by 1989 , when this study was operationalized , did not seem
to fit state of Oregon experience. State of Oregon nursing
home survey data was not based on information needed t。
establish reliable LOS parameters. Therefore , a combination
。f estimates were developed using models which were being
produce and published for the first in 1988. A brief summary
。f method used and results is presented. A comprehensive
discussion in available in Appendix B.
A sample size was estimated from information extracted
from the literature. But , this involved much uncertainty
about what variability in days of stay should be used t。
estimate sample size. Such variability also would determine
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the amount of difference between the mean LOS for the tw。
groups that needed to be identified in order to determine
that their difference was significant.
Based on national data , mean days of nursing home stay
ranged from 1.5 to 2.5 years depending on the source and
location. Considerable information is now available on the
effects of relatively small numbers of long stay residents
。n the mean of shorter stay patients which , by far , comprise
the largest portion of ICF’ residents. It was not available
in 1989. Of course the maximum variability allowed was 730
days , due to censoring caused by the study period. In fact ,
a small proportion of ICF’ residents used close to 730 days.
Assistance was obtained from Center for Health Research
biostatisticians , in making some of the computations needed
for sample size estimates but the variability used in that
process was based on this investigators interpretation of
the literature.
Computations about variability were performed based on
the Ravlin and Weiner model (1988) , shown in the Appendix B.
These computations were done by age cohorts. The computed
variability in days of stay in a nursing home was used t。
estimate sample size required in each age cohort cell for
Risk (Medicare Plus) residents estimated to be in ICFs.
These estimates are for Research Question II.
At .90 power to detect a difference of 180 days between
Mean LOS , and an alpha level of .05 , for age cohort 65-74 ,
the sample size estimate for Risk residents was 313;
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At .80 power to detect a difference of 180 days between
Mean LOS , and an alpha level of .05 , for age cohort 65-74 ,
the sample size estimate for Risk residents was 176;
At .80 power to detect a difference of 180 days between
Mean LOS , and an alpha level of .10 , for age cohort 65-74 ,
the sample size estimate for Risk residents was 138;
The above sample size estimates were done by age
cohort , as indicated. When sample sized for age cohort 65-74
were compared to the estimated number of KP Risk Medicare
ICF’ residents in Multnomah County , (see Appendix B). It was
apparent that insufficient nursing home residents were
available from which to select a random sample of the size
needed. Even if taken collectively for the three years ,
{75+65+72-212} , it appeared that at .80 power and an alpha
level of .10 that a 65 percent sample of residents was
needed; if an alpha of .05 was used , an 83 percent sample
was needed. At .90 power and an alpha of .05 , only 2/3 the
estimated sample residents needed were available.
One overall estimate indicated that 2 , 864 sample IeF’
residents was needed. Other overall sample estimates were
done based on being able to detect a difference of 20 days
between group mean LOS. F’。r an aSYmmetrical distribution , a
sample size of 3300 was required. For a normal distribution ,
a sample 훌ize of 2000 was needed; normality could not be
assumed in this study. Thus , 3300 nursing home residents was
even larger than the high estimate done using the Ravlin and
Weiner based estimate model (Appendix B, high - 2438 , low -
1625). It was so much larger than Appendix B that the notion
62
。f doing a study based on random sample design was
abandoned. The decision to forego random sampling was solely
that of this investigator , and not others at CHR.
Therefore , the research methodology in this study is
not based on inferential statistics. Some F tests are used
to suggest where differences in means is statistically
significant , in Chapters VII and VIII but the hypothetical
population suggested by doing such tests is simply
conceptualized as KP capitated Medicare members , generally.
As it turned out , there were 395 Risk Medicare ICF
residents in the overall data set. That was about what was
required for the total Risk sample at .80 power at an alpha
level of .10. There were 820 unique persons in ICFs during
the study period. That was about one-half of the low Ravlin
and Weiner estimate. The total SNF+ICF unique persons was
1160 , or about 2/3 of the low R & W estimate. It was close
to the estimate in Appendix B. It is worth noting that
benchmark studies in this area by Liu and Manton , used
samples of over 6500 nursing home residents.
In retrospect , the variance selected for use in
estimating sample size , and factor (difference in days in an
IeF’ between groups) of detectability between means (6
months) were both inappropriate. While it is true that
potential variance was the maximum of the study period days
(730) , the problem would have been resolved by focusing on
the shorter-stay IeF residents. This is recommended for
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future studies.
The research methodology problem is that to detect the
small amount of difference in days used , between Risk and
S/HMO , requires a large sample. Using only shorter stay
members , for example only those with one year or fewer days ,
would facilitate answers to Research questions I , II and
III. That is , since the S/HMO ECB benefit cannot cover a
protracted time period , only those with one year of stay or
less , could be done. This presumes having LOS data in the
data base used for sample selection. Persons selected in the
random sample whose days of stay exceeded one year could be
set aside and replacing by accepted replacement sampling
techniques. This may require drawing a number larger than
the sample estimate. Appendix B includes estimates of ICF
stays by proportional rates derived from a lifetime use
formula published by Meiners and Trapnell , [45] and developed
further by Rivlen and Wiener. [46]
In reality , another sample size issue existed for the
three Research Questions , IV-VI , in that the number of Risk
members likely to spend-down to Medicaid status was not
documented , and information about S/HMO member expenditures
known to spend down was unknown.
Here , variability of the response variable , time t。
spend- down , was noted in the literature as being one year
。r less. But , that included SNF care as well , and a sizable
number of ICF residents in this study did not reside in
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SNFs. The measure of variability for days to spend-down was
confused by a longer time span than the study period
including dates beginning with the advent of S/HMO and Risk
(4/85) through June , 1989 , when data was collected.
This study increased the level of appreciation about
advice by one author on estimating variability for sampling
in support of inferential testing:
In general , the more variability present in the
response variable , the more difficult it becomes
to answer a particular research question , such as
whether two drugs are equivalent. Thus , as
variability increases , the sample size must be
increased to enable you to draw an inference
about an entire population of response
variables. [47]
Since data collection , based on random sample
estimates , was abandoned , a decision was made to pursue the
study on the basis of obtaining and evaluating descriptively
population data and true nursing home data for that research
population. Thus , all utilization data was collected on all
KP members residing in all SNF’ 。r ICF institutions in
Multnomah County during the study period , provided they were
age 65 or more by July , 1988.
Later , an indirect test was made to determine the
likelihood that all KP residents of Multnomah County ,
identified by zip code , who were in SNF or ICF locations
during the study period , where in these 48 nursing homes.
This was done by running data from the current KP "KARE ’l
data base files on nursing home residents , implemented in
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1990 and loaded with all data by the end of that year , t。
determine how many of these residents were in nursing homes
。utside of Multnomah County. Approximately five percent were
located in facilities in Washington , Clackamas or Clark
counties. There were no operational changes to suggest that
more than 5 percent of the residents identified in this
dissertation study were located outside of the 48 facilities
from which data was obtained in Multnomah County.
。ther studies , performed by experienced investigators ,
have found major research methodology problems when working
with nursing home sample data. Such reports are recently
published , as discussed next.
The 1985 National Nursing Home Survey data was flawed
seriously by sampling problems. That study was done by the
National Center For Health Statistics , but not published
until March , 1990. In 1992 corrections were published
because threats to the validity of sampling estimates
confounded the published values. This was caused by survey
questionaire misuse by nursing homes. Also , sampling
problems were related to sample design which failed t。
relate correctly to the stated research objectives. Sample
estimates of days used in the 1985 NNHS were erroneous.
Information was collected on discharged events
rather than discharged residents. [In addition ,
This was compounded by repeated selection of
sampled residents due to failure to account for
multiple facility admissions and due tol
variation across facilities as to how stays are
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defined. [The NCHS warns about nursing home
survey samples as follows:] Construction of
length of stay estimates is complicated in
surveys such as the NNHS , which use facility
based definitions of a nursing home stay as the
sampling frame for current and discharged
residents. It is necessary to consider a
resident ’ s entire pattern of nursing home usage ,
including multiple nursing home stays and
intervening hospital utilization , in calculating
length of stay. [48]
This NCHS warning surfaced problems similar to those
identified during step five in the research plan , which was
the data collection phase. After making the decision t。
collect data on all possible KP Medicare members residing in
all SNF’ and ICFs in Multnomah County during the study
period , work was began in improving the lists of names on
hand from records used to reimburse KP physicians for such
nursing home visits.
Three years of monthly lists were key punched and
converted to a summary of unique members at each facility.
Monthly lists were valuable because it demonstrated to those
nursing home administrators who opted to have their staffs
provide requested data , that the task was limited. That is ,
not all records had to be reviewed. This assumption was in
error. As valuable as they were , it was discovered that as
much as 10 percent of listings either listed person who were
not KP members during the study period, or failed to list
such persons. Some physicians made visits without claiming
reimbursement.
Over 75 percent of the data was collected personally by
67
this investigator during initial site visits. Among those
facilities preferring to assemble the data , it was necessary
to review and redo much or their work , including a review of
all records for all residents during the two year study
period. The greatest problem with facility staff work
involved definitional differences between facilities about
discharges vs transfers to the hospital and back. Also ,
discharges between levels of care was often complicated by
intervening hospital stays , and failure to correctly record
discharges. The data collection forms and instructions were
tested at two nursing homes in advance of use.
Great attention to validation of dates , in this study ,
assured high reliability of data concerning cumulative days
in residence by level of care for all nursing homes used by
each resident. Some residents were readmitted up to 10 times
during the 24 months.
Another problem encountered which future research may
consider is the complexity of finding historic business
records of nursing homes. Frequent change of ownership is a
problem commonly understood to exist among proprietary
nursing homes. Owners are not required by law to leave
business documents , other than registers of admission and
discharge , after transfer of ownership. The law does require
that medical records be left at a facility. As a result , it
was necessary to track down several prior owners and obtain
permission to go to off-site storage locations where such
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documents were kept , presumably for audit and tax purposes.
Another complexity of procuring business records
relates to corporate ownership for non-profit and for-profit
。rganizations. Some facilities do not store historic
documents on-site but rely on , or are required by , central
business offices to receive input , process and return it , as
needed , and store it. Thus , in some cases , it was necessary
for the facility to retrieve computerized historic records.
In several instances , that cost either the facility or the
investigator a not-so-nominal fee.
In those cases where business records could not be
。btained for all dates of residence , generally for long stay
residents , it was necessary to compute the amount of funds
received by the nursing home. This was accomplished by use
。f files to which access was granted in 1991 by the Medicaid
Audit Department , Senior and Disabled Services Division ,
State of Oregon , for research purposes only. They contain
data regarding operating costs by year as well as Medicaid
reimbursement rates allowed by year. Days of stay were
multiplied by operating cost and Medicaid rates. Such
documents are filed at CHR where they can be treated by the
confidentiality standards which apply to research involving
human subjects research.
Documentation of admission and discharge dates was not
always clear in business records of some nursing homes. It
was necessary to obtain facility permission to extract such
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data from patient care records. In some cases that was done
by facil土 ty personnel where confidentiality issues were a
matter of concern.
Age eligible Medicare status need not have preceded the
member's admission to a nursing home , since days of Cost ,
Risk or S/HMO eligibility commenced with Medicare status ,
which allowed censoring of nursing home days which preceded
。r succeeded initial and terminal eligibility dates. Since
nursing home days were censored by study period dates , days
。f stay for long term residents admitted before age 65 , and
before the study period , were excluded from the analysis
rates. However , such data was collected , because it was
needed for identifying financial records.
If a suspected member resided in a nursing home during
the study period , data was collected from the beginning of
their first admission to the facility through the period of
June , 1989. Such data was used for post-study period
analysis of spend-down and Medicaid eligibility and
expenditures ends with that June , 1989.
Some other data collection issues are listed. Admission
and discharge dates were entered as identified by nursing
home records. A problem requiring hundreds of data entry
corrections resulted from both interfacility and
intrafacility transfers in which the discharge data and
readmission date were the same. This prevented separation of
time periods by programming language subtraction. Systematic
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modifications were made to either discharge date or
readmission date.
The preceding aspects of data collection took
considerably longer than projected in the original research
plan. It is essential to allow adequate time for data
collection involving such complexities. All 48 facilities
were prepared for this study by preliminary letters from
nursing home associations , the Center for Health Research ,
and Portland State University. Data collection packets were
provided and formally arranged meetings were conducted with
facility management.
Much negotiations was required since facilities do not
generally open records to investigation except when required
to do so by law. Access was generally , good , and resistance
was readily overcome when facility management learned that
this investigator was concurrently completing a six month
traineeship as a nursing home administrator , approved by the
Oregon Board of Examiners for Nursing Home Administrator
licensing. In instances where resistance was encountered ,
some contacts were made by KP visiting nurse practitioners
familiar to those facilities. Their presence made data
collection easier.
On site data collection from a large number of LTC
institutions under separate ownership or control involves
considerable research time , expense , experience , knowledge
and collaborative support.
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Survey collection forms were tested at two facilities
in advance of June , 1989 , though to be representative of the
48 sites. The first mistake this choice involved was t。
select one out-of-state site. Record keeping is conditioned
by state Medicaid auditing , a fact not fUlly appreciated at
the time. The second mistake was that two facilities were
selected because they were known to have good record keeping
practices from prior experience. The recommendation derived
from this experiences is that test sites include facilities
with the least developed business practices. Record keeping
practices at some facilities were inadequate , including some
under "chain" ownership.
Even though many issues arose in the data collection
phase of this study , the reliability of data collected is
good. It was not necessary to drop any residents from the
data set because minimum data was lacking or because it was
unacceptably incomplete.
Identification of KP members was assisted by a
preliminary list extracted from 48 monthly lists of nursing
home visits by KP recertification staff. In addition t。
looking for these persons , it was possible at most sites t。
scan admission and discharge registries for all persons
admitted , including other KP names. Such registries usually
include the location from which residents came or went ,
which helped with that identity.
The resulting data set of nursing home residents is
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summarized in Tables IV , V, VI , below. It is the residual of
1421 nursing home residents identified during data
collection whose data collection forms were key punched int。
a VMS support system and down-loaded to S1032 for initial
testing. Another 200 names were discarded because of
eligibility status , age , or zip code questions.
The fifth step in the research plan involves the
complicated task of clarifying the research population. This
activity was started at the same time as estimation of
sample size but delayed when random sampling was abandoned
as the basis for data collection. The final research
population comprise members with Multnomah County zip codes
who were age eligible Medicare beneficiaries during the
study period. Model A represents eligibility data for three
groups among which members moved during the study period ,
making these groups not mutually exclusive. The above
summary of research population eligibility groups is
presented because Models A and B are used in analysis of
data are throughout the rest of this study. Model B views
eligibly grouping in a different way , by identifying each
combination (seven) of the three eligibility groups in Model
A. Model B is shown in Table VI. Days of eligibility are
identified precisely for each of the 19 , 261 Subjects. Note:
Model A and Model B refer to methods of organizing the
research population into separate datasets for purposes of
analyzing the data.
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TABLE IV
NURSING HOME RESIDENTS IN SNF AND/OR ICF’
FACILITIES ONAT LEAST ONE DAY
。E’ THE STUDY PERIOD
IN THE OVERALL
DATA SET
(a)
Model A Model B
NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE I MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
NH Cost Risk S/HMO Tota11 Never SHMO Total
SHMO Sometime
S+I 260 564 390 1214 I 739 421 1160
SNF’ 114 269 182 565 I 351 204 555
ICF’ 186 395 287 868 517 303 820
S+I (42 ) (100) (79 ) (219) I (129) (86) (215)(b)
Research Population by eligibility groups above col ..
KP 6181 11525 6297 24003 12926 6335 19261
(a) S+I is the unique count of residents
(b) ( ) is the number in both SNF’ and ICF
TABLE V
NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE COUNT BY RESEARCH
POPULATION MEMBER ELIGIBILITY GROUPS
Cost members: 6 , 181
Risk members: 11 , 525
SHMO members: 6 , 297
Total:
Unique count of members:
Number in two or more groups:
뼈없-”%’
’-”
l
μ
H-4. Model A
Model B
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TABLE VI
THE SEVEN COMBINATIONS OF MODEL B CLUSTERED BY MEMBERS
WHO WERE WERE ’'NEVER S/HMO"
AND I’S/HMO SOMETIME"
Cost only
Cost+Risk
Risk Only
S/HMO Only
Cost+S/HMO
Risk+S/HMO
Cost+Risk+S/HMO
(C , C+R , R)
(S , C+S , R+S , C+R+S)
2321 (7 Eligibility Groups
4608 of Model B, Format B)
5997
2510
2517
874
434
19 , 261
12 , 926 (2 Clusters of Model B,
6 , 335 14’。rmat A)
19 , 261
Duration of eligibility in each status is important in
this study since it represents the time of exposure during
which nursing home admission may occur while enrolled in
Cost or Risk of S/HMO.
Among Risk members , 39훌 。f the 11 , 525 enrollees were
eligible throughout the Study Period (730 days) , while 79홈
had 365 or more Risk enrollment days. Among S/HMO members ,
55훌 。f the 6 , 297 SHMO enrollees were eligible throughout the
Study Period , while 77훌 had 365 or more SHMO enrollment
days. Cost days were affected by the involuntary conversion
。f Cost to Risk among Medicare members during the period
4/85 through 12/86. The result of conversion diminished Cost
enrollment to less than 20훌 。f its December , 1984 count.
Thus , 24 훌 。f the 6 , 181 Cost enrollees were eligible
throughout the Study Period while 36.6% had 365+ days.
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Many problems regarding use of the above data needed
resolution before using it in rate numerators. These are
discussed because future research of this nature will
encounter similar problems , unless they use the data base
created for this study. Many of the solutions were very time
consuming , technical in nature and required much expensive
computer time.
Given the problems of securing research membership data ,
a decision was made to obtain research population data while
gathering or working with collected nursing home data. T。
resolve the problem of identifying the full research
population , the Center for Health Research committed
resources to extract Medicare data from the membership file
needed to meet requirements of Research Questions I and II.
Determination of residence was established either by
having a Multnomah county zip code for their personal
residence , including that of a nursing home or other
custodial facility , or that of a subscriber with whom they
lived , such as a child, or sibling or other person in a role
allowed by KP to act as a subscriber. The list of Zip codes
finally used included those at the margin of county lines in
1988 , rather than in 1985-87. Zip code areas are continually
changing.
For some members , this criteria was complicated by
having seasonal residence in other states , or other counties
in Oregon , while maintaining their primary residence in
76
Oregon. Some members were out of the area for large portions
。f the study period , and if such information was known , they
were deleted. Such data was cross-checked with three sources
including the overall membership data base , Medicare Durable
Medical Equipment contract records , and KP Claims and
Billing Department records , all of which were used in the
early stages of this study to help identify probable nursing
home users , and to confirm member eligibility status.
Persons who retained their Multnomah County zip code t。
continue eligibility in KP , but who declared an out of (KP)
service area residence , were excluded from the research
population.
Enrollment in KP as a Cost , Risk or S/HMO member was
determined by membership file first-Medicare eligibility
date in each of these three status. Some members were age 65
and Medicare eligible except for being employed with health
benefits which were primary to Medicare entitlements , s。
they were removed from the research population.
A similar problem existed in eligibility data except
the problem was extant where overlapping coverages occurred.
Generally , these were not data entry errors but due to dual
status involving dual premiums or both spouses covered by
joint policies of the other. All such overlapping dates had
to be resolved before eligibility date profiles could be
created and before cross-match of nursing home dates and
eligibility periods could be done.
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The sixth step in the research plan , undertaken before
June , 1989 , involved acquiring data for analysis of rCF’
residents who became Medicaid dependent. Such data was
needed to because it was the only source of data from which
Risk ICF resident socio-economic and ADL health status
indicators could be obtained. It would also provide a basis
for comprehensive comparative analysis between Risk and
S/HMO , regarding other factors that ECB which could account
for any differences observed between Risk and S/HMO rCD use
patterns.
The State of Oregon had agreed to provided all data
needed on KP members who became Medicaid from year beginning
1986 through 1989. Such information had to be selected from
a large bank of month-end tape files by SSD staff using the
mainframe at SSD. Arrangements were made for acquiring such
data which was to be transferred to CHR on down-loaded EDP
files.
Five months , out of 36 months , of preliminary data was
received from Adult and Family Care Services files. This
data was being cross-matched with KP Medicare member data in
。rder to have SSA numbers and HIC numbers matched with the
encoded SSD number which SSD used to ensure confidentiality
。f the 360 data base Medicaid Master files. Such information
is subject to Human Subjects Protection research protocol
and not in any way available for commercial use. The State
。f Oregon would benefit by this research in that it needed
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information to determine the cost-effectiveness of
purchasing the ECB for Medicaid members enrolled under
S/HMO. Substantial time was invested in this effort by CHR
and this investigator. But , Measure 5 resulted in
termination of down-loading activities which only the State
。f Oregon could do. As a result , an important element of
this study was discontinued.
The seventh step in the research plan includes the very
time consuming problem of data management procedures
required for this study. Four basic data sets were created
for the analysis of nursing home data. The source files from
which supporting data was obtained includes the Membership
Information database. Other subsidiary files used t。
supplement this data has been mentioned above. Collectively ,
KP membership information was loaded into the first data set
and arranged into two files; one was a multiple record file
and the other was a file on one comprehensive record per
member.
The Nursing Home Resident file was created, from data
collected as described. Financial data was separated from
utilization data. No member names were included to assure
confidentiality. This was the second basic data set.
Data was extracted from the KP Hospital Discharge Data
Base for use in Chapter IX analysis of differences in ICD9
primary and secondary codes prior to the first study period
ICF admission. This was the third basic data set.
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S/HMO member intake questionnaire and survey update
data is stored at the CHR. A small amount of data was down-
loaded from it to enable analysis of members who were newly
enrolled compared to those who converted from other KP
status. Risk data on this matter was available from the
membership data base. That was the fourth basic data set.
This file was used to confirm that all members in the
Nursing Home data set had been certified for ECB services at
some point.
All of the source files are huge and the resulting four
study files are large. Numerous skills had to learned t。
transfer and manipulate data extracted for use in this
study. The software system used to transfer information from
three of these data base files was Compuserve 1032 designed
for handling large data sets in their initial form. It is
not a system intended for use in data analysis. After
information was assembled in 1032 , it was transferred to the
SAS software systems which operates in the host VMS system
used by the CHR.
Considerable energy was required to learn SAS
programming at a sufficient skill level to array subsetted
and nested data in mutually exclusive data sets. Attention
to proper relationships between and within data sets was
required to avoid computational errors which would undermine
the validity of findings. Some understanding of set theory
is important for a study of this nature.
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File structure required much attention in this study ,
as files were needed which stored data in multiple records
for each member , and other files needed to have all data
about each member in one record. F’low charts and file name
systems were needed to facilitate return to files for
correct data at different stages of its evolution.
Quality control procedures were essential to assure
correct input when constructing a data set , as well as for
。utput of programming commands. Consultation with seasoned
programmers at CHR was essential with complex files but only
the investigator can know if the output is good or bad ,
which only comes from an intimate knowledge of data under
use. Much time was consumed in this study acquiring the
skills and experience to progress with confidence in the
results.
The eighth step in the research plan involved creating
rates which would be used in comparing Risk and S/HMO
utilization patterns , trends in nursing home revenue for
Risk and S/HMO members , and Medicaid data.
In this study , rates for each eligibility group are
compared to establish differences in utilization of and
expenditures for ICF’ services. Rates for Risk eligibility
group members serve as the baseline against which rates for
S/HMO members are contrasted. If substantial differences are
。bserved， and the pattern of differences is clear, then that
pattern is interpreted as an indication that the S/HMO
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Expanded Care Benefit may be influencing those observations.
Raw rates are determined for Research Questions I-IV , by
dividing the dependent variable for each eligibility group
by independent variable for each eligibility group data.
Age differences were observed for each eligibility
group by comparing the mean , median , first (Q1) and third
interquartile (Q3) ages. These are summarized in Chapter
IV. While mean ages are quite similar , considerable
differences existed between median ages and Q3 ages. Since
age distribution within eligibility group could affect
。bserved differences in use rates , an age-adjustment
procedure is used to remove such potential affects. The
distribution of members within each gender and age cohort of
the total research population is considered to be a
"standard population ’, which is used to perform that
age-adjustment.
Specifically, the proportion of members in each age
cohort within gender is determined for the the overall
research population. The use rate , as determined for each
age cohort within gender for each eligibility group , is
multiplied by the proportion of members in each each age
cohort by gender for the overall "standard" research
population. Each of these computed , or "standardized’I use
rates are added to create a composite standardized use rate
for each eligibility group. This age-adjustment procedure
corrects for apparent differences between eligibility group
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specific rates which result from age distribution
differences.
This is called the direct standardization method of
performing an age-adjustment. The result of this
mUltiplication is a computed rate that can be expected in
the standard population if those age-specific rates had
prevailed. Apparent differences between actual rates for
each eligibility group may be eliminated by this process if
actual differences existed.
Direct standardization may be applied only when
the schedule of specific rates for a given
population is available ... Consistent inequal-
ities among [actual] specific rates , stratum by
stratum , yield direct adjusted rates bearing the
same inequalities ... [but] bear in mind that an
adjusted rate , no matter which method is used ,
has meaning only when compared with a similarly
adjusted rate. Its magnitude means little in and
。f itself ... The magnitude of the rate , however ,
is seen to depend strongly on the composition of
the standard population. [49]
Of course , examination of actual "crude ll rates is an
essential part of the analysis and must be done preliminary
to comparison of standardized rates , since the latter can
mask changes in rate differences between strata. According
to J. Fleiss , a biostatistician , it is wise to use more than
。ne index for summarizing age- and sex-specific incidence
rates. is simply a value necessary (op. cit. [7]). After
considering differences in actual rates , and examining
patterns observed for computed age-adjusted rates which are
the principal values used in tables presented in Chapters
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IV through IX , then rate differences are evaluated and
findings are reported within the chapter in which such rates
are presented.
。ther factors than age differences are considered in
the production of rates for each Research Question. One of
those is whether the conversion of Cost Medicare members t。
Risk Medicare status , or the transfer of pre-TEFRA Risk
members into TEFRA capitation contracts , affected Risk
baseline rates differently than S/HMO rates? The specific
concern was whether a disproportionate number of members
with prior nursing home use ended up in Risk status due t。
both HCFA requirements regarding enrollment of existing KP
members in S/HMI。’ and the criteria excluding nursing home
residents from enrolling in S/HMO? Pre-TEFRA Risk members
were not allowed to enroll in S/HMO until after 1988. If
Cost members were in a nursing home when they applied for
S/HMO , they could not be accepted , although some were
enrolled who had previously resided in a nursing home.
The ninth step in the research plan was developed after
looking initially at the overall rates. This involved
creation of Analysis Models A and B, and subsets I and II of
the overall model. These were the solution selected to deal
with the problem described in the preceding paragraph.
Specifically , two subsets were created from within the
。verall data set of nursing home residents; both excluded
some or all members from each eligibility group who had been
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in a nursing home before the study period. These subsets are
used to evaluate how the conversion process might have
affected use rates based on the history of nursing home
admissions before the study period. Neither are intended t。
replace the overall rates as the principal finding but only
to surface the direction in which such rate patterns after
effects of initial Cost conversions and pre-TEFRA Risk
transfers are considered.
Two basic eligibility status models are used for
analysis. Model A identifies research population members by
Cost , Risk or S/HMO status for use as a denominator; it
additively counts each member with more than one eligibility
status while in respective groups , when the denominator is
per 1000 members.
There are 19 , 261 members by unique count , but 24 , 003
members when multiple status is counted , thus 4 , 742 members
were enrolled in two or more eligibility status during the
study period.
However , in Model A, the denominator allocates exact
days of eligibility for multiple status members t。
respective Cost , Risk or S/HMO groups. Thus , eligibility
status days are not over-counted and , Model A is a very good
evaluation tool to use in answering research questions about
cumulative days of stay per member year of eligibility. Not
。nly is it a precise measure of such rates , and provides a
basis for relative comparison of Risk and S/HMO , it als。
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measures precisely the relative opportunity for each
eligibility group member to be in a nursing home as a Cost ,
Risk or SHMO beneficiary.
Model A also allocates ICF or SNF days to each
eligibility status so that no days of nursing home stay are
。verlapping across two eligibility status.
Model B addresses the issue of multiple eligibility
status where the denominator is per 1000 members by
isolating the 7 combinations of the three groups (Cost , Risk
S/HMO) so that the denominator of each combination is a
unique (or mutually exclusive) member count. These seven
combinations are reduced to two clusters of members who were
IINever-S/HMO" or who were "S/HMO-Sometime" when using
Analysis of Variance F tests for significance of difference
between the means for the two groups , Risk and S/HMO.
Model B is used for presenting financial data because
the data collection methodology made it impossible t。
associate payments received with each stay , or level of
care , in multiple level facilities. Therefore , financial
data , as a numerator , could not be cross-matched with level
。f care eligibility status. Model B resolves that analytic
issue.
The short-coming of Model B is that it does not
differentiate Cost from Risk from S/HMO ICF’ days within each
mutually exclusive cluster, for multiple eligibility users;
。nly that they were never in S/HMO or in S/HMO sometime.
86
In addition to Models A and B, it seemed necessary t。
create Subsets I and II from the overall ICF resident data
set. The methodological logic for Subset II was to clarify
whether the conversion of Cost members to Risk status
affected use rates differently than S/HMO rates , in the
sense that Cost members could be in a nursing home at the
time they were transferred to Risk status , whereas that was
a much less likely event for Cost or Risk members wh。
converted to S/HMO (not accepted if in a nursing home at
time of S/HMO application). It appears that conversion did
influence rates , but the pattern that emerged did not
reverse the overall direction.
Subset II is used as the primary tool to clarify this
conversion issue. It removes 71 of the 1331 SNF and ICF’
residents who were in the nursing homes when the study
period started. These 71 residents were either discharged
and not readmitted , or never discharged.
The first subset is selected by the criteria of not
having been in either an SNF or ICF nursing home prior t。
the first ICF admission during the study period. This is
called Subset I in the graph below.
Subset II includes all those in Subset I , and in
addition , includes all those who had an admission during the
study period but had been in a nursing home prior to their
first ICF admission during the study period; i.e. they may
have been in either an ICF or SNF at the beginning of the
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study, or admitted and discharged before the study period.
up to this point , Subset II is the same as that used for
Research Question I. But , an additional 71 persons are
removed who had long nursing home use records.
All ICF residents in Subsets I and II are also in the
。verall data set used for output of overall rates for ICF
days per year of member eligibility. The difference between
。verall rates and those for Subset II is that seventy-one
members are in the overall ICF’ resident data set who were
not in Subset I or Subset II.
A visual aid is presented below which shows how these
two subsets , and the 71 others , are nested within the
。verall nursing home user data set. The justification for
removing these 71 residents from Subsets I and II is that
they had a history of nursing home use which , in many cases ,
preceded the implementation of S/HMO and Risk TEFRA
enrollment programs in April , 1985. Also many of these 71
residents remained throughout all or most of the study
period, and none of those discharged were readmitted.
Although they are a legitimate part of the overall data set
for production of rates [nursing home days per member year
。f eligibility] , it is also valuable to observe whether the
S/HMO rate remains below that of Risk without their
influence , and to clarify rates for members whose lifetime
use of nursing homes began in proximity to or after
implementation of S/HMO and Risk.
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There were three methodological reasons for creating
subset I. F’irst , Subset I allows analysis of nursing home
use rates for residents who were at the beginning of their
lifetime use of nursing homes; therefore , it also eliminates
the problem of left censoring of utilization data from
before the study period. Utilization analysis of nursing
home residents requires recognition that many residents have
。ngoing， although not necessarily continuous , residency
status. In this study , about 75훌 。f all nursing home
residents had 3 or less admissions , but the other 25훌
trailed off to a maximum of 10 admissions. This recurrent
admission process must be accounted for when developing
conclusions or doing estimates of true use rates. Many
studies have failed to do so , resulting in flawed findings.
The 1985 National Nursing Home Survey (NNHS) produced
seriously flawed data because it failed to ask for a correct
history of prior nursing home admissions. Therefore , in 1992
a revision of findings was published.
The methodological issue is , how does the investigator
manage left and right censoring of data , to correctly
estimate true lifetime use rates? The answer is to be very
clear about the descriptive data beyond censored study
points. While the original research plan included survival
estimates , but until descriptive data was fUlly understood,
model building for that kind of analysis was not
appropriate.
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Recent studies by Mark Meiners , including a
meta-analysis of all spend-down research through 1991 , and
by Thomas Bice 1990 , including a study of the 15 year
connecticut nursing home data base , showed how the 1977 and
1985 NNHS findings under-estimated lifetime nursing home use
projections due to censoring without proper descriptive data
about pre and post sample readmisisons. In this study ,
Subset I is used with financial data up to one year after
the study period , in an effort to capture a high proportion
。f lifetime use-rate data.
The second reason for creating Subset I was t。
facilitate a meaningful analysis of Medicaid dependency
patterns for shorter-stay residents , by eliminating left
censoring (prior nursing home) use as a reason for
differences between Risk and S/HMO for becoming welfare
dependent. Since spend-down occurs between 1-2 years after
first admission as a private pay resident for 95 훌 。f
Medicaid dependent persons , this study is able to identify a
presumably reliable rate on that event , given that this
study ’ s data base includes data one year after the study
period.
A third reason for Subset I , was that a few long stay
residents can badly distort descriptive parameters of
financial data in this study. Several residents had well
。ver $100 , 000 in nursing home revenues , which strongly
affected the mean of total payments received.
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Beginning and ending dates were cross-matched against
beginning and ending dates of study period. The above graph
shows which combinations of admissions within the study
period (SP) were assigned to data Subset II and data Subset
I within the overall dataset.
Figure 1 , below , presents unique combinations of
admissions to nursing homes during the study period.
Before SP
Censor Pt.
Begin SP
Censor Pt.
End SP After SP
71 others
not in subset
I or II
SUBSET I
(no prior
admissions)
_______ 1 1 _
-----.---------------.1-----------SUBSET II
(admits before
SP possible)
(includes
169 Not In
subset I)
_···_--(-----_··------1-----------
Figure 1. Overall nursing home resident data set
showing combinations of admissions before ,
during and after the study period and shows
which combinations comprise Subsets I & II &
Overall (Subset III). ( - period of IeF stay)
Both TEFRA Risk and S/HMO eligibility status commenced
in April , 1985; this raises the question , why was the Risk
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use rate for ICF days in residence per year of eligibility
so much higher than that for S/HMO?
Of these 71 members , thirty-four were in Risk
eligibility status , twenty-seven were in Cost status , and
。nly four were in S/HMO status.
All of the 34 Risk members were Cost conversions or
roll-over members from the Medicare Plus Demonstration
Project. This suggests that Cost and Risk member ICF user
history was substantially more established than that of
S/HMO when the study period began.
The question raised here is , does removal of these 71
residents account for some part of the rate differences in
days of stay per year of eligibility between Risk and S/HMO?
Several macro-level reasons come to mind. Effects of
managing the S/HMO Extended Care Benefit could produce the
difference. S/HMO members in ICFs tended to stay for shorter
periods but have more readmissions.
Could some characteristic of the Risk population bias
their health and social status toward greater need for ICF
services? Those in Medicare Plus might be older.
Could some characteristic of the S/HMO population bias
their health and social status against need for ICF services
such as the enrollment policy prohibiting acceptance of
persons in a nursing home at the time they applied? Adverse
。r favorable selection bias were issues of concern t。
researchers in both Medicare Plus (PreTEF’RA RISK) and
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Medicare Plus II (S/HMO).
Or , could the process of converting Cost to Risk
members could have produced an administratively induced
bias , based on the order in which conversions were
implemented?
Regarding those seventy-one members in the overall data
set , sixty-six were in ICFs , of whom thirty-three were in
the Risk eligibility status. All thirty-three Risk members
were in "group sponsored·’ status , rather than ’· individual
payer" status. That means all such nursing home users were
receiving a health benefit from a prior employer , union , or
。ther collective sponsor who paid some portion of the
Medicare Supplemental Insurance benefit premiums to KP for
that member. Such payments did not include money for LTC
benefits.
Another characteristic of these 33 Risk nursing home
users is that their mean days (333.2 days in the study
period) of stay was substantially greater than any other
subset observed, including "individual·· Risk members from
the pre-TEFRA Demonstration Project. Median days for these
thirty-three Risk members was 353 days; 03 was 570 days , and
01 was 86 days). Several were in ICF status across the
entire study period. Furthermore , they had the highest mean
age (88.2) and median age (87.1) of any subgroup from within
the overall data set of nursing home residents; (03 was 93.1
and 01 was 84.8). In contrast , Cost members within this
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subset of 66 ICF users , had a mean of 206.9 days of stay, a
median of 137 days; (Q3 - 349 days , and Q1- 25 days).
Apparently, these 33 Risk ICF residents contributed
heavily to the overall Risk rate. Why didn ’ t S/HMO members
have more ICF users who had transferred from Cost or Risk
status? No doubt one of the answers is that one of the few
barriers to converting into S/HMO was that the member could
not be in a nursing home at the time of application. Given
this difference between Risk and S/HMO groups , it seems
reasonable to remove at least those members from the Risk
data set whose history of ICF utilization was known to load
the rates with days of stay at the front-end , many of whom
remained throughout all or most of the study period.
A third concern about factors potentially affecting use
rates is related to the rate denominator in Research
Question I. Specifically, some members were in more than one
eligibility status , as noted earlier in this Chapter.
However , that problem is eliminated in Research Question II ,
by using mutually exclusive days of eligibility per member
per year , which absolutely eliminates overlapping counts.
Except for Research Question I , this problem is
resolved either by using days of eligibility as the
denominator , or creating mutually exclusive combinations and
clusters of the three eligibility groups , which is called
Analysis Model B. Mutually exclusive groups are for the
denominator in Research Questions III , V, VI , in contrast t。
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Analysis Model A, which is used in Research Question I. It
should be noted that the most frequently used denominator in
the literature on nursing home utilization appears to be a
count of the population or "per 1000 population." That is a
useful crude rate when not comparing population subsets
between which population members move. Model B allows the
use of that denominator (/1000 members) because it controls
for , rather eliminates double counting.
Analysis Model B uses the the three not-mutually
exclusive eligibility groups , Cost , Risk , and S/HMO from
analysis Model A, but they are organized into seven mutually
exclusive combinations of eligibility which include: Cost ,
Cost and Risk , Risk , S/HMO , Cost and S/HMO , Risk and S/HMO ,
Cost and Risk and S/HMO. Additionally, these seven groups
are divided into two clusters , the first of which includes
groups one through three who were members that were never
enrolled in S/HMO during the study period. The remaining
four groups comprise the second cluster which includes
members who were in S/HMO sometime during the study period.
The seven groups under Model B are called F’。rmat B; the
two clusters are called Format A, of Model B. Each resident
can only be in one of the seven groups in Format B, or one
。f the two clusters of Format A. Figure 2 lists Formats A
and B of Model B showing combination elements. Thus , Formats
A and B of Analysis Model B are used to present differences
in the mean of payments receivedl 1000 research population.
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S/HMO
I {S/HMO only - Group 4
I {S/HMO+Cost - Group 5
Sometime} I {S/HMO+Risk - Group 6
{S/HMO+Cost+Risk - Group 7
Format BFormat A
Never S/HMO}
’4
『4
’J
때빼빼GGG---yky파쇄파。RO랴랴·앓야야파rlI‘,l1‘fl
,‘
Figure 2. Mutually exclusive model used to present
rates on paYments received/l000 research
population members in Model for Analysis B.
A mutually exclusive model (Model B) is used for three
reasons. F’irst , at some facilities data collection problems
prevented reliable allocation of financial information
according to ICF or SNF levels of care. Second , financial
data cannot be allocated to periods of eligibility the way
days of stay were in Chapter IV. Third, reliable allocation
。f financial data to the study period was not possible
because financial records at some facilities did not specify
periods of stay for which funds were received. Financial
records for multiple admission residents on Medicaid were
especially difficult to interpret , regarding periods of stay
represented by the paYments. These issues were discussed in
greater detail in Chapter III.
Units of measurement for the rate used for financial
information are as follows: total payments received for each
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member who resided in a nursing home during the study period
are accumulated within each of the seven mutually exclusive
groups (Format B) and two mutually exclusive clusters
(Format A)i the sum of such payments forms the numerator in
this rate. The membership count allocated to each group or
cluster forms the denominator. The numerator is first
divided by the denominator to produce the non-standardized
rate (payments/group members{not just residents}) , which is
multiplied by the standardizing ratio of age cohort
distribution within gender to adjust for effects of
differences in gender by age cohort between each group or
cluster. The standardized rate is multiplied by 1000 , the
result of which is presented in tables prepared for Chapters
VII and VIII.
A mutually exclusive model is used for financial rates
for three reasons , in addition to the issue of not-mutually
exclusive denominators. First , at some facilities data
collection problems prevented reliable allocation of
financial information according to ICF’ 。r SNF levels of
care. Second , financial data cannot be allocated to periods
。f eligibility the way days of stay were in Chapter IV.
Third, reliable allocation of financial data to the study
period was not possible because financial records at some
facilities did not specify periods of stay for which funds
were received.
Financial records for mUltiple admission residents on
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Medicaid were especially difficult to interpret , regarding
periods of stay represented by the payments. These issues
are discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.
Revenues received by nursing homes means total debited
to accounts receivable for each member from all sources for
SNF and ICF use prior to , during and up to one year after
(before July , 1989) the study period.
Subset 工 I is used as a surrogate for the overall data
set in Chapters VII and VIII , because nursing home use prior
to the study period affects the amount of payments received
rate used to measure differences between Risk and S/HMO.
Hopefully , such organization will assist the reader(s)
in moving through a great deal of numeric information
without loosing track of the evaluation process use t。
summarize patterns or similarities and differences between
Risk and S/HMO member use of ICFs during the study period.
Figure 3 , below, outlines the use of Models and B in
subsequent chapters.
APPROACH TO EVALUATION OF FINDINGS
A consistent format is used to present data and report
findings as shown in Figure 3 , and the following subtitles:
Pre-observation comments , Research Goals , Research Question ,
Rates for Overall and/or Subset II , and/or Subset I data ,
Observations for each table , Summary Of findings , Research
Methodology Issues , Policy Research Recommendations.
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MODEL A MODEL B
F’。rmat a
MODEL B
Format b
1.
E’ile
2.
PERSON BASED GROUP BASED CLUSTERS
MODEL NOT MUTUALLY
CONSTRUCT EXCLUSIVE
BET ’ WN C R S
(COST RISK SHMO)
3.
MUTUALLY MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE EXCLUSIVE
ELIG. GROUPS CLUSTERED
C, CR , R, S , NEVER SHMO VS
CS , CR , CRS SHMO SOMETIME
ELIG. STATUS ELIG. STATUS
IDENTIFIED BY IDENTIFIED
GROUPED ELIG. BY CLUSTER
STATUS FOR FOR ADMITS
ADMITTED RPM
CRITERIA ELIG.STATUS
FOR MATCH IDENTIFIED
OF RPM BY RPM FOR
ELIG & EACH ADMIT
NH ADMIT
4. _I
Research Questions I , II:
CRITERIA ADMIT DATE
FOR COUNT >30JUL ’ 86
AS ADMIT <OlJUL ’ 88
AGE ELIG
MEDICARE
ADMIT DATE
>30JUL ’ 86
<OlJUL ’ 88
AGE ELIG
MEDICARE
ADMIT DATE
>30JUL ’ 86
<OlJUL ’ 88
AGE ELIG
MEDICARE
POSS ADMIT
B4 SP
NO NH ADMIT
B4 SP
a.
IN NH ON
30JUL ’ 86
+ ADMITS
DURING SP
b.
ADMIT AFTER
30JUN ’ 86
BUT PRIOR
NH USE POSS
c.
ADMIT AFTER
30JUN ’ 86
& NO PRIOR
NH ADMITS
a.
IN NH ON
30JUL ’ 86
+ ADMITS
DURING SP
b.
ADMIT AFTER
30JUN ’ 86
BUT PRIOR
NH USE POSS
c.
ADMIT AFTER
30JUN ’ 86
& NO PRIOR
NH ADMITS
POSS ADMIT
B4 SP
NO NH ADMIT
B4 SP
a.
IN NH ON
30JUL ’ 86
+ ADMITS
DURING SP
b.
ADMIT AFTER
30JUN ’ 86
BUT PRIOR
NH USE POSS
c.
ADMIT AFTER
30JUN ’ 86
& NO PRIOR
NH ADMITS
POSS ADMIT
B4 SP
NO NH ADMIT
B4 SP
b.
a.
5. I
R. Q. III-VI)
CRITERIA •
ADMISSION
TO COMPARE
DAYS USED
Figure 3 . Model for Analysis and format for
presenting observations in Chapters IV through X.
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ICF VS SNF VS NURSING HOME
An issue is addressed next which was referenced in
Chapter I regarding nursing home level of care. It is
discussed because Federal regulations modified legislation
and regulations pertaining to nursing homes which created or
distinguished between that level of care in which skilled
nursing care eRN) was required continuously , and that level
。f nursing home care in which skilled nurses were required
intermittently for patient care.
By this action , HCFA decreed that SNF’ and ICF falsely
differentiated patient needs and that each patient must be
rated according to a score derived from a Minimum Data Set
。f criteria prescribed by HCF’A. This raises the question
about the relevance of findings in this study regarding ICF’
care , given this policy change. Aside from the historic
value , ICF level care was the term that the nursing home
industry generally understood to differentiate chronic long
term institutional care from post hospital convalescence for
Medicare patients. Insurance carriers offering policies made
and continue to make that distinction. It remains the terms
。f reference used w~thin the nursing home industry outside
。f the Veterans Administration.
States pursued Medicaid pass-through funds based partly
。n formulas related to SNF and ICF level of care. Therefor ,
states differentiated patients in a way which followed that
policy choice. To this extent , elimination of the terms SNF
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and ICF was a rational policy change.
In the State of Washington , about 90홈 。f all Medicare
and Medicaid admissions to nursing homes were SNF , and 10훌
ICF , during the 1980s. In Oregon , the converse existed where
90훌 。f Medicare/Medicaid admissions were ICF and 10훌 SNF.
Large variation existed among states many regarding such
classification practices. For example , some states allowed
use of ICF level care for a patient being fed via
nasogastric or gastic tube , while others required they be
classified as SNF , for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement.
[per 9/15/92 phone conversation with Elizabeth Cornelius ,
Ph.D. , Office of Demonstrations and Evaluations , HCP’A. ,
regarding HCFAs plan to use the MDS as a basis for
reimbursing nursing homes] .
It is important to note that published research about
nursing home utilization focuses mostly on SNF Medicare
services and ICF services by individuals who are welfare
recipients. Prior to 1991 and implementation of OBRA ’ 87 ,
Medicare files contained only SNF reimbursement related
information. State and federal Medicaid data regarding ICF
services included only welfare recipients. Nursing home
utilization rates and financial data on SNP’ and ICF services
not covered by Medicare or Medicaid has low visibility among
journal articles.
Even reported findings on the S/HMO participant ’ s use
。f ICFs includes only that portion within the benefit limit
101
as authorized by lithe SHMO and expenditures paid for by
Medicare."[50]
In this study , nursing home utilization and
expenditures data , regarding Subject ’ s use of SNF and/or ICF
services , includes non-Medicaid and non-SHMO ICF data , in
addition to SNF Medicare , and SNF data beyond that covered
by Medicare but before Medicaid eligibility, and data while
Medicaid eligible.
ISSUES RELATED TO GENERALIZATION OF STUDY FINDINGS
Caution is required about any generalization of any
studies regarding nursing home utilization. That caveat
applies to this study , for reasons other than not using
random sampling and inferential statistics as the basis for
analysis.
Large variation exists between states and within states
regarding several important variables commonly used t。
describe urban nursing home utilization. These variables
include: age distribution of the elderly; differences in
health conditions of residents , as defined by DRG/ICDM
hospital codes and by ADL defined functional disabilities;
methods used by states to classify nursing home residents as
SHF or IeF [during the time period of this study];
availability of SNF and ICF beds; availability and state
policy on the use of other levels of long-term care
facilities.
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variance in age distribution is considerable between
states and counties among Americans over age 64. The
age cohort for those 85 and over is a target group ,
regarding nursing home use rates , because the proportion
admitted to a nursing home is high. Census data for 1990
indicate that Midwestern states have very high distributions
。f such elderly. In MSA wichita , Kansas , 13.6 per cent of
those over age 64 were 85 years old or more , while in the
Multnomah County , only 6.x훌 were 85 years or more [1990
census]. State of Kansas - 12.3훌 vs State of Oregon
9.9훌. [51] The final chapter is used to synthesize findings
from the next six chapters in this study. Some hypothesis
testing recommendations are made related to such findings.
CHAPTER IV
OVERALL USE RATES F’。R RESEARCH QUESTIONS I AND II
There is growing evidence that suggests that
management control practices may be associated
with lower costs in health care facilities.[52l
The purpose of this chapter is to present use rates
which respond to policy issues of interest in this study.
Research Questions I and II are presented in this chapter
which respond to two of those policy issues.
A population based policy concern is addressed first.
Specifically , does the S/HMO Expanded Care Benefit influence
the rate at which ICF services are accessed? This is not an
issue of frequency of access , rather one of initial access.
There are several issues related to this policy concern.
Does this ECB increase the use of ICF services in addition
to providing formal home care services? Does the ECB benefit
appear to improve access to ICF services for members whose
needs are certifiable at that level of care? Baseline Risk
rates provide the ~omparison against which conclusions are
descriptively inferred in this study, regarding such policy
concerns. Research Question I responds descriptively to that
policy concern.
Improved access is an important goal so long as
resulting residency patterns don ’ t become excessive or
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inflationary. In a risk-based HMO , that is a critical
。perational issue. It is also a matter of substantial
interest on the part of health care policy makers who are
pondering whether long-term care entitlements are an
affordable national goal , and looking to S/HMO for some
answers.
Thus , the second policy concern addressed in this
chapter is whether the operational principles of managed
care , as practiced in this HMO , contain utilization of ICF
services by S/HMO members certified for use of their ECB t。
cover costs of ICF services? Research Question II responds
descriptively to that policy concern. The baseline for
comparison is Risk member ICF use rates.
Under Research Question II , values from the Overall
data set are used to produce baseline use rates for Risk and
S/HMO nursing home residents. These rates form the basis of
evaluation of differences in this study. Descriptive data
from two Subsets (I , II) , are extracted from the Overall
data set; they are used to identify patterns of change from
Overall utilization differences when residents with nursing
home admits prior to the study period are removed.
Subset II was used for Research question I. That is ,
members who were in a nursing home on day one of the study
period are removed , if they did not have a subsequent
readmission during the study period. Such persons were
almost exclusively Risk and Cost members; most of the Cost
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members involved had began their use of nursing homes before
the Risk TEFRA and S/HMO commenced. That was the case for
some of the Risk members because they had been participants
in the Medicare Plus Demonstration project.
Subset I provides a view of use rate patterns for first
time ICF residents. Thus , nursing home residents are removed
from Subset I who did not any prior admission to an ICF’
before the study period. Such persons are just beginning
their lifetime use of nursing homes , compared to the Overall
data set which includes many persons part way into their
life cycle of nursing home use.
Patterns are summarized regarding differences in use of
ICF services associated with three age cohorts based on
non-standardized rates.
Raw data is used to display the percent of distribution
。f cumulative days used by nursing home residents within
five length of stay (LOS) time ranges during the study
period. This information is provided in response to the
policy research concern about what proportion of S/HMO
nursing home users are reasonably protected against nursing
costs by front-end , shorter-stay, LTC benefits? In contrast ,
what proportion of S/HMO nursing home users are likely to g。
through the ECB financial shield and begin a period during
which they must rely on personal assets to cover nursin당
home costs. That circumstance places them in peril of
catastrophic financial harm. The policy issue is what
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proportion of nursing home users are served by the ECB at
this S/HMO Demonstration site.
Some Overall SNP’ and combined SNF+ICF rates are
presented where they help clarify use rate patterns and
trends for ICF residents.
Research Question I in this study asks whether
differences exist between three eligibility groups regarding
respective probabilities of becoming an ICF resident during
the study period. The units of measurement in this rate are
the unique number of members admitted to an ICF during the
study period while enrolled in Kaiser Per.manente as Cost , or
Risk , or S/HMO Medicare beneficiaries , per 1000 members of
Cost , Risk , or S/HMO eligibility groups. By definition , this
research question excludes persons in a nursing home at the
beginning of the study period.
Research Question I: Are There Differences Between Cost ,
Risk , and-S/HMO-Regarding The Number of ICF Residents Per
1000 Research Population "Members" During The Study Period?
Members may have become an ICF resident while in more
than one eligibility status. This could occur under tw。
circumstances: first , if a member ’ s eligibility status
changed while they were in a nursing home they are credited
as having an admission under each eligibility status. Or , if
a member ’ s first ICF stay was all under one eligibility
status , but a subsequent admission was under another status ,
then one admission per eligibility group was counted.
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Specifically, twelve percent (nineteen of the
。ne-hundred fifty-four Cost ICF residents) subsequently were
in Risk status as ICF residents. Four percent (eleven of the
two-hundred eighty-two S/HMO ICF residents) also had ICF
admissions during the study period while in Cost or Risk:
two were in Cost and nine were in Risk. Model A is used t。
present probability of admissions , in Table VII , below.
TABLE VII
OVERALL 1ST ADMISSION RATES STANDARDIZED BY SEX & AGE COHORT
UNIQUE NUMBER OF ICF’ RESIDENTS ADMITTED IN
THE SP PER 1000 COST OR RISK OR S/HMO
MEMBER GROUPS WHICH ARE NOT
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
(BY GENDER)
Model A
ICF
1st SP 1st SP 1st SP 1st SP
Admission Admission Admission Admission
/1000 RPM /1000 RPM /1000 RPM /1000 RPM
in COST in RISK in S/HMO Overall
M + F 24.44 31.61 42.40 32.65
n - (154) (353 ) (282) (789)
Male 24.36 28.01 39.03 29.87
n - (61) (128) (98) (287)
E’emale 24.49 33.99 44.62 34.48
n - (93) (225) (184) (502)
Denominator
n - 6 , 181 11 , 525 6 , 297 - 24 , 003
Source: Appendix C
The standardized rate per 1000 S/HMO members who became
IeF’ residents during the study period was thirty-four
percent greater than that rate for Risk members , and
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seventy-three percent greater than the rate for Cost
members. This Overall rate represents the probability of
becoming an ICF resident while in the research population as
Cost , Risk or S/HMO Medicare status during the study period.
The above observations are important because they
suggest that access to lCF services is facilitated by the
ECB for persons certified as needing that level of care.
Within eligibility groups , females in S/HMO status were
fifteen percent more likely to reside in an ICF than S/HMO
males; females in Risk were twenty-one percent more likely
than Risk males to reside in an lCF , while almost no rate
difference by gender occurred for members while in Cost
status.
Between eligibility groups , the probability of being in
an lCF was thirty-nine percent greater for S/HMO males than
Risk males , and was thirty-one percent higher for S/HMO
females than Risk females. Clearly, the probability of
becoming an ICF resident was greatest for S/HMO members ,
based on differences in age adjusted use rates.
The literature on nursing home use leaves little doubt
about a strong association between age and probability of
becoming a nursing home resident. This is because older
persons tend to differ from younger persons regarding the
type and effects of chronic illness. Chronic illness
patterns are evaluated in Chapter IX in an attempt t。
determine is hospital discharge information suggests that
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S/HMO members health status differs from Risk in a way which
explains use rate differences. That evaluation suggests as
much similarity in health status as dissimilarity.
Some studies estimate that twenty percent of the
population over age eighty-five reside in nursing homes.
That suggests the probability of becoming a resident must be
high which is examined in the next table. Rates presented in
Table VIII are based on raw data and are not the result of
any adjustment for differences in age cohort distribution of
the Cost , Risk or S/HMO members.
TABLE VIII
。VERALL RAW RATES F’。R 1ST ADMISSION BY SEX & AGE COHORT
UNIQUE NUMBER OF ICF RESIDENTS ADMITTED IN
THE SP PER 1000 COST OR RISK OR S/HM。
MEMBER GROUPS WHICH ARE NOT
MUTUALLY EXCLUS 工VE
(BY AGE COHORT)
RAW Rates 1st SP 1st SP 1st SP 1st SP
Admission Admission Admission Admission
/1000 HPM /1000 HPM /1000 HPM /1000 HPM
ICF’ in COST in RISK in S/HM'。 Average
Age Cohort
65-74 4.64 6.82 13.96 8.01
75 84 25.22 32.90 52.61 36.54
85-105 109.09 136.74 139.65 130.58
Source: Appendix C
Based on Raw Rate Differences , within S/HMO , members in
age cohort 85+ were 1.7 times more more likely to reside in
ICFs than S/HMO age 75-84. Within Risk members in age cohort
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85+ were 3.2 times more more likely to reside in ICFs than
Risk age 75-84.
Comparison between S/HMO and Risk shows that in age
cohort 65-74 , the rate of first admission during the study
period was 104훌 greater for S/HMO than Risk members; and in
age cohort 75-84 the rate of first admission during the
study period was 60% greater for S/HMO than Risk members;
and in cohort 85+ , the rate of first admission during the
study period was 2.1훌 greater for S/HMO than Risk members.
Why is this pattern of differences occurring? Is age
distribution different among S/HMO than Risk members?
Mean and median ages of research population members
within each eligibility status do not suggest that Overall ,
first-admisson ICF’ rates would be much different for S/HMO
than for Risk or Cost , as summarized next.
Specifically, age parameters of research population
members by eligibility group are summarized. Mean age for:
Cost - 76.1 , Risk - 75.2 , S/HMO - 76.3; Median ages are:
Cost - 74.6 , Risk - 74.1 , S/HMO - 75.2; Interquartile ages:
Cost - 70.9-80.2 , Risk - 68.8-79.9 , S/HMO - 70.8-80.8.
These descriptive data show that S/HMO members are
approximately one year older , on average , than Risk members ,
which raises doubts about age as an explanatory variable for
the above rates/1000 research population eligibility group
members. If mean age of research population members does not
explain differences between S/HMO and Risk probability rates
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for rCF use , are there differences in SNF rates which could
suggest reasons for rate differences? This is explored in
Table rx which compares Overall rates for the probability of
admission to an rCF and to an SNF , as well as comprehensive
nursing home age-adjusted use rates.
The above observations reinforce the first use rate
findings that ECB help facilitate access to rCF’s. Mean age
is very similar between Risk and S/HMO research population
members.
Many members who became rCF residents were admitted t。
an SNF before or after an rCF stay. F’。r certain chronically
ill patients , rCF care is a multidirectional extension of
either post-hospital recuperation or deteriorating health.
Some patients go into an reF and after a time need skilled
care continuously, as provided by SNF’s: Table rx shows both ,
followed by Figure 4 , showing rCF , SNF’, and SNF+rCF rate The
probability of S/HMO members becoming an SNF resident was
fifteen percent greater than that for Risk members during
the study period.
The probability of S/HMO members becoming a nursing
home resident , using either rCF or SNF care , or both , was
twenty-seven percent greater than that for Risk members
during the study period.
Within S/HMO , the rate per 1000 members of having one
。r more admissions to an SNF during the study period was
fifty-eight percent less than the rate for having one or
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more admissions to an ICF. Within Risk , that rate difference
was only thirty-six percent.
TABLE IX
SEX BY AGE COHORT STANDARDIZED RATES FOR ALL
UNIQUE NUMBER OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS BY
LEVEL OF CARE ADM工TTED DURING THE SP
PER 1000 COST OR RISK OR S/HMO
MEMBER GROUPS WHICH ARE NOT
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
(MALE + FEMALE)
Model A 1st SP 1st SP 1st SP 1st SP
Admit Admit Admit Admit
/1000 HPM /1000 HPM /1000 HPM /1000 HPM
in COST in RISK in S/HMO Overall
ICF 24.44 31. 61 42.40 32.65
n - (154) (353) (282) (789)
SNF 16.73 23.27 26.78 22.45
n - (105) (261) (176) (542)
SNF+ICF 41. 16 54.60 69.18 54.96
n - (259) (614) (458) (133 1)
Denominator
n - 6 , 181 11 , 525 6 , 297
-
24 , 003
Source: Appendix C
The focus of this study is on ICF level care , and not
SNF level care , because entitlement benefits and Medicare
Supplemental benefi~s do not cover ICF care expenses. But ,
SNP utilization rates are very interactive with IeF rates.
The above rate is important because it emphasizes that
entitlement benefits for SNF care are being used in similar
ways by Risk and S/HMO members.
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It also suggests that access for both Risk and Sf}뾰O
members is based on Medicare entitlement and basic
Supplemental Plan coverage , rather than on ECB. The slightly
higher S/HMO rate is not surprising because the ECB allowed
S/HMO member to use up to $10 , 500 for SNF care , during the
study period , if approved by the case manager. The lower
Cost member use rate not surprising since Cost members were
not required to carry the Medicare Supplemental benefit
until after they were offered Risk conversion , or were
exempted from conversion.
A use rate which measures the probability of becoming
an ICF’ resident is much different that a rate which measures
frequency of admission , which is not presented in this study
although produced in the course of data analysis. Some
members were admitted ten times to nursing homes during the
study period , but that is the product of interfacility
transfers , short term use for family care-giver respite , or
。ther services best provided by an institution. However ,
about seventy five percent of all nursing home stays were
accounted for by members with three admissions or less.
Frequency of admission may be an indicator of nursing
home policy on managing patients with a change of health
status , or of the appropriateness of physician admitting
practices to a given level of care , or of the nature of
services provided at a given facility. For example , some
facilities expect their turnover rate to be higher if they
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receive many patients with short life expectancy, or with
post-fracture rehabilitation needs , or for respite care.
The probability of becoming a nursing home resident is
affected by many factors , also. If one population Subset is
comprised of persons with more disabling chronic illness
than another , is the variance in rates affected? If one
population subset is comprised of persons with insurance
benefits , unlike another population subset , do those wh。
have insurance use the service more than those who do not?
In this study, an overarching policy question is , did the
Expanded Care Benefit affect nursing home use; more
specifically, did it affect ICF use?
Measurement of utilization often involves several tests
。f empirical information in order to adequately clarify such
questions. Generally, literature which reports on nursing
home utilization includes at least two , and often three ,
rates including:. [number of residents per 1000 population ,
。r/and number of admissions]; [days in residence per year ,
and/or mean length of stay]. Rates used by HMOs are often
expressed as annualized member months of eligibility, i.e. ,
year of eligibility per member. That convention is used
here.
In 1985 , the non-standardized , national sample of the
number of residents age 65 and greater in nursing and
personal care homes was 46.2 per 1000 population. This is
somewhat less than that for Risk and S/HMO and somewhat
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above that of Cost members. National sample data was based
。n a count of residents for calendar year , 1984 and includes
some residents from a level of care in licensed or certified
institutions whose admitting criteria were less restrictive
than for intermediate care facilities in Oregon. F’acilities
providing only mental health services are excluded. [53] [54]
The rate presented for Multnomah County in Table X,
below , is based on a one day annual survey of all nursing
home residents in all nursing homes. [55] The average of tw。
years is used for the rate of 42.4 per 1000 population age
65 and over. Population data for Multnomah County is from
Portland State University. [56J
Caution is urged in comparing KP research population
rates with national nursing home use rates , because survey
and sample definitions may be inconsistent with those in
this study regarding criteria for admission to ICFs.
The data is presented here as a flag for possible
future research comparing HMO member use of nursing homes
with non-HMO members. Table X is not presented as baseline
findings The Overall KP rate of nursing home residents per
1000 research population members is thirty percent higher
than the estimated rate for Multnomah County.
Given the caveats and conditions for use , above ,
。bservations are limited to the following points: sample
based estimates for the national rate is twenty percent
lower than overall rates for KP research population members.
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TABLE X
NON-STANDARDIZED NUMBER OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS
PER 1000 RESEARCH POPULATION MEMBERS , AND
PER 1000 POPULATION NCHS 1985 NATIONAL
SAMPLE , AND PER 1000 POPULATION IN
MULTNOMAH COUNTY AGE 65 AND OVER
ESTIMATE OVERALL & BY GENDER
Model A
M + F
Male
Female
65-74
75-84
85+
1985
National
SNF+ICF+?
Nurs.Home
/1000 Pop
(estimate)
46.2
29.0
57.9
12.5
57.7
220.3
1986-87
Mult. Cnty
SNF+ICF
Resident
/1000 Pop
(estimate)
42.4
x**
x
x
x
x
1986-88
Res. Pop.
SNF+ICF’
Resident
/1000 HPM
(C+R+S)
*55.3
50.9
58.2
17.4
64.5
192.6
*Standardized rate ig 54.96; S/HMO rate ig 69.21.
** x information not available.
The National rate is nine percent higher than that for
Multnomah County. Policy analysis which attempts to compare
non-HMO data with HMO data is outside the context of this
study, but could be valuable information for policy makers
interested in generalizing findings regarding the Expanded
Care Benefit portio~ of the S/HMO Demonstration Project.
In order to obtain a comprehensive view of Overall
utilization rates , it is necessary to evaluate other use
rates than that presented for Research Question I. The rate
。f choice for assessing nursing home utilization is days in
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S/HMO.
Research Question II asks whether differences exist
between three eligibility groups regarding respective days
。f stay as an ICF resident during the study period. Units of
measurement are cumulative days attributed to all members
while residing in an ICF during the study period as Cost , or
Risk , or S/HMO Medicare beneficiaries per member year of
eligibility in Cost , Risk , or S/HMO KP eligibility groups.
Research Question II: Are There Differences Between S/HMO
and Risk Member ICFDays in Residence During Study Period/
Member Year of Eligibility?
Days of ICF residence are apportioned according t。
their overlay on periods of eligibility in Cost or Risk or
S/HMO KP membership. If the resident ’ s eligibility changed
while in an ICF (or SNF) , their days in residence are
censored by such eligibility dates. No member was in an ICF
residence across all three eligibility status even though
some members were enrolled as Cost , and Risk , and S/HMO
during the Study Period.
The unit of measure in tables presented under Research
Question II is: [days of ICF stay per days of eligibility
within each Medicare beneficiary group during the two year
study period]. Conversion of that rate denominator is needed
to create relative values for comparing Cost , Risk and S/HMO
rates and because denominator values are so large. Thus
[days of eligibility during the study period] , become [per
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member year of eligibility].
Table XI presents Overall rates for all members
residing in an ICF or and SNF , or both , including: those in
a nursing home at the start of the study period , those
admitted and discharged during the study period , and those
in a nursing home at the end of the study period. Periods of
stay which crossed the beginning and ending dates of the
study period were censored, accordingly.
TABLE XI
。VERALL RATES , STANDARDIZED BY AGE AND SEX , FOR
DAYS OF NURSING HOME RESIDENCE DURING THE
STUDY PERIOD PER MEMBER YEAR OF NOT
MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE ELIGIBILITY
STATUS COST , RISK , S/HMO IN
THE STUDY PERIOD.
Model A Days Days Days Combined
Male + Female /Yr Elig /Yr Elig /Yr Elig Ave Days
COST RISK S/HMO (C+R+S)
ICF 4.92 4.77 3.45 4.41
SNF 1.00 0.92 0.88 0.94
Source: Appendix C
Based on the above rates , the answer to Research
Ouestion II is that Overall age-sex standardized relative
rates are significantly less for S/HMO than for Risk or Cost
ICF residents , regarding days of stay per member year of
group eligibility.
This is a very meaningful finding because it suggests
that , while access to ICF care may have been enhanced by the
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S/HMO ECB program, S/HMO members were able to find other
。ptions more readily than Risk members , or that S/HMO
members were able to leave sooner , or dependency on ICF
services could be minimized. Chapter VI information suggests
that a much higher proportion of S/HMO members went home
following ICF admission than Risk members.
In empirical terms , the ICF rate for Cost residents was
forty-three percent more than the ICF’ rate for S/HMO
residents; the ICF rate for Risk residents was thirty-
eight percent more than the S/HMO ICF’ rate.
Little variation existed between SNF rates. The Risk
rate was four and one-half percent above the S/HMO rate.
These observations suggest that even though the
probability of residing in an ICF was much higher for S/HMO
members than other Medicare members , the time spent in an
ICF by S/HMO nursing home residents was less than that of
。ther Medicare members. This observation is also made
regarding overall nursing home use. This finding has not
been reported in the literature on S/HMO site studies.
At least one report has identified the higher
probability of ICF admissions for S/HMO than non-S/HMO.
The observed pattern of use of institutional LTC
contrasts sharply with patterns observed in
national data regarding individuals not in SHMOs.
The pattern displays more frequent short-stay
admission to nursing homes and probably less
frequent placements. [57]
One masters thesis (1992) identified this trend based
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。n data limited to S/HMO members in the last year of life
who used nursing homes. "There was no significant difference
in ICF utilization between the study populations in the last
year of life , although the Plus II population showed a
tendency for a higher mean ICF admissions (p-O.14) [than
Plus I Risk] [58]. One study in a non-S/HMO setting reported
a similar finding in a 1988 study of 3 , 316 residents of six
Continuing Care Retirement Communities , (CCRC) which
provided for nursing home care as a part of the financial
investment of thεir members.
A CCRC combines the finance and delivery of long-
term care services within a single organizational
context and insures against long-term care costs.
[One of the findings reported in this study was
that] ... across all age categories , the lifetime
risk of nursing home entry was greater among CCRC
residents than among persons in the community ...
and across communities , the risk of entry was
found to vary dramatically , suggesting that man-
agement decisions are critically important for
controlling the use of nursing home services. The
same study found that the length of stay per ad-
mission is shorter in a CCRC than in the general
community ... CCRC nursing home entrants were found
to enter nursing homes twice as often as their
counterparts in the general community. [59]
In the Overall data set , ICF use rate patterns by
gender are consiste~t with the expected lower rate for males
and higher rate for females , as summarized below , in Table
XII. The rate was thirty-six percent higher for Risk males
than S/HMO males , and forty percent higher for Risk females
than S/HMO Females.
The literature reports a greater likelihood of home
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support systems for males and females , suggesting that the
female pattern is especially important.
TABLE XII
OVERALL RATES , STANDARDIZED BY AGE AND SEX , FOR ICF
DAYS OF NURSING HOME RESIDENCE DURING THE STUDY
PERIOD PER MEMBER YEAR OF COST , RISK , S/HMO
STUDY PERIOD ELIGIBILITY BY GENDER
ICF Days ICF Days ICF Days Combined
IYr Elig IYr Elig IYr Elig Ave Days
Model A COST RISK S/HM'。 (C+R+S)
Gender
Male 4.63 3.69 2.71 3.61
Female 5.10 5.47 3.92 4.92
Male+Female 4.92 4.77 3.45 4.41
Numerator:
ICF n - 34 , 123 77 , 754 33 , 100 144 , 977
Denominator: (000) (000) (000) (000)
n - 2 , 471 6 , 066 3 , 468 12 , 004
Source: Appendix C
Before examining age cohort patterns of nursing home
use , a summary is provided of parameters for age within each
eligibility group of ICF residents during the study period.
Mean ages for ICF residents in the study period are:
Cost - 85.0 , Risk - 84.5 , S/HMO - 82.9. Median ages are:
Cost - 86.0 , Risk - 85.2 , S/HMO - 83.4. 03 ages are: Cost -
80.6-90.4 , Risk - 79.2-90.1 , S/HMO - 77.7-87.8.
Among ICF users , the first and third interquartile mean
value (01 , 03) of ages for S/HMO members were 1.5 years
younger than Risk at 01 , and 2.3 years less than Risk ICF
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users at Q3. Median age is 1.8 year less , and mean age is
1.6 years less for S/HMO than for Risk ICF residents. An
examination of non-standardized (Raw) ICF rates by age
cohort is presented in Table XIII , below.
TABLE XIII
OVERALL RAW RATES BY AGE & SEX FOR ICF DAYS OF NURSING
HOME RESIDENCE DURING THE STUDY PERIOD PER MEMBER
YEAR OF COST , RISK , S/HMO ELIGIBILITY STATUS
IN THE STUDY PERIOD BY AGE COHORT
ICF Days ICF’ Days ICF days Combined
/Yr Elig /Yr Elig /Yr Elig Ave Days
Model A(RAW) COST RISK S/HMO (C+R+S)
Age Cohort
65-74 0.66 0.66 0.81 0.70
75-84 5.69 5.57 3.84 4.58
85-105 20.71 22.81 13.62 19.73
Source: Appendix C
The S/HMO raw rate for age 65-74 is twenty-three
percent greater than that for Risk. The Risk rate is forty-
five percent greater than that of S/HMO in age cohort 75-84
and sixty-seven percent greater than that of S/HMO in age
cohort 85-105. Thus , in the Overall data set , S/HMO rates
are consistently le~s than Risk rate in each age cohort and
gender cell.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter and as
discussed in Chapter III , Overall rates are contrasted with
Subsets I and II , presented in Table XIV , below , in order t。
see how patterns change when residents with prior nursing
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home admissions are removed. F’igure 5 presents data from
Tables XI and XIV , following the latter table.
In Subset II , the S/HMO rate of days in residence per
year of eligibility is ten percent less than that of Risk
and eight percent less than the Cost rate for ICF members
admitted during the study period. Thus , use rate differences
between Risk and S/HMO are not as disparate after removal of
those 71 residents (34 Cost , 33 Risk , 5 S/HMO) in an ICF at
the beginning of the study period who were not readmitted
during the study period. It appears that Risk and S/HMO
rates were the same under these conditions of comparison.
TABLE XIV
USE RATES , STANDARDIZED BY SEX AND AGE COHORT FOR
ICF DAYS IN SP PER HPM YEAR OF ELIGIBILITY BY
COST , RISK , S/HMO ELIGIBILITY STATUS
Model A
Male + Female
ICF’ Days
/Yr Elig
COST
ICF Days
/Yr Elig
RISK
ICF Days
/Yr Elig Ave
S/HMO Combined
Subset I
Subset II
2.26
3.45
2.58
3.51
2.67
3.19
2.56
3.41
Source: Appendix C
Subset II still included other residents who had
admissions before the study period. In Subset I , the S/HMO
rate was three percent above that for Risk. In Subset I all
members with prior nursing home experience are removed.
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Because information in Chapter VII suggests that SIRKO
days may be less than Risk when the year following the study
period is considered.
This underscores an important policy research issue
when doing policy analysis about nursing homes; lifetime use
patterns are likely to differ significantly from those
。bserved in shorter term patterns. Caution is emphasized
about formulating policy on one time rates such as those in
the National Nursing Home Surveys or annual state surveys.
Differences within Risk and s/HMO are important
。bservations in the table below. Specifically, the magnitude
。f change in use rates between Subset II and Subset I shows
that the S/HMO rate reduced by only half that of Risk in
Table XV , below. The change in rates between Subset II and
Subset I , below , was nineteen percent for S/HMO , while the
change in rate between Subset II and Subset I was thirty-six
percent for Risk.
A similar pattern is observed for raw rates by age
cohorts. Raw annualized use rates within age cohort display
two patterns of special interest regarding differences
between Subset I and Subset II for Risk and S/HMO days used
during the study period per member year of eligibility. The
first pattern shows that S/HMO rates are greater in the tw。
younger age cohorts but less in the oldest age cohort in
both Subsets I and II , as seen in Table XV , below. Within
age cohort 85+ , S/HMO is twenty-eight percent below Risk.
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TABLE XV
RAW RATE FOR ICF DAYS PER MEMBER YEAR OF ELIGIBILITY
BY MEMBERS IN COST , RISK , OR S/HMO ELIGIBILITY
STATUS BY AGE COHORT
Model A ICF Days ICF Days ICF Days
(RAW)/Yr Elig /Yr Elig /Yr Elig
COST RISK S/HMO Average
Age 65-74
Subset I 0.26 0.56 0.56 0.50
Subset II 0.34 0.61 0.77 0.60
Age 75-84
Subset I 2.32 2.50 3.52 2.77
Subset II 3.74 3.33 3.76 3.54
Age 85+
Subset I 10.67 11. 56 9.01 10.64
Subset II 15.77 16.41 11. 83 14.96
Source: Appendix C
Within Subset II , this rate for S/HMO age 85 and over
is thirty-nine percent less than Risk. The oldest S/HMO
members use less ICF services , collectively, than their
counterparts in Risk. This pattern is recurrent in all other
rate comparisons. Some variable(s) is/are affecting ICF use
rate patterns for "old old" S/HMO members which is not
affecting "old old’I Risk IeF’ residents , or at least not s。
it is visible in measurement rates used here.
The opposite trend occurs between Subsets I and II in
age cohort 75-84 and this pattern also prevails under all
tests of difference. Specifically, this rate is forty-one
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percent greater for S/HMO than for Risk ICF users in Subset
I , and thirteen percent greater for Subset II.
Within S/HMO age cohort 75-84 , the rate decreases
thirty-one percent between Subset II and Subset Ii within
Risk the rate decreases forty-two percent between Subsets I
and II.
These two patterns ‘ and trends form a recurrent
。bservation throughout all remaining analysis in this study ,
including analysis of Medicaid rates and analysis of
expenditures for nursing horne care. The above table suggests
that the ECB program could be managing different age cohorts
differently. Or , different needs may exist in each age
cohort for Risk members than for S/HMO members.
Several other views of this changing pattern are
presented. First , raw rates for days of stay are compared by
days per research population member. Rates , for ICF days
used per research population member in Table XVI , follow the
same trends as the pattern observed for the preceding rate ,
days used per member year of eligibility. However , there is
an important difference. The magnitude of difference between
Overall data set values and those of Subsets I and II is
much less. Days of eligibility were selected over members as
the denominator because the latter should give a better
indicator of the opportunity of having days in a nursing
horne relative to the days in each eligibility over which
that event was occurring. At least the above table confirms
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that the pattern prevails under both denominators of members
in the eligibility group and days of eligibility.
TABLE XVI
ICF DAYS USED PER RESEARCH POPULATION MEMBER
BASED ON RAW DATA FOR SUBSETS I AND II
AND OVERALL DATA SET OF ICF RESIDENTS
IN NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
COST , OR RISK , OR S/HMO
ELIGIBILITY STATUS
Model A ICF Days ICF Days ICF Days
Male + Female /member /member /member Ave
COST RISK S/HMO Combined
Overall 5.52 6.74 5.25 6.04
Subset II 3.88 4.97 4.84 4.66
Subset I 2.56 3.68 4.05 3.49
Source: Appendix C
Raw data is used to give another view of utilization
differences for Risk and S/HMO ICF residents by Subsets I ,
II. Descriptive parameters of mean , median and third
interquartile range days of stay are shown in Table XVII ,
below for Cost , Risk and S/HMO groups in Model A. In fact ,
the values shown in the third interquartile range of days of
stay may be an indication of what is taking place among
among S/HMO members that accounts for the trends observed in
the preceding two tables.
The length of stay (LOS) variance is substantially less
among S/aMO members than among Risk or cost members. But ,
more important , is the pattern of descriptive information
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about S/HMO members; its central tendency is closely formed
at 100 days , similar to that allowed by the ECB , then.
TABLE XVII
MEAN LENGTH OF STAY FOR ALL ICF’
RESIDENTS IN SUBSETS I , II
Cost Risk S/HMO
ICF’ Res. ICF Res. ICF’ Res.
Subset II
Mean LOS 155 163 108
MedianLOS 79 76 48
Q3 LOS 222 256 117
Subset I
Mean LOS 136 151 100
MedianLOS 64 68 47
Q3 LOS 192 233 109
Note: numbers are rounded to nearest whole number.
Substantially less LOS variance about the S/HMO mean ,
than about the Risk mean LOS , reinforces the notion that use
rates for S/HMO were influenced by the ECB benefit level of
100 days maximum. Since this is a two year study period , the
question needs pursuing about whether the mean LOS of 100
days is a lifetime pattern for that subset of S/HMO users or
simply coincidence which would change over a longer period
。f time. In policy issue terms , is this rate mainly a
product of balancing managed care practices with health care
needs or is it a chance observation? If not the latter, this
is an encouraging finding about the policy concern for the
manageability of insured LTC. The 100 day limit was a non-
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renewable benefit from one year to the next unless out of an
ICF and in a home while on ECB benefits for 60 days or more.
These LOS data observations lead to another important
evaluation process of differences in use rates. That is , how
do time periods of stay differ when cumulative days are
clustered according to notions of shorter-stay and longer
stay. A policy issue of some interest is the basis for this
evaluation step. There is some debate about whether the ECB
days of nursing home coverage (100 days) is sufficient? The
policy issues is , how long should such a benefit provide for
in order reasonably protect most shorter-stay nursing home
residents against using all their personal assets for
expensive nursing home costs? One test of this question is
what proportion of days in ICF residence would be covered ,
。n average , by 100 days?
As seen in the above table of mean and median lengths
。f stay , mean and 03 LOS are very close to the 100 day limit
。f non-renewable ECB for nursing home use. Seventy percent
。f S/HMO ICF residents had 100 or fewer ICF cumulative days
。f stay during the two year study period. Ninety-one percent
。f SiRKO ICF residents use 200 days or less during the study
period. Table XVIII , below, provides a better understanding
。f the variance in LOS within and between S/HMO and Risk
nursing home users. Fifty-six percent of Risk ICF residents
had 100 or fewer ICF cumulative days of stay during the tw。
year study period.
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TABLE XVIII
OVERALL DAYS OF STAY BY TIME PERIOD CLUSTERS DURING
THE STUDY PERIOD FOR ICF’, SNF , SNF+ICF
% of 훌 。f 훌 。E
Total Total Total
ICF Days SNF Days SNF+ICF
Days Risk SHMO Risk SHM'。 Risk SHMO
1-30 31.2훌 37.9훌 54.0% 52.3훌 36.4훌 38.6홈
31-100 24.9훌 32.3홈 36.8훌 38.0훌 29.1훌 32.1홈
101-200 13.0훌 12.4훌 4.2훌 6.8훌 10.1훌 14.1홈
201-365 13.9훌 8.51홈 3.8훌 1. 7% 1 1. 4 훌 7.8 홈
366-730 17.0훌 8.9훌 1. 2 훌 1. 2% 12.7 훌 7.3 홈
That is , over fourteen percent fewer Risk ICF residents
would have been within the 100 day limit. A policy issue is ,
would a higher proportion of Risk ICF’ residents have used
fewer total ICF days had they had ECB benefits?
Among those S/HMO residents further analysis is needed
to determine if they were concurrently using there ECB , or
if they used it all , for community based home care? Among
Risk and S/HMO the analysis of ICD hospital discharge codes
used in Chapter IX needs to be applied to this subset ,
together with ADLs , which need to be obtained for the Risk
Residents.
An analysis of total days of ECB eligibility is needed
for the S/HMO subset of under 100 days. This would require a
cross match of nursing home admission and discharge dates
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with dates of recertification for ECB.
The subset of S/RNO members who also were Risk member
needs to be cross-matched with S/HMO users remaining under
100 days to determine how many used their ECB benefits and
reverted to Risk; in the study period that appears to have
。ccurred rarely; confirmation is needed. Ninety-one percent
。f S/HMO ICF residents used 200 days or less during the
study period; eighty-three percent of Risk members required
200 days or less of ICF stay, as seen in Figure 6 , next.
SNF’ rates are nearly identical when grouped. Ninety
percent of both Risk and S/HMO members stayed 100 days or
less. This suggests that utilization control was good. The
real question for policy purposes is , what proportion of SNF
patients needed to use the full 100 days of SNF care? These
values are too close to the Medicare benefit limits to not
suspect a correlation between benefits and discharge.
Eight-seven percent of Risk nursing home users
remained , or used fewer than 366 days out of the 730
potential SNF and ICF days during the study period. A high
proportion of elderly research population members were
eligible during that entire time. Ninety-three percent of
S/HMO nursing home residents used less than the equivalent
。f one year of nursing home days. Since a high proportion of
longer stay patients had multiple admissions , these LOS data
do not necessarily reflect continuous stay.
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In September , 1990 , the first definitive study of
estimates regarding cumulative days of nursing home stay ,
based on sample histories of multiple facility and multiple
admissions data. The findings presented in the above tables ,
based on absolute rather than sample data , show lower
patterns of nursing home utilization than has been estimated
for the nation. liNearly two-thirds of nursing home stays ,
however , have been for 6 months of less and only about 16
percent of persons stayed for longer than two years." (Op.
Cit. GAO[20] p. 12). Another view of LOS patterns is
available from the Urban Institute.
Until 1985 , the NNHS length of stay information
consisted only of one isolated stay per nursing
home resident. Consequently, if an individual had
more than one nursing home stay , those days could
not be linked to analyze patterns of multiple
admissions ... Our second aim is to demonstrate the
importance of accounting for multiple admission
when estimating the number of people who would be
affected by front-end policies such as those
proposed by the former Commissioner Ball and the
Pepper Commission ... The median sample stay of the
65-74 age group (74 days) is 22 days shorter than
that of age group 85+ (96 days) , the difference
increases to 51 days after adjusting for multiple
stays ... Of the short stay group with no prior
days , 33 percent were nursing home deaths [we
included persons who were known to have died in a
hospital after discharge from a nursing home] , and
35 percent we~e discharged alive to a private
residents ... individuals with minimum stays of one
year have a negligible chance {5훌} of returning t。
a private residences noted, limitations of the
NNHS do not allow us to fully capture the
incidence of multiple admissions , either from the
perspective of lifetime nursing home use or
episode of illness surrounding the sample ... [a
simulated model was developed to estimate true
comprehensive nursing home use patterns by
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adjustment for multiple admissions indicates that
25 percent fewer persons would be fully covered
by the three-month front-end policy [recommended
by the Pepper Commission] ... paraphrase ...도흑효
stayed 90-180 days and 180-365 days each in the
simulated model."[60]
Using the Liu and Perozek simulated model of estimated
cumulative days of nursing home stay as the baseline of
comparison for Risk and S/HMO SNF+ICF data , suggests that 15
percent more Risk residents and 20 percent more S/HMO
residents accumulated less than 100 days of nursing home
stay that the model suggests. It also suggests about 2훌 more
more of the sample model remained 90-180 and 180-365 days ,
than was observed in this dissertation study of the true
population.
The Connecticut Nursing Home Data System study , by Liu
and Manton did an analysis of the complete length of stay
distribution on an admission cohort of nursing home patients
in that state. Even that data base , which is perhaps the
’ most complete state wide data base on nursing home use in
America , required estimates for missing information related
to left (entry) and right (truncated tail of the cohort
distribution) censoring. Their model estimates the
cumulative discharge rate to be 34 percent at 90 days , and
43 percent at 180 days and 52 percent at one year. [61]
Several factors could affect the difference between the
Liu and Manton model of Connecticut data and this study. It
may be that the two year study period falsely censored many
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Risk and S/HMO members whose true cumulative days of stay
would be longer when examined. Such examination is entirely
feasible since all utilization and financial data was
collected on all nursing home members prior to the study and
up to one year after.
Another nursing home care model-building issue exists
which is unique to the S/HMO research population , at least
at the KP S/HMO Demonstration site. This issue relates t。
some proportion of members being eligibility for ECB
services on an intermittent basis. That does not
necessarily mean they were not eligible for ECB while in a
nursing home , but it could be a consideration in
differentiating possible effects of S/HMO ECB on ICF use. In
this S/HMO research environment any model which is created
to estimate comprehensive lifetime use rates must als。
consider eligibility status for both the benefit and
eligibility groups. That adds some serious complications t。
the model building effort. [62]
The S/HMO ECB allowed up to 100 days beyond what
Medicare covered in either an SNF or ICF during the study
period. That suggests the likelihood of some interaction
between SNF and ICF use rates , beyond what exists for
persons not having SHMO benefits. One policy issue arising
from this situation is whether the comprehensive use of
nursing home services is different for S/HMO that Risk?
The research question pursued next is whether the ICF
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pattern observed above differs from use rates for combined
SNF and ICF stay? In the next analysis , Table XIX , that
question is examined on a group basis; that is persons with
。nly SNF care are included in the rates as well as persons
with both SNF and ICF stays.
Among shorter-stay residents , it is not always easy t。
differentiate between persons qualifying for SNF care and
those belonging in ICF care. Making that differential
determination sometimes requires a lengthy period during
which a patients condition is stabilizing. For this reason
it is well to begin this evaluation from an Overall use rate
perspective.
Overall , the S/HMO rate , above , is thirty-two percent
less that that for Risk , and is seven percent less than Risk
in Subset II. In Subset I Risk is nine percent below that of
S/HMO for combined SNF’+ICF nursing home use.
Once again , the reversal of the use rate patterns in
Subset I suggests the need for analysis of utilization data
following the study period. Analysis of payments receives
suggests that the S/HMO rate in Subset I should also be less
than that for Risk.
The observation inferred by the above rates is that the
trend of effects of S/HMO ECB on Overall nursing home use
rates is similar to that for ICF only, but the magnitude of
differences are less. Based on the earlier comparison of SNF
rates this is not surprising.
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TABLE XIX
USE RATES , STANDARDIZED BY SEX AND AGE COHORT FOR
SNF+ICF DAYS IN SP PER HPM YEAR OF ELIGIBILITY
BY MEMBERS IN NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE COST ,
RISK , OR S/HMO ELIGIBILITY STATUS
SNF+ICF SNF+ICF’ SNF’+ICF’ SNF+ICF
Model A NH Days NH Days NH Days NH Days
Male + Female /Yr Elig /Yr Elig /Yr Elig /Yr Elig
COST RISK S/HMO Combined
Overall 5.95 5.69 4.32 5.35
Subset II 4.22 4.34 4.07 4.23
Subset I 2.84 3.17 3.45 3.19
Source: Appendix C
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Two Research Questions were addressed in this chapter.
The findings for both show that ICF utilization was
different between S/HMO and Risk members during the study
period. Specifically, Overall rates in Research Question I ,
indicates that S/HMO members were much more likely to become
ICF residents , but the Overall rate in Research Question II ,
shows that S/HMO used substantially fewer ICF days than Risk
members. Thus , the inference is that the ECB facilitates
access to ICF services that they may not have enjoyed, but
also facilitates both effective management of that access by
case management which can offer a home based alternative t。
institutional care as a means of meeting the elderly members
LTC needs.
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Subset I has the effect of removing residents whose
days of stay spanned the study period and may have included
many months or years on either side of the twenty-four month
window of analysis. Subset I also has the effect of removing
。ne of the study period censoring factors , wherein length of
stay is potentially terminated , unnaturally , on one end.
However , it also reduces the use rate pattern more likely t。
surface from a lifetime of nursing home needs. Subsets I is
introduced as a tool with which to surface questions about
the Overall rate patterns.
In age cohort 85+ , the S/HMO rate is consistently less
than Risk under all conditions. This suggests that S/HMO ECB
may be affecting the oldest age cohort differently than
younger S/HMO members.
Mean lengths of stay were less for S/HMO than for Risk
members and variance about the mean is considerably less ,
suggesting that the 100 day ECB limit was an influence in
ICF use rates.
Patterns of stay demonstrate that more S/HMO residents
remained in nursing homes {SNF+ICF} for fewer cumulative
days than Risk members. Given the time-span of this study
that is only a tentative pattern , but the trend is important
because it reinforces the observations from use rates that
S/HMO member ’ s use of nursing homes is influenced in ways
not observed for Risk members , which infers that the S/HMO
ECB must be considered as a a strong influence in member
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decisions about home based vs. institutional based care.
No doubt , there were other organizational influences which
affected utilization of S/HMO ICF residents , as well as
socioeconomic and health factors.
DISCUSSION: EXTERNAL ISSUES POTENTIALLY AFFECTING USE RATES
Why aren ’ t differences in use rates constant between
the three criteria for which rates are produced , i.e. , (1)
all residents in study period; (2) those admitted during the
study period , who had a history of SNF/ICF admissions before
the study period; (3) residents whose initial ICF admission
was during the study period? Is it due to magnitude of rate
changes in S/HMO , or Risk or both?
The likely answer to higher S/HMO rates in Subset I is
that as case management skills improved, members certified
for nursing home care who were less dependent , were placed
at home , leaving a higher proportion of longer-stay
placement. Eliminating S/HMO members with nursing home stay
prior to the study period probably would have eliminated the
shorter-stay , multiple admission residents.
At the same time , there were other organizational and
environmental events taking place which were more likely t。
affect the Risk ICF rates than S/HMO rates. It was a dynamic
period, regarding nursing home utilization.
In fact , at least three other PQlicy events were taking
place , which deserve noting , that could have affected use
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rates , especially those for Risk members. They were not
measured or otherwise studied as a part of this research
project. Their affect on Risk and S/HMO use rates would have
been strongest in the latter half of the study period. That
was also a time when SHMO member use of nursing homes was
increasing. Tighter controls over nursing home use would
have a greater influence on Subset I than the Overall data
set because
F’irst , during the study period , HCFA regulations were
clarified, regarding capitation paYments , to include higher
monthly reimbursement for Risk Medicare members in nursing
homes , including those in ICF and residential or foster
level care facilities. This higher capitation paYment
recognized greater expenses incurred by HMOs from caring for
members in nursing homes. KP also recognized it needed t。
do a better job of managing nursing home expenses.
Although KP was a model for hospital utilization
review , it had not applied that model to KP members in
nursing homes. Beginning in 1985 , such a program was pilot
tested using one geriatric nurse practitioner to do on-site
review for level of care needs. This supplemented Medicare ’ s
requirement of initial and quarterly physician review for
SNFs , and annual review for ICFs. By late 1987 and early
1988 , that program was expanded to include three nurse
practitioners to do ICF review; it was not uncommon that
many of the 600+ ICF patients were reviewed quarterly, and
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in some cases monthly.
Second, KP hospital emergency rooms developed lists of
elderly persons who frequented ERs for problems which could
be stabilized or resolved quickly , including short term use
。f in home services by community based care givers. Such
persons might otherwise have been placed in an ICF , or other
suitable institutions.
Third , by the end of the first year in S/HMO , SNF’ costs
were escalating rapidly. This may have led to more intensive
utilization review of S/HMO members in SNFS , resulting in an
increasing substitution of ICF care for SNF care , when ever
needs of such S/HMO members could be safely and adequately
met at the lower level of licensed staffing required of
ICFs.
How these utilization activities contributed to the
pattern of changes in rates observed for the Overall data
set of ICF users , is not known , but they were part of the
changing process of managing long term care needs of KP
members during the study period.
If these events are as described , it only strengthens
the Overall data set findings for Research Question II. That
is , even under an environment of increased use of ICFs , and
under the most conservative measure of ICF use rates , n。
difference in days used per member year of eligibility was
。bserved between S/HMO and Risk eligibility groups. And ,
under the Overall use rates , S/HMO nursing home residents
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clearly used fewer ICF days per year of member eligibility
than did Risk members who resided in ICFs.
POLICY RESEARCH OBSERVATIONS REGARDING ICF USE RATES
Answers to Research Questions I and II raise some key
issues about operational implementation of a S/HMO model.
One issue is , under what conditions is it operationally
rational to expand a Medicare Supplemental health care
benefit so it includes some reasonable amount of ICF level
long-term care services , without leading to an economically
untenable affect on the financial well being of the HMO?
Another issue is that an Expanded Care Benefit does
not , a priori , lead to inflationary use of ICF services ,
given the conditions under which use rate differences were
measured in this study. The fact that S/HMO members were
more likely to become ICF residents did not materialize int。
more ICF days in residence. This suggests the possibility
that a managed care system can successfully manage ICF use
rates , probably even more rigorously than initially managed
by KP and S/HMO case coordinators.
From a national policy perspective , the outcome of
rates for Research Questions I and II should offer
encouragement about enlarging S/HMO Expanded Care Benefit
trial programs wherein a rigorous test of difference between
trial and control groups is conducted including comparison
。f the community based component of an ECB.
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The next chapter examines rate differences in Risk
members who pay Medicare Supplemental Benefit dues out of
pocket compared to those whose dues (premium) are paid via a
group sponsor. It also examines differences in use rates
between Risk and S/HMO members who are enrolled from the
community in contrast to those who converted from within KP.
And , differences within Risk membership are viewed regarding
those who rolled over into TEFRA Risk status from Medicare
Plus Demonstration Risk status. Did these factors influence
Risk or S/HMO rates in a way which warrants caution about
findings regarding Overall IeF use rates , presented above?
CHAPTER V
USE RATE DIFFERENCES BASED ON SOURCE OF ENROLLMENT
The [Medicare Plus Prospective payment] project
stimulated a new planning process for geriatric
care and fostered the development of the Social
HMO demonstration (Medicare Plus II) that began
serving serving Medicare beneficiaries with
expanded in-home support service benefits in
March 1985. [63]
Within the Risk research population group there were
Medicare members (2/3) who paid the Supplemental Benefit
directly to KP , and there were others (1/3) whose Supplement
Benefit premium was paid by a group retirement program
sponsor. This chapter compares S/HMO members , all of whom
paid their premium directly to KP , with those Risk members
who also paid KP directly , as individual subscribers.
Within S/HMO and individual Risk eligibility groups ,
there were two basic categories of enrollees; those wh。
converted from Cost status within KP and those who enrolled
directly from the community and were new to KP. This chapter
compares new and converted rates for Risk and S/HMO members.
Also , a substantial portion of the direct pay Risk
membership was comprised of transfers for the Medicare Plus
Demonstration project. They were not allowed to become S/HMO
members during the study period, or until 1989. Rates for
individual Risk and S/HMO members are compared next , in
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。rder to answer Research Questions Ia and IIa.
Research Question I : What Differences Existed Between
Individual Risk Mem를ers and S/HMO Members Regarding the
Probability of Becoming An ICF Resident Per 1000 Members?
Table XX , below , shows standardized use rates for this
Research Question. SNF rates are also presented.
TABLE XX
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY AGE COHORT WITHIN GENDER)
NUMBER OF ICF & SNF RESIDENTS PER 1000 RISK &
S/HMO INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS , SEPARATED BY
"NEW" AND ’'CONV" STATUS AT TIME OF
ENROLLMENT IN RISK OR S/HMO
ELIGIBILITY STATUS
42.40
Risk
Model A New
Male + Female /1000
Individual ICF 37.34
。verall
[Total Risk]
[Total S/HMO]
Individual SNF 32.36
Risk
Conv
/1000
30.26
31. 61
16.35
S/HMO
New
/1000
43.94
28.49
S/HMO
Conv
/1000
46.37
26.85
Overall
[Total Risk]
[Total S/HMO]
(Individual)
ICF numerator 168
denominator 3449
Source: Appendix D
23.27
118
4194
131
2913
26.78
146
3196
No residents are included in the rates who were in a
nursing home at the beginning of the study period. Risk
rates presented in this chapter exclude numerator and
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denominator values for I groUp" members , and include only
lI individual ll Risk member values.
S/HMO members were about thirty percent more likely t。
become ICF residents than individual Risk members.
Both new S/HMO and converted S/HMO were more likely t。
reside in an ICF than either individual new or converted
Risk members. This is consistent with previous findings in
which group and individual Risk members are compared with
S/HMO , regarding risk of ICF’ admission.
Individual new Risk and new S/HMO members were
twenty-three percent more likely to become ICF residents
during the study period than were converted Risk members.
New S/HMO members were six percent less likely t。
become ICF residents during the study period than were
converted S/HMO members. This is important because a finding
。f little difference suggests that S/HMO sampling procedures
used to control against adverse selection bias resulted in a
wide cross section of the community, rather than attracting
many persons expecting to access and use IeF services. "If
subscribers representing higher than average risk choose the
plan , then that plan is said to have experienced adverse
selection from the group in question. II [64l
Similarly, new Risk members were ninty-eight percent
more likely to become SNF residents during the study period
than were converted Risk members. New S/HMO members were
6.1훌 less likely to become SNF residents during the study
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period than were converted Risk members.
The broad policy concern addressed in this chapter is
about the uncertainty of effects on an ECB program which
enrolls new Medicare members directly into a capitation
program on the basis of receiving a LTC benefit.
Table XXI shows that removal of group Risk members from
the data set affects Risk rates in age cohort 75-84 by
raising the Risk rate to that of S/HMo. Apparently, more
group Risk members were younger than non-group Risk members.
TABLE XXI
RAW RATES BY AGE COHORT FOR ICF RESIDENTS PER
1000 HPM SUBSET FOR: NEW AND CONVERTED
SIHMO AND INDIVIDUAL (NON-GROUP)
RISK KP MEMBERS
Individual
Risk Risk s/HMO s/8M。
Model A New Conv New Conv
Male + Female 11000 11000 11000 11000
age 65-74
RAW (ICF) 17.98 3.61 14.13 14.48
효RgA트W-7프二(8I호CF) 42.20 28.04 55.51 51.92
료RAgW트 8프+(ICF) 114.80 163.00 123.63 152.02
Source: Appendix D
Specifically, comparison of rates for probability of
admission of individual Risk and S/HMO members shows the
same pattern of reduced use of ICF and SNF services for age
cohort 85 new members , compared to both converted members
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and to new members in age cohort 75-84. This pattern was not
。bserved when Risk Group members were included. S/HMO rates
exceed those of individual Risk members in age cohorts 65-74
and 74-85.
Overall differences between age cohorts 75-84 and 85+
may simply represent differences in nursing home placement
efforts by families , providers , or welfare case managers.
Or , it may be that those who survive age cohort 75-84 simply
have different states of disability and dysfunction , or/and
their dependencies can be satisfactorily managed in
non-nursing home surroundings.
The similarity of rates for new Risk and S/HMO in age
cohort 85+ , and higher rate for S/HMO than Risk in age 75-84
was observed in the overall rates presented in Chapter IV.
Within S/HMO there is little rate difference that
suggests new members needed more ICF services than converted
S/HMO members. In fact , among the group most likely to use
ICF’ services , age 85+ , converted S/HMO members were 23% more
likely to reside in an ICF during the study period than were
new S/HMo. Interestingly, that same observation is made
about their respective SNF use rates.
A more focused policy question arises about the above
patterns regarding the need for research about the effects
。f early screening on ICF access. This is really an issue of
how these two groups were accessing care If converted
members with established physician relations were ending up
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in nursing homes and then notifying S/HMO , that was
circumventing the screening and case management process. If
new members , without established physician relationships
were identified by early screening and intervention was
。ccurring before nursing home entry occurred , then the S/HM。
system was working better for new members than converted
members.
Within Risk there is a notable difference in rates
between new and converted Risk members which suggests that
age cohort 65-84 new Risk members needed ICF services more
than converted members , while new Risk members age 85+ had
less need for ICF services converted "old-old" Risk members.
That is not observed for SNF level care.
Research Question IIa : Are There Difference In IeF Days Used
During The Study Period Per Member Year of Eligibility
Between S/HMO and Individual Risk Members?
In the Table XXII , below , Cost rates are removed.
Overall , S/HMO members resided in ICFs significantly fewer
days per year of eligibility than overall individual Risk
members.
The overall new S/HMO rate is twenty-nine percent less
than that rate for individual new Risk members , and the
。verall converted S/HMO rate is forty-seven percent less
than that for individual converted Risk members.
Rates for "group" Risk residents must be lower than
rates for individual Risk members , based on observations
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from the above table. Why group Risk rates may be lower than
individual Risk rates is a matter of some policy interest.
TABLE XXII
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY AGE COHORT WITHIN GENDER)
NUMBER OF ICF & SNF DAYS FOR INDIVIDUAL RISK
AND S/HMO RESIDENTS ACCORDING TO NEW AND
CONVERTED STATUS DURING THEIR NURSING
HOME STAY
Individual
Risk New Risk Conv S/HMO New S/HMO Conv
ICF Days/ ICF Days/ ICF Days/ ICF Days/
Yr Elig Yr Elig Yr Elig Yr Elig
Model A
Male+Female
Overall 5.41 4.69 3.99 3.19
[Total Risk]
[Total SHMO]
Source: Appendix D
4.77
3.45
If aS/HMO ECB was marketed to sponsors of group
retirement plans , benefit rates might have to be adjusted if
the difference was great. Some follow-up studies on this
policy issue is needed.
。ne additional issue is addressed before leaving this
question of rate differences between converted and new
members in Risk and S/HMO. Specifically, are use rates
different for Risk members during the study period wh。
transferred from the Medicare Plus Demonstration Project ,
than use rates for Risk members who enrolled after April ,
1985 , following TEFRA-authorized HMO capitation contracts?
153
If so , is there some apparent reason for such
differences which could influence interpretation of
composite rate differences between S/HMO and Risk during the
study period? Use rates and age differences for each of the
four Risk subsets are compared , as a method of clarifying
this research question.
HCFA required an enrollment ratio of three (I’new")
community residents to one ("converted") KP Cost Medicare
member during the Medicare Plus Demonstration Project. Since
that project did not offer an Expanded Care Benefit , nothing
was known about differences between new and converted
pre-TEFRA Risk members regarding their need ICF services.
However , a great deal is known about other characteristics
which could affect IeF use rates.
The entire Spring 1984 edition, Volume 5 , Number 1 , of
The Group Health Journal is devoted to an analysis of
enrollment differences between new and converted Medicare
Plus Demonstration Project members. For example , it was
reported that Risk "conversion members generally are sicker
than the new members , especially with regard to heart
disease and hypertension." (Op. Cit. [63])
Research Question I is revisited in Table XXIII , next ,
with Risk data only (S/HMO data is omitted). Model A is used
to present the following table , which separates individual
Risk members into four subgroups in order to observe what
proportion of ICF residents per 1000 Risk members were
154
transfers from the Medicare Plus Demonstration Project
(1980-84) .
TABLE XXIII
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY SEX AND AGE COHORT)
ICF AND SNF RESIDENTS PER 1000 MEMBERS FOR:
A. NEW RISK ENROLLED BEFORE APRIL , 1985;
B. NEW RISK ENROLLED AFTER AFTER 1984;
C. COST MEDICARE CONVERTED TO RISK
BEFORE APRIL , 1985; AND
D. AFTER APRIL 1985 ,
AS INDIVIDUAL
MEMBERS
The probability rate for becoming an ICF resident was
。ver seventy percent greater for Medicare Plus Demonstration
Project Risk members than that rate for Risk members whose
Risk eligibility status commenced after April , 1985. Also ,
this SNP rate was higher for pre-TEPRA Risk members. Age
differences among research population members in each subset
follow the pattern of differences in this use rate.
As will be seen later in this chapter, Risk members wh。
converted from Cost into the Medicare Plus Demonstration
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Project (1980-1984) had the highest probability rate of
becoming an ICF resident during the study period , of all
eligibility subsets examined , including S/HMO. However ,
their days in an ICF were slightly lower than other subsets ,
but it appears that their death rate was high. Among Risk
members , they were most likely to be admitted to an ICF from
home , and most likely to be discharged to a community-based
convalescent center , as presented in Chapter VII.
Table XXIV summarizes differences in the rate for
nursing home days by the four Risk subsets. New pre-TEFRA
Risk ICF residents used more days than converted pre-TEFRA
Risk members. New individual TEFRA Risk ICF residents used
fewer ICF days than converted individual TEFRA Risk members.
Overall , new pre-TEFRA Risk nursing home residents used more
combined days per year of eligibility than residents in any
。ther Risk subset. This is not surprising , given their mean
age. In contrast , converted TEFRA Risk members admitted t。
an ICF had the highest rate , but the lowest mean age.
The rate of ICF days per member year of eligibility for
new Risk members enrolled from 1980-1984 , Column a , was
twenty-three percent greater than that rate for Risk members
who converted from Cost to Medicare Plus during 1980-84 , as
shown in Table XXIV , below.
For new Risk members whose eligibility status was
established after April , 1984 (Column b) , this rate was
forty-three percent less than the rate for converted Risk
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TABLE XXIV
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY SEX AND AGE COHORT)
ICF’ & SNF’ DAYS PER MEMBER YEAR OF ELIGIBILITY:
A. NEW RISK ENROLLED BEFORE APRIL , 1985;
B. NEW RISK ENROLLED AFTER AFTER 1984;
C. COST MEDICARE CONVERTED TO RISK
BEFORE APRIL , 1985; AND
D. AFTER APRIL 1985
Model A
Male + Female
Risk New
< 4/85
/yr elig
(a)
Individual
Risk New Risk Conv Risk Conv
> 4/85 < 4/85 > 4/85
/yr elig /yr elig /yr elig
(b) (c) (d)다-때
꽤
뼈-
4.37 3.27 3.56
0.68
4.69
0.651. 25 0.72
Source: Appendix D
members whose eligibility status succeeded April , 1984 ,
(Column d). New Risk members from pre-TEFRA used about 80
percent more SNF’ days than members who converted to Risk
enrollment after the TEFRA contract was implemented.
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS ABOUT RATES IN THIS CHAPTER AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS REGARDING PRIOR OBSERVATIONS
。 New and converted S/HMO members had a greater
probability of entering an ICF during the study period than
either new and converted Risk members. This rate difference
is probably not due to selection bias and not age related.
。 The probability of becoming an ICF resident was
slightly greater for Medicare Plus Demonstration Project
(pre-TEFRA) Risk members than for S/HMO members. Since rates
are age adjusted, the fact that the mean age of Risk
Medicare Plus Demonstration Project members was four years
。lder than that for S/HMO does not explain the finding. If
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this is related to the phenomenon of pre-TEFRA Risk members
having had more time to develop a physician relationship and
admission to an ICF was more easily authorize
。 The probability of becoming an ICF’ resident during the
study period was nearly two times greater for Risk members
who had been in the Medicare Plus Demonstration Project
(1980-1984) , than for Risk members who enrolled after the
TEFRA capitation contract was implemented (4/85). The mean
age of Risk Medicare Plus Demonstration Project members was
six years older than Risk for members enrolled after April ,
1985. No age adjustment was made within Risk , so age is a
possible factor regarding this difference.
。 Individual Risk rates are higher than group Risk rates;
the policy issue is whether persons with employer sponsored
retirement benefits use less institutional LTC that
individual payers , after age and gender adjustments are
made. Such differences were not clarified in this study.
。 The converted TEFRA Risk rate was higher than rates for
new TEFRA Risk subsets during the study period (1986-1988).
A similar finding was reported about such conversions under
the Medicare Plus Demonstration Project (pre-TEFRA) during
the period 1980-1984.
。 However， pre-TEFRA new Risk Rates were higher than
pre-TEFRA converted rates during the study period , after the
long term care ICF Risk residents were removed from the data
set. This shift emphasizes the need for lifetime use rates.
。 Within age cohort 85+ , the rate for TEF’RA Risk
residents was substantially greater than the rate for
Medicare Plus Demonstration Project Risk members during the
study period. This was explained by the days used rates for
converted (Cost to Risk) TEFRA Risk members.
。 The overall S/HMO rate was clearly less than the rate
for either new or converted individual Risk ICF residents.
。 In age cohort 85 , new S/HMO and converted S/HMO rates
for ICF days are lo~er than individual new Risk and
individual converted Risk rates.
。 The similarity between S/HMO and individual Risk
research population members , regarding age and gender
distribution as well as similarity in numbers makes a
valuable contribution to descriptive data produced in this
study. Specifically, it confirms that between the most
ideally matched Risk and S/HMO groups , the pattern observed
in Chapter IV is upheld. The S/HMO member probability of
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but for S/HMO ICF residents , days of stay are substantially
less for S/HMO than Risk residents. This strengthens the
notion that the ECB and related case management process
improves access but that does not lead to inflationary use.
Instead , it suggests that such S/HMO access patterns can be
managed effectively with financial incentives and formal
care alternatives. The ECB allows dependent elderly t。
remain in a home environment who otherwise might have
continued in an ICF’ . Confirmation testing of this concept is
needed because it is has significant policy implications.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ISSUES RELATED TO THIS CHAPTER
In this study , the separation of group from individual
enrollees is slightly artificial , in that KP members may
have been enrolled in groups prior to converting t。
individual Risk or S/HMO status. In the process of
evaluating S/HMO and Risk data for creation of variables and
files to be used in analysis , some absolute numbers were
produced. It is clear from some evaluation of historic
membership files that the transition from non-Medicare
employment status with group health benefits to Medicare
status , greatly alters the proportion of HMO members covered
by group benefits compared to Medicare members who pay for
Medicare benefits out of pocket. In order to affect
widespread acquisition of a Medicare based Expanded Care
Benefit , it is probably necessary to market it to employers ,
in the absence of a national policy for long-term care. If
marketed to persons below age 65 , an important policy issue
would be that group rates be continued after age 65.
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POLICY RESEARCH ISSUES
Future studies should consider random sampling which is
designed to select individual Risk members for the control
group so that the size of the Risk group is balanced with
that of S/HMO , making it easier to perform statistical
analysis which require balanced cell sizes. In order to d。
an analysis of difference in Risk group and Risk individual
payers it would be appropriate to identify all individual
members who had previous group status and remove them from
the individual Risk sample.
The research question of interest between group and
individual members is whether having a retirement benefit ,
which pays all or part of the basic Medicare Supplemental
Benefit , is associated with differences in nursing home use?
That is , do retirees who have a work related retirement
benefit which makes capitated payments to the HMO for
entitlement based Supplemental Benefits , have different ICF
use rates than those who pay for these benefits out of
pocket.
A follow-up analysis of differences between rates for
retirement benefit groups and individual payer groups is
recommended. In this study about 900 Risk members were
removed from the individual Risk data set who also were
carried in the Risk Group data set. There were other
instances of duplicate status. Validity of differences
between individual and group rates was in question and
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direct comparison of those rates was avoided. That is why
conclusions about effects of group rates were inductively
arrived at by showing differences between individual Risk
rates and overall Risk rates.
Thus , it is almost certain that group rates were lower
than individual Risk rates , but to what extent is uncertain.
This discussion is presented here because it has policy
implications regarding prospective marketing of an Extended
Care Benefit to Medicare (on non-Medicare) members enrolled
in the HMO via sponsored retirement benefit plans. For one
thing , employers may wish to know the extent to which they
feel they might be subsidizing and adjusted community rate
which included individual Medicare Supplemental Benefit
premiums which included an ECB.
Employers may want to know that kind of information if
they are considering the purchase of an Expanded Care
Benefit for future retirees as part of their retirement
benefits package. This is a policy research marketing issue
about whether group members are less likely to represent
adverse selection bias than individuals members who want t。
buy an Expanded Care Benefit. This question was not fully or
successfully addressed by this study. But , hypothesis can be
tested based on descriptive data presented.
In future studies , confirmation of the potential
selection bias identified in this chapter may be justified
for HMO rate setting purposes. Public policy for widely
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available LTC benefits needs to be informed about such
actuarial issues because of the implications for Medicaid
expenditures.
CHAPTER VI
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL RISK AND S/HMO RESIDENTS
REGARDING ADMISSION AND DISCHARGE PATTERNS
Numerous studies suggest that one-fifth t。
。ne-third of those in institutions are receiving
an inappropriate level of care. F’。r example , of
the million or so institutionalized elderly , 17
to 25 percent are there only because of n。
alternative social support system. [65]
Admission and discharge patterns are another important
component in the analysis of nursing home utilization. Thus ,
ICF admission and discharge patterns are evaluated t。
determine if there are differences between four individual
Risk subsets , and two subsets in S/HMO , which differentiate
new members from converted members.
The objective of this analysis is to clarify whether
differences in location prior to the initial ICF admission
and after the final ICF’ discharge , during the study period ,
provide macro level clues to characteristics about each
subset of ICF users which may help explain differences in
use rates. Findings may also suggest other areas of analysis
which may explain differences in use rates. This also may
further clarify whether some use rates are indeed affected
by some form of selection bias , as tentatively observed in
Chapter V.
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The analysis presented in Table XXV , below , examines
differences in source location prior to first ICF admission.
Only data from Subset I is used because it captures the true
source location from which members came at the time of first
ICF admission. Subset I is used for last known disposition
。f members not residing in an ICF when data was collected.
TABLE XXV
SOURCE LOCATION FROM WHICH ICF RESIDENTS CAME
AT THE T工ME OF THEIR FIRST ADMISSION
Percent of Percent of
Source All S/HMO All Risk
Location ICF Residents IeF Residents
SNF’ 12.2훌 14.7%
ICF 3.1홈 3.9%
*Other Com. 4.4 훌 7.5 훌
Home 13.7% 10.8홈
Hospital/ER 66.7훌 63.1훌
Nothing remarkable is presented in the above table ,
regarding differences between Risk and S/HMO for source
location prior to first ICF admission.
/l Other" community facilities is a greater source of
admissions in Risk than S/HMO , but the difference is offset
by a higher percent of admission from home in S/HMO than
Risk. That is an expected difference given the emphasis on
home placement by Extended Care Benefit case coordinators.
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Similarity of hospital and SNFs as a source location is
an important observation because it suggests that the
progressive care of Medicare patients in capitated status
was managed in a similar way , and that discharge utilization
review practices were similar.
This similarity between source locations does not
follow through into ICF discharge disposition location ,
which is a very important observation, given differences in
。bservations about rates presented in earlier chapters.
This similarity is the basic reason for presenting the
above table. Comparison of source locations and disposition
locations leads to some important policy implications and is
the basis for recommending some research hypotheses in the
final chapter. Table XXVI shows admitting source locations
。ther than ICF and Home to clarify dissimilarities between
admission and disposition sites.
TABLE XXVI
SOURCE LOCATION FROM WHICH ICF RESIDENTS CAME
AT THE TIME OF THEIR FIRST ADMISSION
OTHER THAN HOME OR ICF
Source
Location
Percent of
All S/HMO
ICF’ Residents
Percent of
All Risk
ICF Residents
양-y빼-e빼
없劉없따떼-빼때뼈-떠
*
T
1. 1훌
3.2홈
1.4훌
1.8훌
7.5훌
10.5훌
18.3홈
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*1I 0THER COM." means community based facilities other
than ICFs , or Home , including: (RCF) Residential Care
Facilities , (AFC) Adult Foster Care facilities , (ALF)
Assisted Living Facilities , and (ILF) Independent
Living F’acilities.
Probably , the higher level of AFC as a source of
admission is related to the high proportion of Medicaid
recipients who are placed in AFCs as an alternative t。
ICF’, although the substitutability of AFC for ICF
placement is not pervasive.
According to Kane , IIBased on our evaluation of
adult foster care thus far , we conclude that adult
foster care residents , on the whole , are a less
frail group than those served in ICF facilities.
On the other hand , it also appears that adult
foster care has been accommodating and can
accommodate persons with high degrees of physical
and cognitive impairment. Some overlap exists
between the populations served in the two settings
[AFC and ICF] though , on average , the nursing home
group (perhaps because of the presence of a wide
range of alternatives , including foster care) is
more frail. Given these distinctions , it is
unlikely that adult foster care can replace the
ICF , although there seems to be some
substitutability at the lighter end of care
needs."[66]
Discharge to an AFC or other community based location
is not represented as substitutability of services in Table
XXVII. While that may be the case , it is very likely that
numerous circumstance precipitate discharge to ACFs from
ICFs , including conditions of financing , social support
networks , functional status , medical conditions , needs
assessment and satisfaction with environmental conditions.
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TABLE XXVII
DISPOSITION LOCATION TO WHICH ICF’ RESIDENTS WENT
FOLLOWING THEIR LAST KNOWN DISCHARGE
Percent of Percent of
Disposition All S/HMO All Risk
Location ICF’ Residents rCF Residents
SNF 0.8% 0.7홈
rCF 6.7훌 9.7훌
*Other Com. 12.4 훌 10.9 훌
Home 32.2 훌 17.2 훌
Hospital/ER 11. 0% 16.2 훌
Death at rCF 30.6홈 35.5훌
Figure 7 presents some interesting observations and
surfaces information not previously reported in the
literature , regarding comparison of two capitated groups ,
。ne having and ECB and the other not having and ECB.
Last S/HMO ICF discharges were much more likely to be
sent home than Risk residents at last discharge. Given the
goals of the S/HMO Expanded Care Benefit , this is an
encouraging observation.
S/HMO rCF days of stay are similar to those of Risk in
the data set used for these tables (Subset I) , so that
longer convalescence is not a likely explanation. Age of ICF
users was similar also , as was gender mix. The proportion of
deaths in ICFs was sixteen percent higher for Risk than
S/HMO , which may reflect that S/HMO members had more options
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to choose from for their final period of life.
without data on differences in ADLs or IADLs , which
give categorical values to differences in dependency , it is
difficult to say whether chronic disability levels were a
cause for difference in home discharge rates. That data is
needed for residents in the data set. It is possible that
such information could be obtained from nursing home records
。n these persons , at a reasonable cost.
A companion observation is the difference in percent of
discharges between Risk and SIHMO to other community
facilities. Although SIHMO is only fourteen percent greater
than Risk , when taken together , the difference between SIHMO
and Risk is impressive , as seen in Table XXVIII , below.
TABLE XXVIII
DISPOSITION LOCATION TO WHICH ICF RESIDENTS WENT
FOLLOWING THEIR LAST KNOWN DISCHARGE
OTHER THAN HOME OR ICF
Source
Location
Percent of
All SIHMO
ICF Residents
Percent of
All Risk
ICF Residents
RCF
AFC
ALF
* ILF
other Community
Home
Total Community
(excluding ICF’)
2.2홈
6.5훌
1. 1훌
1. 1훌
10.9홈
17.2홈
28.1훌
Forty-five percent of all SIHMO ICF residents in Subset
I were discharged to a community location other than another
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ICF , at the time of their last discharge , compared t。
twenty-eight percent of all Risk last known discharge
placements. That is , discharge planners were able to place
fifty-nine percent more last ICF’ discharges in community
based facilities than they arranged for Risk members in
Subset I.
Again , the percent of ICF discharges sent to AFC sites
is of interest because it is different than source
admissions data; the percent of S/HMO members is higher than
that for Risk.
Table XXIX shows use rate differences between S/HMO and
individual Risk ICF residents.
TABLE XXIX
SUMMARY OF DISPOSITION FOR LAST KNOWN ICF DISCHARGE
F’。R ALL NEW AND CONVERTED S/HMO ICF’RESIDENTS AND
(ONLY) INDIVIDUAL RISK RESIDENTS BY SUBSETS
(A) PRE-TEFRA AND (B) TEFRA CONTRACT
RISK ELIGIBILITY STATUS
Individual
Disp. S/HMO S/HMO Risk Risk Risk Risk
Loc. New Conv New New Conv Conv
<4/85 >4/85 <4/85 >4/85
훌 Col% Col 훌 Col 훌 Col 홈 Col 톰 Col
SNF 00.0 03.1 02.2 00.0 00.0 00.0
ICF 16.0 18.9 13.7 14.3 11.4 19.4
。THER COM. 11. 7 05.5 12.1 07.1 15.7 08.4
HOME 36.2 37.8 14.4 21. 4 25.7 13.9
DEATH 19.1 15.0 20.1 14.3 17.2 19.4
HOSP/ER 17.0 19.7 37.5 42.9 30.1 38.9
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Percentages for each of the five location variables
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differ somewhat for individual Risk members. Differences
between new and converted S/HMO and Risk members contribute
to information about their use rates. They also suggest the
importance of obtaining socioeconomic variables which
characterize differences in member groups that may
facilitate community based discharges.
The substantially lower percentage of S/HMO discharges
to the hospital , relative to any of the four individual Risk
subsets , offers some clues about differences in rates for
ICF’ days in Chapter V.
ICF death ratios parallel their days used rates. That
is new pre-TEFRA and converted TEF’RA use rates were higher
and so are their ICF’ death rates. The same is observed about
new S/HMO. This suggests those subsets may have included
more permanent residents who remained until death.
The lower percent of discharges to hospitals for both
S/HMO subgroups is an observation for which no answers are
surfaced in this study. It is interesting that both TEFRA
Risk subgroups had higher ratios of discharge to the
hospital and for death than the two older Risk pre-TEFRA.
The proportion of discharges to community facilities ,
。ther than IeFs , is' presented below in summary form followed
by a table giving supportive detail.
S/HMO members receiving ECB services at home , whose
。nly use of ICFs was for respite , could be expected to have
fewer days in residence.
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Differences in discharge patterns to other ICFs is
relevant to differences in ICF use rates because of several
reasons. Discharges directly from one ICF to another occur
for a limited number of reasons , some of which include: (a)
resident is in a facility not accepting Medicaid patients ,
which was a factor for both Risk and S/HMO members whose
initial nursing home stay was in a nursing home with which
KP contracted for SNF and ICF services , that discontinued
participation in the Medicaid program; (b) patient became
Medicaid eligible in a facility that did not have Medicaid
beds which were available , i.e. , all licensed Medicaid beds
were filled; (c) S/HMO Case coordinator requested that
member be moved to an ICF facility with which S/HMO
contracted; (c) patient or visiting KP nurse practitioner
was not satisfied with care given by a nursing home; (d)
patient had needs better provided for at another nursing
home , such as those with advanced dementia; other
patient/family dissatisfaction.
These reasons are listed because they suggest that
。perational issues need to be considered as an explanatory
variable for determining why the percent of discharge t。
。ther ICFs might be'higher for S/HMO; and indeed both S/HMO
subsets are higher than three of the four Risk subsets.
Equally important , they suggest the need to examine
differences in rate of spend-down to Medicaid eligibility as
a reason for differences in length of stay. If Risk rates
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are higher than S/HMO , which Chapter VIII suggests is true ,
then more Risk members could reside longer in ICFs , or AFCs ,
because that is where the State of Oregon requires them t。
be , or/and that is where families want them to be , in order
to continue to be recipients of Medicaid support.
。ne operational reason for rate differences is that
S/HMO members may have been located at nursing home sites
where closer monitoring of continuing need for ICF care
could be conducted by KP utilization review staff. This was
done by both S/HMO case coordinators and geriatric nurse
practitioners whose responsibility was to frequently assess
changes in patient condition , oversee quality of nursing
home care , communicate with patient , physician and family
and about patient needs , and advise S/HMO coordinators as
needed. Such patient oversight was also conducted on Risk
and Cost members , but without S/HMO case coordinator
participation. Indirectly , therefore , ICF’ transfers imply
possible reasons for shorter stay, even for those S/HMO
members who were considered permanent placement , but whose
condition might eventually permit use of other community
based institutions.
When the overall pattern of ICF discharges to both HOME
and community facilities other than ICFs is examined , the
trend is clear: both "new" and "conv" S/HMO members were
transferring from ICF to community based living arrangements
at significantly greater rates than any of the four Risk
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subsets presented above. Of the four Risk subsets , only
those who converted to Medicare Plus Demonstration Project
in 1980-1984 had a lower but similar pattern of discharges.
SIHMO ICF residents also were discharged to reside in their
home or someone ’ s home at a much greater rate than Risk
members.
Analysis of ICF discharges to other community based
locations , besides ICFS , is presented in Table XXX , below.
TABLE XXX
SUMMARY OF DISPOSITION FOR LAST ICF’ DISCHARGE
TO COMBINED HOME , RCF , AFC , ALF’, ILF’
THE SUM OF WHICH IS PRESENTED AS
"COMMUNITY·’ OTHER THAN ICF
Indiv Indiv Indiv Indiv
Disp. s/HMO SIHMO Risk Risk Risk Risk
Loc. New ConY New New ConY ConY
After After Before After Before After
훌 Col 훌 Col % Col 훌 Col 홈 Col % Col
*OTHER COM. 11.7 05.5 12.1 07.1 15.7 08.4
HOME 36.2 37.8 14.4 21. 4 25.7 13.9
COMMUNITY 47.9 43.3 26.5 28.5 41. 4 22.3
*RCF 3.2 0.0 1.4 0.0 7.1 2.8
*AFC 5.3 5.5 5.0 0.0 5.7 5.6
*ALF 1. 1 0.0 1. 4 7.1 2.9 0.0
*ILF 2.1 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
* OTHER COM. includes community based facilities other
than ICFs for care of disabled and dysfunctional
dependent persons , including: (RCF) Residential Care
Facilities , (AFC) Adult Foster Care facilities , (ALF)
Assisted Living F’acilities , (ILF) Independent Living
E’acilities.
The percent of discharges to Adult F’。ster Care , shown
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in the table below , is similar across five of the six
subsets , which probably is related to members who became
Medicaid recipients , since the State of Oregon vigorously
pursued that solution an alternative to ICF’ level care.
It is not clear why no Risk members who enrolled after
April , 1985 , were discharged to AFC facilities But the
combination Assisted Living Facility and Adult Foster Care
suggests that new Risk members enrolled after April , 1985
may have had sufficient personal assets available to them t。
afford ALF’ and avoid the need for Medicaid funds , or were
not as disabled or dependent as other Risk subset members.
There were only 15 such members and their use rates were
lower than S/HMO or the other three Risk subsets , especially
among females , as may be observed in use rate tables
presented above. They also were slightly younger which may
not have affected use rates but may correlate with having
more personal assets.
Table XXXI shows the proportion of residents still
present in nursing homes at the time data was collected;
they are omitted from the tables in this chapter. Not
surprisingly, fewer Medicare Plus Demonstration Project
members remained in an ICF than Risk TEFRA members or S/HMO
members. Why such a disproportionate percent of converted
Risk TEF’RA residents remained in nursing homes is not known ,
but it suggests a higher proportion of long term residents
existed in that subset than among new Risk TEFRA residents.
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TABLE XXXI
PROPORTION OF RISK AND S/HMO RESIDENTS STILL PRESENT(SP)
IN AN ICF AT THE TIME DATA WAS COLLECTED AND THEREFORE
MISSING FROM DATA IN DISCHARGE DISPOSITION TABLES
Indiv Indiv Indiv Indiv Indiv Indiv
Disp. S/HMO S/HMO Risk Risk Risk Risk
Loc. New Conv New New Conv Conv
Aft Aft B4 Aft B4 Aft
*
홈 Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col
SP in
ICF’ 28.0 13.0 09.7 06.7 00.0 46.0
*SP means Still Present in an ICF on 7/89.
No doubt , the very high proportion of Risk members wh。
converted from Cost to Risk during or before the study
period affected the Risk rate. Risk conversions after April ,
1985 had the highest days in age cohort 85+ per member year
。f eligibility, by far , of all subsets examined. (See
Appendix B). Apparently, that conversion factor als。
resulted in more long term permanent placements than in
。ther Risk subsets. Unless those Risk members were in a
nursing home before having an opportunity to apply for
S/HMO , why they did not do so is an interesting research
question. Indeed , some of them were among the 71 ICF users
identified as "outliers" in Chapter IV.
The higher proportion of new S/HMO members who were
still present suggests that recruitment of new members from
the community included a higher proportion of persons wh。
would become permanently placed in ICFs than occurred from
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higher proportion of new members were older , so that the
cohort survival phenomenon may have been a factor.
Is there anything instructive about patterns of
locations from which first 工CF’ admission come , regarding the
above subsets? The following table points to the need for
clarifying possible differences in medical status of
pati응nts admitted to ICFs , given the very high proportion of
admissions from hospitals.
With the exception of Risk members whose eligibility
data in that status was established after April 1985 , n。
remarkable differences exist between subsets. Clearly, Cost
who converted to Risk after April , 1985 , had a need for more
intense nursing and personal care after being in community
facilities than other Risk or S/HMO members. If nothing else
this observation signals the need for HMOs to monitor care
rendered to KP members in non-nursing home community based
facilities.
An interesting use rate observation is made about
’'HOSPITAL/ER as a source of first ICF admission. This rate
appears to be substantially higher than that for national
data. Since this data is from a period of time after DRGs
had their first impact on nursing home admission rates , it
is doubtful that this observation is associated with that
phenomenon. Location prior to first ICF stay is shown next
in Table XXXII.
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TABLE XXXII
SUMMARY OF LOCATION PRIOR TO FIRST ICF ADMISSION
F’。R NEW AND CONVERTED S/HMO ICF RESIDENTS AND
(ONLY) INDIVIDUAL RISK RESIDENTS BY SUBSETS
(A) PRE-TEFRA AND (B) TEFRA CONTRACT
RISK ELIGIBILITY STATUS
Indiv Indiv Indiv Indiv Indiv Indiv
Prior SIHMO S/HMO Risk Risk Risk Risk
Loc. New Cony New New ConY ConY
Before After After Before After Before After
1st ICF 훌 Col % Col % Col % Col % Col 훌 Col
Admit Fm:
SNF 15.4 11. 9 13.6 27.3 13.9 11. 5
ICF 2.2 3.7 2.4 9.1 5.6 6.8
*OTHER COM 3.3 5.5 8.8 0.0 4.2 17.3**
HOME 12.1 12.8 10.4 9.1 15.3 6.8
HospIER 67.0 66.0 65.6 54.5 61. 1 56.8
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*COMMUNITY 15.4 18.3 18.4 9.1 19.5 24.9
(Home+other community)
** 17.3 - (RCF-4.5 + AFC-6.8 + ALF-6.8 + ILF’-0.0)
This study shows a trend similar to but slightly higher
than the national pattern in the same time period ,
especially for S/HMO members. Why is that so? This pattern
is one of several good reasons to examine differences in
hospital discharge diagnosis from 1985 through the study
period among Risk and S/HMO members admitted to ICFs within
the study period. That is accomplished in the next chapter.
Analysis of mortality patterns among ICF’ users includes
admission and discharge analysis , but also re~lires death
certificate data and hopefully information regarding
location of following discharge. In this study, the KP
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membership information data base includes a variable
regarding reason for termination , including death. That data
is used for the following table. Termination data is
generally entered as the last day of the month in which
enrollment ended. Since nursing home data collection
commenced in June , 1989 , termination data is used for that
month regarding members in respective eligibility group
subsets , who were also in ICFs.
Table XXXIII is provided in response to Research
Question II , regarding how differences in days used per year
。f eligibility might have been affected by differences in
death rates. One possibility is that higher death rates
resulted in earlier censoring of days in residence.
TABLE XXXIII
COMMUNITY BASED FACILITIES OTHER THAN ICF
TO WHICH INDIVIDUAL RISK AND S/HMO ICF
RESIDENTS WENT FOLLOWING DISCHARGE
Indiv Indiv Indiv Indiv
Disp. S/HMO S/HMO Risk Risk Risk Risk
Loc. New Conv New New Conv Conv
After After Before After Before After
훌 Col % Col % Col , Col 훌 Col 훌 Col
KP Membership
Termination
(death) 50.4 56.8 51. 3 60.0 58.3 59.3
(by 6/30.89)
Last ICF Discharge
within Study Pc:1
DEATH 19.1 15.0 20.1 14.3 17.2 19.4
HOSP/ER 17.0 19.7 37.5 42.9 30.1 38.9
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The combination of hospital discharges and death while
in an ICF is not a precise measurement of death rates
because not all last ICF discharges to the hospital were
followed by death. However , it is a good indicator. When
compared to percentages of ICF residents whose membership
was terminated due to death either during the study period
。r within one year after the study period , the combining of
variables "DEATH'’ and "HOSP/ER" looks like a reasonably good
estimator of mortality rates for last ICF discharges.
Risk ICF residents may have had a higher incidence of
mortality during the study period than S/HMO ICF’ users ,
based on this crude measure of death. If that is correct ,
that only adds to the reasons for looking to variables other
than age and gender , to explain lower S/HMO rates than Risk
rates for cumulative days of stay in ICF’s during the study
period.
It is likely that ICF days in residence were affected
somewhat by the higher death rates , observed from KP
membership data. If taken together , DEATH and HOSP rows
suggest somewhat higher rates of mortality for Risk ICF
users who had enrolled as new Risk members after April , 1985
and Cost conversions to Medicare Plus (Risk) Demonstration
Pr。그 ect.
Risk ICF residents who enrolled after April , 1985 had
the lowest percent of last ICF discharge to Home and highest
rate of last discharges to the Hospital; combined discharges
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to hospital and percent of members dead by July , 1989 ,
suggests that health status of Risk members enrolled after
April , 1985 may have been a contributing factor to nursing
home utilization rates.
POLICY RESEARCH ISSUES
This chapter suggests that ECB is an incentive for
limiting ICF level services , when alternative home care is a
accessible , and that this incentive is likely to affect both
new and converted HMO , in a similar way. The observed data
also suggests that individual payers are likely to respond
to incentives positively. Such observations have not been
reported previously comparing ICF discharge patters of tw。
HMO capitation groups.
This chapter provides baseline data about nursing home
use rates regarding sources of admission to and discharge
from ICFs. The pattern of discharges from ICFs to community
based institutions , other than ICFs and to Home , merits
further research to identify whether closer monitoring and
early intervention could improve such rates.
Policy and policy based protocol for such monitoring
and early intervention care is an important utilization
issue relevant to any effort to extend Expanded Care
Services to an entire HMO population. Of course , it also is
fundamental to good patient care of dependent elderly
persons. Use rates may have been affected by differences in
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such monitoring practices.
Values for variables examined in this chapter suggest
they could serve as useful explanatory data , together with
ADLs , health status (lCD codes) and mortality data , t。
clarify whether length of lCF (or total nursing home) stay
differences between S/HMO and Risk are influenced by the
existence of an Extended Care Benefit and related case
managers , or more likely due to differences in those
covariates. To do so would require some form of analysis
which clarified interactions between independent variables
and length of stay, as well as interaction between
independent variables. No doubt , multicolinearity would be
extant between them , in any regression procedure used for
such analysis.
Based on descriptive information which these tables
contain, SNF’ appears to the only variable of doubtful value
for use in building a multivariate model with which to help
clarify differences in lCF use rates between S/HMO and Risk
residents.
CHAPTER VII
REVENUES RECEIVED BY NURSING HOMES FOR RESIDENT CARE
I/ Econometric cost functions cannot yet provide
ratesetters with predictions about the cost of the
efficient provision of nursing home care appro-
priate to patient needs. In any case , the design
。f reimbursement systems must be founded not only
。n technical information but also on public policy
goals for long-term care. I/ [671
The policy issue addressed in this chapter is whether
the combined effects of ECB incentives for improved access
to ICF services and S/HMO managed care policies , operational
practices and related LTC goals result in S/HMO eligibility
group ICF costs which are different from Risk eligibility
group ICF baseline costs.
As observed in Chapter IV , Overall data set rates for
S/HMO member access to ICFs was much greater then that of
Risk members , however , Days of ICF stay were substantially
less for S/HMO than for Risk ICF residents. The combined
effects of access and cumulative stay comprise overall ICF
utilization and cost outcomes. It was not know whether rates
for total nursing home revenues for s/HMO ICF residents
differed from those for Risk ICF residents before the study.
This chapter presents an analysis of differences
between rates of nursing home revenues for S/HMO and Risk
ICF residents per 1000 s/HMO and Risk members. Another view
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。f relative payment differences is also presented by
comparing differences in mean of revenues per S/HMO resident
and mean of revenues per Risk resident; tests are used t。
indicate whether differences are statistically significant.
The numerator used for computation of rates comprises
all payments received (revenues) by nursing homes for care
they provided to research population members who became IeF
and/or SNF residents during the study period. The
denominator used in this rate is members; specifically, per
1000 members.
Nursing home revenues , for such residents , include all
moneys received during the period mid-1985 through June 1989
(before , during , and after the study period) , by all nursing
homes in which any resident resided during the study period
(July , 1986 through June , 1988).
In this chapter , revenues are not reported for all
residents in the Overall dataset. Instead , only Subset II
and Subset I residents are used. Subset II revenues are
reported because residents in that data set did not reside
in nursing home before 1985 , thus their utilization history
meets the time limitation , mid-1985 through mid- 1989.
Subset I revenues are reported because residents in that
data set had not used nursing home services before the study
period. Thus , the rate comparison reported below for Subset
I has the effect of limiting numerator revenues to a three
year period (July , 1986 through June , 1989).
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Rates (for nursing home revenues for rCF residents
11000 {Risk>} {SHMO} members) include composite payments
recorded on nursing home ledgers for SNF and reF services
during that four year period. Such rates are also presented
for combined SNF and ICF residents.
In this chapter , only Analysis Model B is used for
analysis of differences in both rates of payments received:
(a) per 1000 research population members; (b) per member
year of eligibility; and mean of revenue for each resident.
A graphic illustration of the two Model B formats is
shown in Chapter III , indicating combinations of group
status used to create denominators for mutually exclusive
membership status tables presented in this chapter.
The advantage of using a denominator of per member year
。f eligibility is that it measures relative time of study
period eligibly by enrollment status during which the event
(numerator) may occur. However , in the case of payments
received , the numerator used is not left and right censored ,
thus reflecting more of a lifetime use than a study period
use. In this case the rate which is least distorted by
factors affecting numerator values is that derived for
Subset I. However , rates for all subsets are shown in Table
XXXIV , below, which responds to Research Question III.
Research Question III , asks: Are There Differences
Between S/HMO and Risk Members Regarding The Means Of Total
payments Received By All Nursing Homes In Which Each
Resident Lived For All Periods Of Stay Before , During , And
After The Study Period Through June , 1989?
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TABLE XXXIV
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY AGE COHORT AND GENDER)
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY NURSING aOMES WITHIN
ONE YEAR AFTER THE STUDY PERIOD FOR ICF
RESIDENTS/MEMBER YEAR OF ELIGIBILITY
IN EXCLUSIVE ELIGIBILITY CLUSTERS:
N1 - "NEVER s/aMO" (C , C+R , R)i
N2 - "S/HMO SOMETIME"(S , C+S ,
R+S. C+R+S)
떼
A-
빼
랴-mF-m-’꿇-돼B--a맡e-야
여-라-띠M-M-
(N1)
Stdizd
payments
(SNF’+ICF)
/HPM Yr
SP Elig.
for ICF
Residents
(See graph , Sl-Slll)
ICF Residents
Subset I (graph-S1)
Subset II (graph-S11)
Overall (graph-S111)
Col. (a)
$310
$426
$623
(N2)
Stdidz
payment
(SNF+ICF)
/HPM Yr.
SP Elig.
for ICF
Residents
Col. (b)
$272
$251
$278
The difference in standardized rates for Subset I
nursing home users is 14 percent. This rate is probably not
affected in any way by the conversion process of
transferring Cost members to Risk or Risk members to S/HMO.
Since a smaller proportion of S/HMO members were Medicaid ,
the value of total payments for S/HMO members is closer t。
private pay billed charges and less suppressed by Medicaid
payment. Total payments for males were $280 per member year
。f eligibility for Risk and $227 for S/SMOi a 23 percent
for males than for females.
difference , but approximately 20 Percent less total payments
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In Table XXXV , below , the standardized rate of money
received by nursing homes , per 1000 members , was twelve
percent less for "S/HMO Sometime" ICF residents (column a) ,
than that for "Never S/HMO" ICF residents (column b) under
Subset I (no nursing home use prior to the study period by
ICF residents). Figure 8 shows total ICF payments.
The standardized rate of money received by nursing
homes , per 1000 members , was sixty-three percent less for
"S/HMO Sometime" ICF residents (column a) , than that for
"Never S/HMO" ICF residents (col파on b) under Subset II (ICF
residents may have had nursing home admissions prior to the
study period) .
Unlike for the Subset I rate , of ICF days per member
year of eligibility presented in Chapter IV, the "S/HM。
Sometime" rate for money received is substantially less than
"Never S/HMO'’ under Subset I , as well as in Subset II. This
finding is important for both policy issue and study outcome
reasons.
The above finding suggests that the ECB as administered
by the S/HMO influenced outcome differences. This finding
provides a basis for the formulation of specifichypotheses
testing statements with which to accept the likelihood of
that observation in a repeated , sample based study from
another time period. Such research is recommended to confirm
the findings of this study.
Regarding SNF+ICF residents , rates for money received
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are nine percent less for I냉/RMO Sometime" than for "Never
S/HMO" in Subset I. This is a true assessment of "nursing
home" revenues under current Medicare Regulations which
does not differentiate SNF and ICF’ as levels of care.
liThe SNF-ICF distinction is clearly not a stable
product definition appropriate for use across the
nation: the estimated SNF-ICF cost differentials
vary among State studies , and direct studies of
production methods and State regulations have
shown that the SNF and ICF designations mean
different things in different States." (Op. Cit.
[67] , p. 61)
TABLE XXXV
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY AGE COHORT AND GENDER)
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY NURSING HOMES WITHIN
ONE YEAR AFTER THE STUDY PERIOD FOR ICF
RESIDENTS PER 1000 MEMBERS MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE ELIGIBILITY CLUSTERS:
Nl • "NEVER S/HMO" (C , C+R , R)i
N2 • liS/HMO SOMETIME"(S , C+S ,
R+S. C+R+S)
Overall (graph-Slll) $1 , 069
SNF+ICF
Subset I $530
Subset II $861
Model B, Format A.
Male + Female
(dollars are rounded)
(See graph , Sl-Slll)
ICF
Subset I (graph-Sl)
Subset II (graph-Sll)
(Nl)
Stdizd
Paymt Rates
/1000
members
Col. (a)
$ (000)
$445
$729
(N2)
Stdidz
paymt Rates
/1000
members
Col. (b)
$(000)
$397
$446
$495
후485
$543
Source: Appendix E
188
‘@@‘『
@드。
=
”s”--?톨
-gi-
、m+
혹m
룸+잉
mg
냥흩-、띠
+4m
껴톨
냥흩‘、”
혹
m。υ.
캄
-s
gi-
、m­
=찌틀잉
&g
띠
。-울-、
m:
RZ
陽%%
”u---
톨!‘‘‘
‘。.‘
ι
。=
”
Fm
p--g·i@
〉。
”
IIl
”
효
m룸엉
m。υ
+
늙{·g
혹m룸
+
캅
-6
잉gu
-
늘흩-、
m
L@>@==-
를
NN
뼈
--“』
@d-mS{
잉
@〉껴
mS{UX
띠
녹의
{m
쿄흘)
매
·aZ
낼。〕}
•
이
”’
=
@!)
”이@』
hi니
}
·”」
ωa
틀앨톨
。。。
i
Lm
다
뀐。”
Lωa
g=PFi---
』녹a
l)@〉-T@U@
」
이·』삐
FF
。1
-->,
Ia"t:»
+.J::I
。~
.... 11I
끼@
ClO I.c
I~
all
s... l s...
::I l aI
cn~
'.-1‘-1.&. 1ftS
a
hi=
”
‘。‘
”밍흩。
s
-
“’
=
m
---m
--lZ
숙
”누
Z
]흐
><[-
』’()
{
‘i용를혹톨홉훌률훌§흩를---
189
Absolute dollars for rates are given in Table XXXVI ,
below. A note about these data on absolute dollars is that
in the Overall data set , not shown , about $400 , 000.00 in
payments had been made for S/HMO members prior to the
beginning of the study period , whereas about four million
($4 , 000 , 000.) had been received by nursing homes for
services used by "Never S/HMO·’ members before the study
period. Subset I helps to confirm the credibility of rate
differences observed in Subset II which include payments
received prior to the study period. Table XXXVI , below , is
a longitudinal measure of expenditures for residents in a
nursing home during the study period.
TABLE XXXVI
ABSOLUTE DOLLARS , AS PAYMENTS RECEIVED
FOR SNF AND ICF SERVICES DURING THE
STUDY PERIOD , WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER
THE STUDY PERIOD
Never S/HMO
Subset I
(SNF+ICF): $6 , 653 , 168.
Subset II
(SNF+ICF):훌10 ， 787 ， 054.
S/HMO Sometime Total
$3 , 265 , 816. $9 , 918 , 984.
훌 3 ， 651 ， 839. $14 , 438 , 893.
Rate include payments received up to one year after the
study period. Data used in this study is reliable and fully
documented from 1985 through 1989. Observations in the above
tables are presented with considerable confidence.
In the following table , non-standardized rates are
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presented by age cohort so the magnitude of difference
between age cohorts is clarified, and so that true total
dollars can be presented in a meaningful way. Second , rates
for the overall dataset are presented so that the effect of
those 71 members removed to create Subset II can be
conveyed.
Model B is used for analysis in this chapter , which
prevents a direct comparison with Model A rates used in
Chapter IV. The trends and patterns from both models suggest
that objectives of the S/HMO ECB program are being achieved.
Table XXXVII , below, shows unadjusted rates for total nuring
home payments received for research population members
residing in ICFs during the study period per 1000 members. A
statistically significant difference exists between the mean
。f such payments for Risk and S/HMO members. In Subset I
and age cohort 75-84 , the IINever S/HMO" rate is twenty-six
percent less than for "S/HMO Sometime." It is the only
instance where that is observed.
In Subset I and age cohort 85+ , the "S/HMO Sometime"
rate is forty-nine percent less than that for "Never S/HMO.II
These rate differences are consistent with rate differences
。bserved in Chapter IV under the not-mutually exclusive
model for days of residence per member year of eligibility.
The "S/HMO Sometime" rate in Subset I under age cohort
65-74 is thirty-nine percent less than that for "never
S/HMO." This is notable because the SNF+ICF "S/HMO Sometime"
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rate of days in residence per member year of eligibility in
Subset I , Chapter IV , Table XVI , was nine percent greater
than that for IINever S/HMO.II
TABLE XXXVII
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY NURSING HOMES WITHIN
ONE YEAR AFTER THESTUDY PERIOD FOR ICF
RESIDENTS PER 1000 MEMBERS MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE ELIGIBILITY CLUSTERS:
N1 - ’'NEVER S/HMO" (C , C+R , R);
N2 - liS/HMO SOMETIME"(S , C+S ,
R+S. C+R+S)
Model B, Format A.
Male + Female
(rounded dollars)
Subset I
65-74
75-84
85+
Subset II
65-74
75-84
85+
Overall
65-74
75-84
85+
Source Appendix E
N1
Payments
rates
/1000
members
Col. (a)
$ (000)
93
469
1 , 926
119
776
3 , 274
144
1 , 172
4 , 821
N2
Payment
rates
/1000
members
Col. (b)
$(000)
67
592
1 , 294
99
607
1 , 532
116
625
1 , 815
Based on the above observations about differences in
rates , it is possible to state a null hypothesis that ,
Differences Are Not Statistically Significant Between the
Mean of Payments For '’Never S/HMO II and "S/HMO Sometime ll
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Nursing Home Residents: a. Overall , b. by Sex, c. by Age
Cohort.
In the following three tables , a trial run test of the
above hypothesis is are presented using nonparametric
Analysis of Variance procedures to measure statistical
significance of difference in means of payments received for
each of the two clusters of ICF residents , "Never S/HMO" and
liS/HMO Sometime."
The raw mean is the quotient of the sum of payments
received for all ICF residents divided by the total number
。f ICF residents in each group under Analysis Model B. A
nonparametric test of ranked revenues per member is used t。
compute a mean for use in this test of differences because
distribution of variance about mean revenues is not normal.
Since statistical tests are intended for use with
random samples to determine the probability that differences
。bserved are probably real and not the result of chance
sampling , it may be seem superfluous to use an Analysis of
Variance test here. That is , rates from this study are
presented on the basis of being derived from an entire
research population , where differences are real and not the
product of chance sampling.
A critical assumption of the analysis of variance
procedure is that differences in values are distributed in a
statistically normal way. The SAS procedure known as
NPAR1WAY provides a nonparametric option for an analysis of
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variance test; it does not compute an F value based on the
assumption of normal distributional of (payments) values
about the means for each group compared. Rather , it ranks
all the observations and computes an F value based on
difference in rankings.
This analysis of variance F tests procedures is used
here in the context that data used were hypothetically
representative of all KP Medicare members during the period
1985 - 1990 , and a random drawing from that membership would
have a good chance of looking like the two years actually
used in the research population.
A relaxed condition for rejecting the null hypothesis
is selected because it is a trial process. Determining
statistical significance is based on an alpha level of .10.
That is , a probability (p) value is computed to determine if
the mean score (ANOVA Mean Score F) produced by the
statistical procedure is likely to be the result of chance
sampling or if difference in means is likely to be real.
Thus , in Tables XXXVIII and XXXIX , p values of .10 or
more require that the null hypothesis , above , be accepted.
Values of less than .10 allow rejection of the null
hypothesis.
The probability value of F for mean scores under
columns A and B, below , suggest that the difference is
statistically significant in every instance of comparison,
except in age cohort 75-84. Thus , parts a and b of the null
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hypothesis , above , are rejected; part c of the above null
hypotheses statement is not rejected because the p value of
F is .10. Although the acceptance or rejection premise is
based on the p value being greater than .10 , rejection is
hard to defend for a rounded value of exactly .10. Indeed ,
throughout this study , a pattern of higher rates for S/HMO
than Risk residents was consistent in age cohort 75-84.
TABLE XXXVIII
NPAR1WAY NONPARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
TESTS F’。R DIFFERENCES IN PAYMENT MEANS
BETWEEN CLUSTER A (NEVER S/HMO) AND
CLUSTER B (S/HMO SOMETIME) OF
ANALYSIS MODEL B
Model B,
F’。rmat A
Subset I
(no admit prior
to study Period)
A
Never S/HMO
(C , C+R , R)
s
B
S/HMO Sometime
(S , C+S ,
R+S , CRS)
$
Male+Female
ANOVA Ranked Mean $14 , 026.86 $9 , 583.84
Score: F value - 12.864 Pr>F - 0.0004
Male
끓OVA Ranked Mean $13 , 307.82 $8 , 270.16
Score: F value - 7.790 Pr>F - 0.0057
Female
ANOVA Ranked Mean $14 , 478.73 $10 , 321.34
Score: F value - 6.277 Pr>F - 0.0126
료~ Cohort 75-84
ANOVA Ranked-Mean $13 , 905.23 $10823.60
Score: F value - 2.741 Pr>F - 0.0990
Aqe Cohort 85+
ANOVARanked Mean $13 , 907.64 $9666.90
Score: F value - 5.574 Pr>F - 0.0189
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Next , payment rates per 1000 members are examined again
under Model B, in Table XXXIX , below , but using each
combination of member eligibility. In F’。rmat B, each
eligibility group is listed vertically on the left side of
the following tables , where as clustered groups were listed
horizontally along the top of the previous two tables.
TABLE XXXIX
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY AGE COHORT AND GENDER)
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY NURSING HOMES WITHIN
ONE YEAR AFTER THE STUDY PERIOD FOR ICF
RESIDENTS PER 1000 MEMBERS IN MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE ELIGIBILITY GROUPS: I.E. ,
COST , COST+RISK , RISK , S/HMO ,
COST+S/HMO , RISK+S/HMO ,
COST+RISK+S/HMO
Model B, Format B.
Male + Female
Stdizd Pmts
for ICF’ Res
/1000 member
Subset I
Col. (a)
$ (000)
Stdidz Pmts
for ICF Res
/1000 member
Subset II
Col. (b)
$ (000)
Group (rounded dollars)
Cost only 444 1 , 093
2. Cost+Risk 597 743
3. l’new" Risk 378 611
4. "new" S/HMO 409 517
5. Cost+SHMO 338 479
6. Risk+SHM。 304 241
7. Cost+Risk+SHMO 129 173
。verall Mean payments $430 $631
Per 1000 member for ICF’ residents
Source: Appendix E
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In Subset I (column a) , rows 3 and 4 show that the
’'new ll S/HMO rate is eight percent greater than II new" Risk
for payments received per 1000 members. liS/HMO Only" ICF
days per year of member eligibility were fifteenpercent
less than that for Risk. S/HMO only and Risk Only members
were either enrolled directly from the community , rather
than converting from within KP , or at age sixty-five (65)
they enrolled directly into Risk or S/HMO.
Since rates for payments received by nursing homes
included SNP’ and ICF payments , the observation of this
reversal may be related to the higher use of SNF by S/HMO
than by Risk members. This observation is repeated when SNF
and ICF days are combined , as seen in the following table.
Observations regarding rows 3 and 4 (new Risk vs. new S/HMO)
。f Format B do not alter the overall findings of Format A in
Analysis Model B.
It does confirm similar observations about "new" S/HMO
members using more days in the study period than "new" Risk
members. In fact the rate for payments received suggests
that the difference in days used prevailed for study period
residents who continued use of nursing homes over the year
succeeding the study period.
It can be stated that "new" S/HMO members would have
been a greater liability than other groups of S/HMO members
as well as "new ’, Risk members , relative to total nursing
home expenditures for those who resided in ICFs during the
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study period , under Subset I. That was not true when
residents were included who had began their use of nursing
homes prior to the study period , in Subset II.
In Table XXXIX , above , rates confirm what was observed
in Table XXXVIII , regarding substantial savings in nursing
home expenditures for S/HMO member in ICFs.
What explains the greater expenditures for nursing home
care by Cost members who converted to S/HMO than occurred
for Risk members who converted to S/HMO (rows 4 and 5 ,
column (a) , in Table XXXX , below? Prior use is not an
explanatory variable in Subset I , column (a)i very few S/HMO
members became nursing home residents between the time of
their application and effective date in S/HMO. Fewer yet had
been in a nursing home but discharged prior to the time of
application for S/HMO , although those who were may have had
significant nursing home experience. S/HMO applicants were
rejected if in a nursing home at that time.
In the preceding table of ICF residents , new S/HM。
residents in Subset I was the single group rate , within the
cluster of group rates for liS/HMO Sometime , ’I which exceeded
anyof the group rates for "Never S/HMO."
This was true for both SNF plus ICF and ICF rates in
Subset I. It was not observed in Subset II. It is possible
that nursing home use prior to becoming a S/HMO member
affected rates in row 5 resulting in a higher relative
payment level than for "Never S/HMO."
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TABLE XXXX
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY AGE COHORT AND GENDER)
TOTAL PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY NURSING HOMES WITHIN
。NE YEAR AFTER THE STUDY PERIOD FOR SNF & ICF
RESIDENTS PER 1000 MEMBERS IN MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE ELIGIBILITY GROUPS: I.E. ,
COST , COST+RISK , RISK , S/HMO ,
COST+S/HMO , RISK+S/HMO ,
COST+RISK+S/HMO
Model B, Format B.
Male + Female
Row Group
1. Cost only
2. Cost+Risk
3. .’new" Risk
4. "new" S/HMO
5. Cost+SHMO
6. Risk+SHMO
7. Cost+Risk+SHMO
Mean Payments
Per 1000 members
for SNF+ICF Days-S~
Source: Appendix E
Stdizd
Payments
for ICF
& SNP’ Res.
/1000 members
Subset I
(a)
$ (000)
Stdidz
Payments
for ICF
& SNF Res.
/1000 members
Subset II
(b)
$ (000)
(rounded dollars)
524 1 , 206
656 823
478 785
nV
A1
r。
’I
A월
ζu
SV
F3
”‘
왜
띠
%
R」
IJ
,‘‘
184 221
$515 $750
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SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS
。 Less revenue was received for ICF’ residents who were in
the cluster S/HMO Sometime then for nursing home residents
in the cluster Never In S/HMO , under both Subset I and
Subset II of Format A, Model B.
。 Less revenue was received for every age cohort of ICF
residents who were in the cluster S/HMO Sometime then for
nursing home residents in the cluster Never In S/HMO , under
both Subset I and Subset II of Format A, Model B.
。 Less revenue was received for nursing home residents
(SNF plus ICF’ ) who were in the cluster S/HMO Sometime then
for nursing home residents in the cluster Never In S/HMO ,
under both Subset I and Subset II of Format A, Model B.
。 A statistically significant difference in means was
。bserved， confirming that cluster rates for S/HMO Sometime
were less than cluster rates for Never S/HMO , with one
exception. This was observed for each test of gender , as
well as for all residents in Subset I , and for age cohorts
65-74 and 85+ , but not for age cohort 75-84. The analysis of
variance test for difference in means represents the sum of
nursing home payments received for all ICF residents in each
cluster divided by the number of residents in that cluster.
This exception is consistent with rates for ICF days per
member year of eligibility. This exception did not appear in
Subset II.
。 More revenue was received for nursing home residents
who were enrolled directly into S/HMO as new members during
the study period , i.e. , in the cluster S/HMO Sometime , then
for nursing home residents who were enrolled directly int。
Risk as new members during the study period , i.e. , in the
cluster Never In S/HMO , under Subset I , but not under Subset
II of Format B, Model B.
POLICY RESEARCH ISSUES
It is difficult to find data in the literature which is
comparable to that presented in this chapter. The generic
problem is finding nursing home payments for ICF services;
much data is available for SNF revenues or computed costs ,
but little is reported on ICF revenues. Even less is
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reported on total nursing home revenues (SNF+ICF’) for those
who become ICF’ residents. While Medicaid and Medicare data
is often reported , private pay revenue , is rarely reported.
The 1985 National Nursing Home Survey presents the most
recent characteristics of nursing homes , nation-wide. In
1985 there were 19 , 100 nursing homes with 1 , 624 , 200 beds of
which 69 percent were under proprietary ownership. Nursing
homes are certified for SNF’, ICF’, both SNF and ICF’, or not
certified by Medicare and or Medicaid. IN 1985 , 75훌 。f
nursing homes had some beds certified as meeting SNF and/or
ICF level criteria by either Medicare , Medicaid or both ,
accounting for 89 percent of total nursing home beds. Of
certified nursing homes (14 , 400) , 40 percent were State or
Federally certified for both SNF and ICF beds , accounting
for 50 percent of all certified beds. Occupancy levels were
in excess of 90 percent. The average daily rates for private
pay was $61 for SNF , $48 for ICF $31 for RCF level services.
In the west , these per diem rates were $58.22-SNF ,
$47.44-ICF and $28.52 for ReF. Medicaid ICF was 43.02. [68]
The use rates per 1000 population age 65 and over are
closer to those in this study than to Multnomah County. They
are as follows: age 65-74 - 12.5/1000; age 75-84 -
57.7/1000; age 85+ 219.4/1000 and overall ages 65+ 46.1; all
Males - 29.0/1000; all females 57.7/1000. [69]
Another study presents a slightly different estimate of
per diem costs from the 1985 NNHS. "Calculated at the sample
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means , marginal costs in SNF’ facilities in 1986 were $130
for a Medicare day , $74 dollars for a private day and $56
for a Medicaid day."[70]
Similar, but not comparable per diem payments are
presented below for nursing home users in this study. Data
includes SNF+ICF payments received for every category; thus
per diem rates are higher than those presented above. Data
in the following table is for nursing home residents whose
first admission occurred prior to the study period , and
whose last discharge data was before the end of the study
period. Thus , none of the financial data is for days of stay
after the study period , as is the case in all previous
tables. This subset of users is the only way that revenues
can be restricted to study period nursing home use in this
study.
Since SNF+ICF’ payment information is combined , the
proportion of days (denominator) in SNF may be greater for
S/HMO than Risk , thus lowering the rate. No weighting is
done to adjust for such differences. These are raw rates.
However , the pattern is too consistent across level of care
and Models A and B to discount the apparent lower mean daily
revenue for S/HMO.
Table XXXXI , below , presents average daily revenues per
research population member as a measure of differences
between Risk and s/HMO ICF residents whose entire history of
nursing home use occurred within the study period. By
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definition , these are not very long-stay residents.
TABLE XXXXI
PER DIEM PAYMENTS INCLUDING SNF’+ICF STAY
BY EACH CATEGORY PRESENTED FOR ALL
MEMBERS WHOSE FIRST ADMISSION &
LAST DISCHARGE WAS WITHIN
THE STUDY PERIOD
Category Per Diem payments F’。r SNF’+ICF’
A-없랬
라
-
여
-
M
-
Cost
$229.86
$153.11
Risk
$257.75
$129.73
SHMO
$200.35
$ 99.08
Model B 때-영
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CHAPTER VIII
DIFFERENCES IN MEDICAID STATUS BETWEEN ELIGIBILITY GROUPS
[An] •• indicator of the spend-down phenomenon is
found in the recent paper of Liu and Manton
(1989) , based on the National Long Term Care
follow-up survey ... over a two year period in a
community sample of disabled elderly who were
initially non-Medicaid , the risk of becoming
Medicaid eligible was 31훌 for those wh。
experienced a nursing home stay and 7% for those
who did not ... it is relevant to know that
spend-down outside the nursing home among the
disabled is not negligible ... Because the
[disabled] group not using nursing homes was
about 7 times the numberadmitted to these
facilities , they accounted for about three-
fifths of the individuals who spent down in the
two year period ... the missing piece is the number
。f dollars involved for each group. For example ,
spend-down for community based care may affect
elderly near the cutting edge of eligibility for
Medicaid and it may not require high expenditures
。ver a long period to make them eligible. The
situation could be quite different for spend-down
due to nursing home stays. More frequently this
may affect individuals whose financial resources
are depleted after meeting large costs for
appreciable periods of time ... In the 1985
NNHS , 36훌 。f patients discharged within
three months , and 58훌 。f those with stays of at
least a year ... [were on Medicaid when
discharged] [71]
Two policy issues are addressed by this chapter. The
first issue is how to reduce the incidence of persons wh。
enter a nursing home and thereafter become dependent on
Medicaid for payment of charges. This study asks what effect
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is the S/HMO concept likely to have on that problem. The
second issue is how to reduce the extent of public financing
required for nursing home residents who spend down. This
study asks what solution does the S/HMO concept offer
regarding that problem.
The S/HMO Demonstration project has not tracked 工CF use
rates of Risk members for purposes of developing control
group data with which to compare S/HMO member use of ICFs ,
nor did HCFA evaluators. Therefore , data has not been
available regarding comparison of Medicaid expenditures for
S/HMO and Risk members.
Specifically , this chapter makes several comparisons of
S/HMO and Risk information collected during this study.
Two rates are used , the probability of ICF and SNF residents
becoming Medicaid eligible up to one year after the study
period and Medicaid payments received by nursing homes
during and up to one year following the study period per
1000 members.
This study does not present other information about the
Medicaid experience of research population members. That
goal was part of the original research proposed to the
Dissertation Committee in 1988. The colloquium proposal
included undertaking multivariate analysis of effects which
various independent variables or covariates might have on
use rates. In fact , preliminary data required for that
research procedure , was partially obtained from the Senior
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services Division , State of Oregon , Medicaid data base files
in 1990 and 1991. But the SSD Data Processing Department
stopped down-loading records of KP members on Medicaid , for
use at the Center for Health Research , following passage of
Measure 5 in 1991. Data in this chapter is limited to only
that collected from nursing homes in 1989 and 1990.
Two Research Questions guide production of rates in
this chapter. The first policy question addressed is , in
what way does S/HMO ECB appear to reduce the incidence of
spend-down related to use of ICF services?
Research Question IV: Are There Differences Between S/HMO
and Risk Research population Members Regarding the
Probability Of Receiving Medicaid Funds To Pay Nursing Home
Bills?
Table XXXXII , below, presents the number of ICF
members , admitted during the study period , per 1000 Cost ,
Risk , S/HMO eligibility group members for whom nursing homes
received Medicaid payments in one year post study period.
In Subset II , the probability rate of becoming a
Medicaid Recipient , during or within one year after the
study period , was forty-four percent less for S/HMO members
who were admitted ~o an ICF during the study period , than
that rate for Risk members.
In Subset I of Table XXXXII , the probability rate of
becoming a Medicaid Recipient , during or within one year
after the study period , was twenty-three percent less for
S/HMO members who were admitted to an ICF during the study
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period, than that rate for Risk members.
TABLE XXXXII
(RATES STANDARDIZED BY SEX BY AGE COHORT)
RATE OF ICF FIRST ADMITS IN THE STUDY
PERIOD /1000 MEMBERS (HPM) FOR WHOM
NURSING HOMES RECEIVED MEDICAID
FUNDS FOR ICF OR SNF STAY
BEFORE 07/01/89
Model A Cost Admts Risk Admts S/HMO Admts
/1000 HPM /1000 HPM /1000 HPM
Subset II
Subset I
9.04
6.68
9.23
6.79
6.40
5.53
Source: Appendix F
Subset I and II rates , above , include the 124 AFC
welfare recipients enrolled in S/HMO during the study
period , 9 of whom were admitted to an ICF after study period
began. Data for AFC nursing home residents are removed from
。ther information presented in this chapter. Only 10 of
these 124 were in a nursing home during the study period;
。ne had been in a nursing home prior to the study period.
Research Question V: Are There Differences In the
proportion of S/HMO and Risk Members Who Were ICF Residents
During the Study Period , Who Also Were Medicaid Recipients
within One Year Following The Study Period?
Table XXXXII , above , describes the probability of
research population members becoming Medicaid dependent.
Another way of describing differences between Cost , Risk and
S/HMO member ’ s Medicaid Assistance patterns is to present
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the percent of nursing home residents from each group for
whom nursing homes received Medicaid payments at some time
during the study period and up to one year thereafter. Raw
data is used for these proportions , as shown below in Table
XXXIII.
TABLE XXXXIII
PERCENT OF TOTAL ICF RESIDENTS BY COST , RISK &
S/HMO DURING THE STUDY PERIOD WHO RECEIVED
MEDICAID ASSISTANCE WITH PAYMENT OF
SNF+ICF BILLS DURING AND UP TO
ONE YEAR POST STUDY PERIOD
(MODEL A) Cost Risk S/HMO Total
(RAW)
Overall 38.17훌 3 1. 14훌 15.68% 27.53훌
Subset II 37.01홈 29.91% 15.25훌 25.75훌
Subset ! 36.21훌 26.95훌 14.51훌 23.74%
Source: Appendix F
Raw data: [by column top down] (Cost: 71/186 57/154
42//116) (Rigk: 123/395 103//354 76/282) (S/HMO: 45/287
43/282 37/255) (Total: 239/868 203/790 155/653)
The pattern of differences in welfare dependency is
clear and the resulting conclusion is inferred with some
confidence that ECB contributed strongly to deferring or
avoiding the need for Medicaid assistance by S/HMO ICF
residents , relative to such need by Risk and Cost members
who were ICF residents during the study period. Figure 8 ,
next , summarizes these differences.
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Another view of data on total payments is presented
next in Table XXXXIV , regarding Research Question IV.
TABLE XXXXIV
PERCENT OF TOTAL ICF RESIDENTS IN "NEVER S/HMO &
"S/HMO SOMETIME" DURING THE STUDY PERIOD WHO
RECEIVED MEDICAID ASSISTANCE FOR PAYMENT
OF NURSING HOME BILLS DURING AND
UP TO ONE YEAR AFTER
THE STUDY PERIOD
(MODEL B)
Never S/HMO S/HMO Sometime Combined
Subset I 29.86% 14.07훌 23.15훌
The pattern is the same in the two preceding tables.
They suggest that the likelihood of spend-down by S/HMO
members , as viewed under Subset I , is about half thatof
Risk members.
However , some cautions are needed about interpreting
the values in the above three tables.
Spend down , as related to nursing home use , by
definition means member assets did not qualify him/her for
Medicaid assistance with payment of nursing home bills
before first being admitted to an ICF’ 。r SNF’.
In reality , Medicaid spend-down is a function of all
medical services which reduce a person ’ s assets to a level
qualifying them for Medicaid funds to pay such bills. Thus ,
a person could be in a nursing home , and not be eligible for
assistance , be discharged to a hospital SNF and readmitted
‘-
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to an ICF after having become eligible for Medicaid
assistance. This is an important issue to address in
clarifying effects of any insurance or service based LTC
program on that need for Medicaid help. Without clarifying
total health costs , it is hard to predict a cause-effect
relationship , or even correlate anyone aspect of health
services , with the moment of spend-down.
In a prepaid , group practice , health center based ,
capitated HMO , where the continuum of each patient ’ s care is
not interrupted by competing groups of providers , care needs
are efficiently coordinated with the full range of health
service providers. Spend-down occurs as a part of this
process. However , among capitated HMO members , nearly all
health costs are covered; seldom to Risk and S/HMO Medicare
beneficiaries use services not substantially covered by
their benefits.
Therefore , aside from persons on welfare prior t。
admission to a nursing home , it is unlikely that persons
would have spent down before entering a nursing home as a KP
member. Risk or S/HMO members newly enrolled directly from
the community could be an exception to that general
condition. This does not mean that converted Risk members in
ICFs during the study were not Welfare recipients. It is
very likely , indeed almost certain , that some Risk ICF
residents in Subset II were Medicaid dependent when the
study period began, because many of them had begun their
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nursing home experience before the study period.
For that reason , findings from Subset I are emphasized
as the most meaningful data regarding possible influence of
S/HMO regarding answers the policy issues and Research
Questions asked in this chapter. It is unlikely that many
Risk IeF residents , whose initial nursing home admission
。ccurred during the study period, were on welfare at that
time. Since that information is not known , caution is needed
about the interpretation of rates presented. The important
issue is the pattern and trend of differences between Risk
and S/HMO they suggest existed.
While the term spend-dow끄 is used above , it is used
with less precision than may be appropriate for some
analysis.
A recent study found that 58 percent of all
nursing home residents remained non-Medicaid
patients during their stays and only 7 percent
spent down during their stay to become Medicaid
eligible. The remaining 35 percent were Medicaid
eligible when they entered. Successfully
targeting 7 percent of the population who spend
down is the key to attaining the [RWJF] project
cost containment goals. [72]
"RWJP" refers to Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
planning grants awarded to eight states , including Oregon.
The purpose of RWJF research money is to promote use of and
study the effects of various insurance policies , and
mechanisms for marketing long-term care insurance , on the
extent to which it protects elderly persons against
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impoverishment resulting from long-term care needs , and the
extent to which it reduces Medicaid costs.
The above citation noted that only 7 percent spent
down , from the 65 percent who were not Medicaid eligible at
the time of nursing home admission; 35 percent were already
。n Medicaid upon nursing home admission.
It is uncertain how observations in the above table
relate to the above citation without knowing how many Risk
members were on Medicaid at the time of admission. Such
information could strengthen the importance of observations
。ffered above.
Given the above observations and caveats , it is
interesting to note that one study of Medicare nursing home
residents (SNF+ICF) , who became Medicaid dependent in the
States of Michigan , California and New York during the same
time period as this dissertation study, showed outcomes
somewhat similar to this study for Californians.
Specifically within 90 days of nursing home admission , 40.8
percent of admissions were Medicaid dependent and within 180
days 51 percent were Medicaid dependent. Rates were
substantially lower in Michigan and New York , than in
California. In all three States , " ... not only is the
prevalence of Medicaid covered nursing home residents
highest for the very old who are female ... but the annual
rate of entry to the nursing home is highest for this group
as well. Females who are very old also had the lowest rates
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。f both nursing home discharge of any kind and discharge t。
the community.II[73]
Age cohort 85+ S/HMO females were substantially lower
users of nursing homes than Risk members , and their rate of
Medicaid dependency and raw rates of Medicaid payments
received per member year of eligibility was much lower
(Subset I , raw rate for female Risk - $209/member year of
eligibility; female S/HMO - $51/member year of eligibility.
Differences in Medicaid payments are discussed next.
The policy issue from which the next Research Question
arises is what cost containment practices can be invoked
which slows or reverses the inflationary trends of Medicaid
payments for nursing homes? Numerous insurance schemes and
trial service plan projects have been and are being tested
by many States. The policy question is what prospect does
the S/HMO ECB concept offer as a policy solution?
The analysis of changes in Medicaid spending on
acute-care and long-term care services revealed
that growth in long-term care spending continue
to outstrip growth in acute-care spending ...Med-
icaid spending in constant dollars increased much
faster for the aged and disabled than for adults
and children [during 1984-87] ...Outlays for
nursing home care increased by 3.9훌 per year in
constant dollars , reflecting a 1.7 percent per
year increase in recipients , as well as a 2.1
percent per year increase in real expendi-
tures per recipient. [74]
ICF services have become the second largest
single contributor to total Medicaid payments
(inpatient hospital services are the largest
single contributor). In 1989 , [non ICF-MR} ICF
services accounted for 16.3 percent of all
Medicaid payments ... If we combing ICF and SNF
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payments , a more consistent pattern emerges ...
For 1982-88 the rate of growth [for SNF+ICF
services] slowed to 7.6훌， and remained at 8.8
percent in 1989. The aged account for ... 81
percent of the combined ICF-SNF payments , s。
utilization and payment patterns in this group
largely determine overall trends in this
sector. [75]
The policy issue of increasing Medicaid cost for
nursing home services is essentially one of cost containment
given the proportion of State welfare budgets consumed by
nursing home payments for welfare recipients.
Research Ouestion VI: Are There Differences In Medicaid
Payments Received By Nursing Homes For Members Residing In
ICFs During The Study Period Per 1000 Research Population
Members?
Nursing home business records differentiated Medicaid
payments from other sources of revenue on a consistent basis
which allowed data collection to proceed as planned for this
variable. Rate information on payments received by nursing
home for residents is presented as a consolidated amount ,
not distinguishing between payments received for SNF level
care and ICF level care.
The fo1l。‘fing tables present rates based on payments
received by nursing homes for ICF residents per 1000 members
by eligibility group. Payments received include all money
recorded on nursing home ledgers as received; amounts owed
。r billed but not collected are excluded. If the nursing
home was licensed for both SNF and ICF services , and both
levels of care were provided then payments received for both
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levels of care are included in rates under this research
question even though the resident status is presented in
following tables as ICF level care.
Payments received by all facilities for all admissions
are accumulated into a single value for each resident.
Payments include those received from before the study period
beginning with 1985 (in Subset II) , during , and after the
study period through June of 1989.
Subset II approximates a longitudinal study of four
years of nursing home use , 4/85 through 6/89 , for all S/HMO
and Risk members who were in a nursing home during the study
period. Persons in a nursing home before or after the study
period, but not during the study period , are not included in
that four year span of information. This span of time is
important to both Subsets I and II for different reasons. It
assures that Subset I includes only persons without prior
nursing home use , and therefore Subset I does not represent
a cross-section of all users the way most nursing home
surveyors do. In Subset II , it assures that Medicaid Costs
for those residents with prior nursing home stays are not
misrepresented, due to left censoring.
Medicaid spend-down rates can be very misleading
without knowing what proportion of persons in a sample have
had previous bills to pay for nursing home care. Only since
the 1985 National Nursing Home Survey have researchers
worked to clarify the effects of prior admission on
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spend-down estimates based on national survey data.
Likewise , without collecting all data from all nursing homes
used by any given resident , Medicaid cost estimates per
resident can be very misleading.
In effect , Table XXXXV, below is a longitudinal study
。f three years duration.
TABLE XXXXV
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY AGE COHORT AND GENDER)
MEDICAID PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY F’。R ICF’ RESIDENTS
ONE YEAR AFTER THE STUDY PERIOD FOR ICF
RESIDENTS/MEMBER YEAR OF ELIGIBILITY
IN MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE CLUSTERS:
N1 • "NEVER S/HMO'’ (C , C+R , R);
N2· liS/HMO SOMETIME"(S , C+S ,
R+S. C+R+S)
(N1) (N2)
Standardized
Medicaid Medicaid
Payments Payments
(SNF+ICF) (SNF+ICF)
/HPM Yr. of /HPM Yr. of
SP Elig. SP Elig.
for ICF for ICF
Residents Residents
Col. (a) Col. (b)
Model B, Format A.
Male + Female
(dollars are rounded)
ICF Residents ONLY
Subset I
Subset II
。verall
SNF+ICF RESIDENTS
Overall stdiz rate
$ 53
$103
$160
$933
$ 33
$ 40
$ 51
$505
Within Study Period ICF RAW Rate
$ 8 $ 3
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The above table includes all nursing home residents
admitted during the study period with no prior admissions.
Subset I represents a "clean catch" specimen for analysis of
rate differences.
As a control or confirmation of this comparative
standardized measurement , the comparable raw rate is
presented as the last line in the above table for ICF
residents who were Medicaid recipients and whose first
nursing home admission occurred in the study period and
whose last discharge date occurred in the study period, and
for whom no subsequent admission occurred within the
following year.
The difference (61 percent) in Medicaid payments per
member year of study period eligibility is substantially
greater , between N1 and N2 for ICF residents in Subset I ,
than the difference (14 percent) in total payments for N1
and N2 ICF residents in Subset I (see Table XXXIV) .
The above data show that the Medicaid Payments for such
Never S/HMO residents was $8.07 per member year of study
period eligibility ($2 , 814 , 939/348 , 825) , while the Medicaid
payments for S/HMO Sometime Medicaid ICF residents was $3.15
year of study period eligibility ($889 , 438/282 , 317 study
period eligibility days) .
Although Medicaid payments comprise slightly less than
half of nursing home revenues , little information is known
about some important aspects of residents who enter a
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nursing home under private pay reimbursement term and
subsequently spend their assets down to levels of welfare
eligibility and therefore become Medicaid Dependent. Among
such persons , it is not well understood how effective
private or public risk pooling schemes might be with respect
to averting nursing home related spend-down; varying
。pinions exist on this matter.
Liu and his associates show that nationally
in the early 1980s most spending down of assets
。ccurred among those residing outside of nursing
homes. (27) [Liu & Manton. , liThe Effect of Nursing
Home Use in Medicaid Eligibility," The
Gerontologist , 30 (February , 1990) , 12] ... On the
。ther hand , the large portion of Medicaid
beneficiaries who became eligible due to spend
down , and the larger portions of all spending
devoted to their care , could be seen as targets
for potential reductions in Medicaid outlays for
nursing home care. The interest in private
insurance for long-term care or mixed public-
private programs springs partially from this
possibility. (28) [Meiners , "Reforming Long-Term
Care Financing Through Insurance, II Health Care
Financing Review(Annual Supplement , 1988) , p.
109-121]
Our findings regarding the timing of
spending down suggest , however , that public
policies and private insurance schemes aimed at
averting spending down among nursing home
residents may have only small effects. The
majority of people who enter nursing homes stay
。nly brief periods , and many of these appear t。
be using nursing homes as adjuncts to acute
hospital care or as substitutes for hospice
services , both of which result in relatively
short stays. These people are unlikely to spend
down , for substantial portions of their nursing
home charges undoubtedly are paid by the Medicare
program. Others who stay longer and eventually
spend down convert to Medicaid on average rather
early in their stays and remain institutionalized
as Medicaid beneficiaries for relatively long
period. This leaves little time for public or
219
private programs to affect the course of spending
down while perhaps committing them to lengthy
benefit flows.
Finally, one might note that , regardless of
the path to dependence , the Medicaid program may
not be the appropriate public instrument for
providing assistance. Rooted as it is in
traditions of welfare policy , with its
accompanying means-tested administrative
regulations , the program invites abuse ,
perpetuates unfairness , and becomes with each new
safeguard administratively more complex.
(29) [Moses , I’The Fallacy of Impoverishment," The
Gerontologist , 30(February , 1990) , p. 21-25].
Unfairness emerges from two considerations.
First , some individuals and families transfer
costs to others by being inclined to and adept at
skirting asset depletion requirements.
Additionally , the Medicaid program ’ s status as a
direct transfer program deprives it of a
rationale for intergenerational equity such as
that which underlies the Social Security
program. (30) [Aaron ,et.al. , Can America Afford t。
Grow Old: Paying for Social Security, The
Brookings Institution, 1989]. This absence ,
perhaps more than other considerations , argues
for abandoning current arrangements in favor of
either publicly enforcing savings or public
incentives that encourage voluntary saving. Delay
in instituting such programs prolongs unfairness
that can only grow when today ’ s middle-aged
population retires shortly after the turn of the
century. [76]
Among research population members in this study, an
important but missing component of information is the
Medicaid status of residents at the time of nursing home
admission. Although observations in the preceding and
following tables show that S/HMO members were less likely t。
be or become Medicaid dependent than Risk members , it is
uncertain what proportion of Risk members were already on
welfare at the time of first nursing home admission. While
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it is unlikely that the availability of such data would
substantially alter the observed differences between Risk
and S/HMO in Subset I , the certainty of this finding remains
。pen to interpretation.
Table XXXXVI , below, provides another view of the same
numerator data used in the table above; the denominator
below is per 1000 members over the two year study period.
TABLE XXXXVI
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY SEX AND AGE COHORT)
MEDICAID PAYMENTS RECEIVED FOR SNF AND ICF
CARE BEFORE , DURING ANDAFTER THE STUDY
PERIOD THROUGH 06/30/1989 FOR MEMBERS
RESIDING IN :rcps DURING THE STUDY
PERIOD/l000 RESEARCH POPULATION
MEMBERS IN "S/HMO SO뾰TIME" OR
"NEVER S/HMO," (MODEL B,
FORMAT A)
Model B
Format A
Nl
Never S/HMO
(C , C+R , R)
Public Pmts
Rec ’ vd
/1000 members
for :rCP Res.
N2
S/HMO Sometime
(S ,C+S , R+S ,C+R+S)
Public Pmts
Rec ’ vd
/1000 members
for :rcp Res.
。verall
Subset II
Subset I
rounded (000)
$
215
116
91
(000)
$
91
80
59
Source: Appendix F
The Overall standardized rate of Medicaid paYments for
ICF residents , per 1000 "Never S/HMO" members is three times
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that rate for "S/HMO Sometime" cluster. Under Subset II , the
"Never S/HMO" rate of payments for ICF residents , per 1000
members is twice that of the rate for "S/HMO Sometime"
cluster. Two important observations are made about the
difference in rates between the "S/HMO Sometime" and "Never
S/HMO" clusters under Subset I.
In previous chapters rates of utilization under Subset
I have shown either no difference between Risk and S/HMO or
a trend of S/HMO slightly exceeding Risk. But , that is not
the case with rates for payments received.
Second , the magnitude of difference in rates on
payments between 꽤ever S/HMO" and "S/HMO" sometime in
Subset I is great enough to suggest that while days in
residence were about the same for Risk and S/HMO , (Chapter
IV) , the $12 , 000 front-end ECB payments for ICF’ services
notably reduced the level of payments needed by Medicaid t。
cover nursing home debts of residents who spent down.
A different view of the answer to this Research
Question is presented next. Total payments received includes
Medicaid payments. Table XXXXVII , below, presents that
proportion of total payments received during and up to one
year after the study period for ICF residents , which were
publicly financed by Medicaid. Table XXXXVIII and Figure 9 ,
show total Medicaid payments received by nursing homes as a
percent of total payments within one year after the study
period for SNF and ICF residents , many of whom were in both
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TABLE XXXXVII
MEDICAID PAYMENTS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL PAYMENTS
FOR ICF’ RESIDENTS IN "NEVER S/HMO & "S/HMO
SOMETIME'’ RECEIVED UP TO ONE YEAR AFTER
THE STUDY PERIOD
Model B (N1) (N2)
(RAW) Never S/HMO S/HMO Sometime Combined
Subset I 20.24훌 14.82훌 18.48훌
In the above table , Raw data for each value listed
are: N1-$1 , 132 , 843/$5 , 597 , 881i N2-$398 , 719/$2 , 690 , 737.
TABLE XXXXVIII
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY SEX AND AGE COHORT)
MEDICAID PAYMENTS RECEIVED FOR SNF’ AND ICF’
CARE BEFORE , DURING AND AFTER THE STUDY
PERIOD THROUGH 06/30/1989 FOR ZCPS OR
g훌P STUDY PERIOD RESIDENTS PER 1000
MEMBERS IN liS/HMO SOMETIME"
。R "NEVER S/HMO ,"
Model B
F’。rmat A
N1
Never S/HMO
(C , C+R ,R)
Public Pmts
Rec ’ vd ‘ for
뿜P aDd/or ZCP
residents
/1000 members
N2
S/HMO Sometime
(S , C+S , R+S , C+R+S)
Public Pmts
Received for
SlIP aDd/or ZCP
residents
/1000 members
rounded
Overall
Subset II
Subset I
뿜P and/or ZCP
(000)
$
583
212
109
(000)
$
328
80
67
Source: Appendix F
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SNF’ and ICF status. Again , these rates measure nursing horne
Medicaid payments for the Never S/HMO and S/HMO Sometime
clusters (N1 , N2 respectively).
The pattern is consistent with that for ICF residents
。nly. This further supports the notion that the ECB reduces
the requirement of Medicaid assistance for S/HMO members wh。
become nursing horne residents.
Under Model A, when an adjustment was made for
residents in both Risk and S/HMO status , the raw data showed
that Medicaid payments for SNF and ICF residents , as a
percent of total nursing horne payments received , was greater
for Risk residents than for S/HMO residents.
Specifically, under Subset I , in the adjusted Model A
for SNF plus ICF residents , nineteen percent (18.6%) of
total payments received within one year after the study
period for Risk residents were from Medicaid sources
($845 , 245/$4 , 544 , 872). The adjustment allocates duplicated
payment equally between Cost and Risk or S/HMO and Risk.
Under Subset I , in the adjusted Model A for SNF plus
ICF’ residents , fourteen percent of total payments received
within one year after the study period for S/HMO residents
were from Medicaid sources ($428 , 768/$3 , 023 , 555). The
adjustment allocates duplicated payment equally between Cost
and S/HMO or S/HMO and Risk. Also , all AFC money is removed.
。ne of the research issues examined in Chapter V was
whether differences in use rates existed between Risk and
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S/HMO members enrolled directly from the community. Table
XXXXIX compares individual S/HMO and Risk members.
TABLE XXXXIX
Model B
Format B
(RATES ARE STANDARDIZED BY SEX AND AGE COHORT)
MEDICAID PAYMENTS RECEIVED FOR SNF AND ICF
CARE BEFORE , DURING AND AFTER THE STUDY
PERIOD THROUGH 06/30/1989 FOR MEMBERS
RESIDING IN ZCP DURING THE STUDY
PERIOD /1000 RESEARCH POPULATION
MEMBERS IN liS/HMO SOMETIME" OR
"NEVER S/HMO," (MODEL B,
ROWS 3 & 4 OF FORMAT B)
Eligtype 3 Eligtype 4
"new" Risk "new" S/HMO
/1000 RPM ----/1000 RPM
(rounded)
Male + Female $(000)
Subset II 138 (59홈)
홈 Diff
$(000)
87
Subset I 83 (38훌) 60
Male
Subset II 102 (50훌) 68
Subset I 65 < 6 훌 > 68鋼-鋼
161
96
(63훌)
(73훌)
99
55Subset I
Source: Appendix F
Model B, Format B allows an examination of such
members. Thus , only two of the seven mutually exclusive
groups under Model B, Format B, are presented next. Such
members are called " new
’
I in this study because they were not
enrolled in KP as Medicare members at the time they became
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capitated Risk enrollees or S/HMO enrollees. However , "new"
also includes members who were enrolled in KP as
non-Medicare members but , became Risk or S/HMO upon reaching
age 65.
Comparison of direct "New" members is of special
interest because of the uncertainty about whether either
introduced some kind of bias which might affect rates in a
way which the other did not. That is , do "new" Risk members
who became ICF residents show different trends in spending
down , and in Medicaid expenditures , than "new" S/HMO
members? Is there adverse selection , likely to disfavor the
HMO or carrier financially , or is there some positive
selection , likely to favor the HMO or carrier financially ,
which surfaces in Medicaid rate analysis? Rate differences
for "new" Risk and "new" S/l뾰o are examined next. The
。verall rate is dropped because it badly distorts this rate
for "Never S/HMO" residents.
Except for "new’I S/HMO males in Subset I , rates of
Medicaid payment per 1000 members are substantially lower
for "new" S/RNO than for I’new" Risk. In Subset II , the "new"
S/HMO public assistance standardized rate is fifty-nine
percent less than that for "new" Risk ICF users , regarding
payments per 1000 mutually exclusive members who became ICF
residents during the study period.
In Subset I , the "new" S/HMO public assistance
standardized rate is thirty-eight percent less than that for
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"new" Risk ICF users , regarding payments per 1000 mutually
exclusive members who became ICF residents during the study
period.
Why is this rate for "new" S/HMO females seventy-three
percent less than that for "new" Risk Females? Why is this
rate of Medicaid payments per 1000 members for "new" S/HMO
females twenty-four less than that for "new" S/HMO males? It
appears from this table and from rates in previous chapters
that there is a group of "new" S/HMO males who had a
significant requirement for nursing home services and
possibly represent a condition of adverse selection at the
time of enrollment.
Whether "new" S/HMO females represent favorable
selection is less clear than that for S/HMO males , because
the female rate does not hold across SNF level care. Could
it be that case management processing of S/HMO members was
more successful in placing or keeping females in community
settings upon determining their need for ICF care , than
males?
Under the Overall data set for Model A, there were 420
SNF and/or ICF S/HMO nursing home residents , ten(10) of whom
were AFC members , (persons enrolled in S/HMO as Adult and
Family Care welfare recipients by the State of Oregon) , nine
(9) of whom were not admitted to nursing homes until after
the study period. One hundred thousand dollars ($106 , 435.00)
were received by nursing homes for these ten AFC members , of
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which twenty-eight thousand dollars ($27 , 876) were paid by
the State of Oregon. Only 124 or the 6 , 306 S/HMO members
were recipients of AFC assistance during the 24 month study
period. In the following analysis , they are removed from
nursing home data to facilitate a summary of spend-down by
members who were not already on welfare.
Of the remaining 411 S/HMO residents who were not AFC
welfare members , fifty-five , or thirteen percent spent down
to become dependent on public financing for part of their
nursing home charges. State of Oregon Medicaid payments for
those fifty-five residents totaled six hundred thirty-five
thousand dollars ($635 , 043.00).
。f the 421 Overall S/HMO nursing home residents , 73
were in either Cost or Risk before , during or· after the
study period; thus , 347 were not in nursing homes while in
non-S/HMO status. Over three million dollars ($3 , 129 , 648.00)
were received by nursing homes before June 30 , 1989 , for
care rendered to these 347 SNF or ICF’ S/HMO residents wh。
were not in Cost or Risk status while in a nursing home.
。f the 347 S/HMO "only·’ eligible nursing home
residents , forty-five or thirteen percent (45/347 - 12.97훌)
became Medicaid recipients by one year after the study
period, for whom four hundred fifty-six thousand dollars
($456 , 644.00) of Medicaid payments were received by nursing
homes.
If Medicaid payments ($27 , 876) for the four AFC are
229
removed ($456 , 644-$27 , 876 - 428 , 768) , fourteen percent
($428 , 768/$3 , 129 , 648 - 13.7훌) of total payments for non-AFC
S/HMO residents who were not also in Cost or Risk came from
public funds (fifteen percent including AFC funds
$456 , 644/$3 , 129 , 648 - 14.59홈) during the four year period
(4/85-6/89) of nursing home experience for S/HMO residents
who were in a nursing home during the study period.
The difference in Medicaid payments between non-AFC
Overall S/HMO in all eligibility status , and Overall S/HM。
who did not reside in nursing homes under Cost or Risk
status is $206 , 000 for ten residents ($635 , 043-$428 , 768 -
$206 , 275) with Cost or Risk status.
Table XXXXX gives another view of Medicaid patterns is
derived from the mean of all paYments received for S/HMO and
Risk nursing home (SNF and ICF) residents who became welfare
dependent.
TABLE L
MEAN OF ALL PAYMENTS RECEIVED FOR S/HMO AND RISK
NURSING HOME (SNF AND ICF) RESIDENTS WHO
BECAME WELFARE DEPENDENT.
Model A, Subset I - Payments Per Resident (7/86-6/89)
In SNF and/or ICFs in Study Pd.
Risk
Mean - $10 , 044
Median - $ 5 , 533
Third $17 , 050
Quartile
S/HMO
$10 , 069
$ 6 , 168
$ 9 , 511
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This above data are discredited some by not having a
good way to remove the proportion of payments received from
either Risk or S/HMO which Cost , Risk and S/HMO residents
incurred while in all eligibility status. The higher payment
per resident at Q3 ($17 , 050) suggests that there were more
Risk members under Subset I who stayed longer and that
probably accounts for the greater proportion of Risk members
who spent down and the higher rates per 1000 members in
tables above.
DISCUSSION ABOUT FINDINGS
Differences in total Medicaid payments are large,
depending on the criteria of prior nursing home admission.
In the data set containing Overall Cost , Risk and S/HMO
information the total of Medicaid payments received was
$9 , 508 , 935. In Subset II , for those admitted during who may
have had prior nursing home use , the total of Medicaid
payments received was $3 , 196 , 436. In Subset I , for those
admitted during the SP with no prior nursing home
admissions , the total amount of Medicaid payments received
was $1 , 816 , 313.
Medicaid payments lag behind dates of service by
months , while determination of eligibility, assets , and
assessment for level of care allowed by Medicare is done. A
percent may be withheld until adjustments from the prior
year are determined. Therefore , studies involving Medicaid
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payments must allow a substantial period following dates of
ICF residence for reasonable completion of payments. In this
study one year was allowed , after the study period. Thus ,
payment data for residents admitted earlier in the study
will be more complete than for those admitted later.
However , the data collection process causes difficulties in
making reliable comparison between eligibility groups in all
but Subset I.
Many factors could influence financial data leading t。
the slightly higher amount of Medicaid payments for S/HMO
members who spent down to welfare , (only) under Subset I.
Did a greater proportion of S/HMO members in nursing
homes die sooner than Risk m양obers， thus reducing the time
during which they remained on Medicaid? Apparently not ,
based on life-status data presented in Chapter VI.
Or , were they discharged from the nursing home by S/HMO
case managers to continue their care in a community based
setting , unlike Risk members? Were S/HMO members otherwise
managed differently than Risk members regarding solutions
for their long-term care needs? Further studies are
recommended and needed to clarify that question. Such
research could use the data base created for this study and
build on it buy collecting and adding needed information.
Did those who remained in nursing homes through the
period during which Expanded Care Benefits paid for SNP
services beyond those covered by Medicare , or beyond the
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period of ICF stay covered by ECB , leave S/HMO and become
Risk or Cost members as they became Medicaid dependent? Only
two instances of that occurred during the study period.
Did S/HMO members have more liquidible assets , than
Risk members , with which to delay the time to spend-down?
Or , did the combination of ECB and personal assets result in
the reduction of need for public assistance? This is unknown
without having State of Oregon SSD data from the Medicaid
files in Salem , Oregon.
Did S/HMO ICF’ members have more support group options
than Risk allowing them to avoid spend-down? If so , was it
because they were there to begin with or because case
managers in S/HMO used ECB funds to create surrogate support
groups which afforded them the option of non-institutional
long-care , not similarly available to Risk members?
What is different about users or/and use of SNF
services by S/HMO members from Risk members that results in
less reliance on public assistance for S/HMO than for Risk?
This issue is especially perplexing , considering that S/HMO
。verall use of SNFs is greater than that of Risk members.
There is much work to be done with the data sets in
this study regarding explanatory analysis which might
clarify why findings are as observed , in addition to the
premise that S/HMO ECB influences the results of nursing
home spend down. The need exists for greater understanding
in general regarding factors affecting spend down , in order
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to formulate policy which effectively shifts from means
tested eligibility to risk-sharing and intergenerational
financing of protection against catastrophic effects of
long-term care for the elderly.
The incidence of Medicaid dependency in this study more
closely approximates the recent findings of studies from the
Connecticut nursing home data base , which is much lower than
most other studies.
The Connecticut data have been used to derive
alternative spend-down estimates that provide
some idea of the magnitude of the biases
introduced by some of the methodological issues
raised earlier. As noted earlier , Connecticut
data clearly illustrated the effect of measuring
spend-down over multiple versus singular
admission; measures of SP1 and SP2 were virtually
doubled when multiple admissions were taken int。
account.
In the more recent (1991) study of
Connecticut data , the authors [Gruenber et. al.]
noted the effect of using a resident versus an
admission cohort on the measure of SP1. Using a
1978-79 admission cohort in the Connecticut data ,
the SP1 estimate was found to be 21훌; using the
。ne-day 1985 resident view , the authors measured
SP1 as almost 40훌! As they argue , this
illustrates effects of considerably greater
lengths of stay represented in the resident
sample in Connecticut. [77]
In this dissertation study , 30 percent of Subset I ICF
residents in Never S/HMO status , whose initial nursing home
stay occurred during the study period , were welfare
dependent one year after the two year study period; 14
percent of such S/HMO Sometime members were welfare
dependent. This was similar to that for Subset I Risk
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residents (27 percent) and S/HMO residents (14 percent);
。verall， including Cost residents (36 percent) , the rate of
welfare dependency , used as a proxy for spend down , was 24
percent , under terms of evaluation established for Subset I.
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS
。 Fewer S/HMO ICF residents per 1000 members , admitted
during the SP , became Medicaid dependent within one year
after the study period , then did Risk ICF users.
。 At least 62훌 fewer S/HMO ICF residents were receiving
Medicaid than Risk ICF residents , during or within one year
after the study period. Among ICF residents with no nursing
home admissions prior to the study period (subset I) , at
least 43훌 fewer S/HMO residents were receiving Medicaid
assistance one year after the study period.
。. S/HMO ICF residents admitted during the study period,
who were Medicaid dependent within one year after the study
period , required substantially less public financial
assistance per 1000 members than did Risk members , based on
Medicaid payments received by nursing homes within one year
after the study period.
。 The State of Oregon apparently paid substantially less
for S/HMO ICF residents who became Medicaid dependent than
for Risk ICF residents who became Medicaid.
POLICY RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
Data from the State of Oregon ’ s Data Base on Medicaid
case worker files is needed , as originally planned for this
study. Such information would provide variables for
explaining whether Risk and S/HMO ICF residents who became
welfare were different , as measured by ADLS , personal income
socio-demographically, by available family or other support
groups , by prior Medicaid status.
And , this study could be extended to compare
differences in community based services. This level of
research could definitely help test a predictive
hypothesis for causal relationships between S/HMO and
reduced dependency on Medicaid assistance.
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CHAPTER IX
MEDICAL STATUS OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS
The non-Medicare nursing home population is quite
distinct from the Medicare population .. In our Medicare
analysis , the first pure type was characterized by a
cancer diagnosis. In this [non-Medicare] analysis , our
first pure type involves some hip fracture , in add-
ition to cancer , as primary diagnosis. This [non-
Medicare] group is distinctly older than the Medicare
group , but is still predominantly female , unmarried ,
incontinent and generally bedfast. In contrast to the
Medicare population , senility , chronic brain syndrome ,
circulatory, and other chronic conditions are preval-
ent ...The second pure group [among non-Medicare
nursing home residents] is associated with a primary
diagnosis of stroke [being] male , married , incontinent
and with a high prevalence of persons who are chair-
fast .. and a wide range of medical problems (diabetes ,
bedsores , kidney failure , circulatory diseases) . [78]
This chapter investigates the discharge diagnosis
patterns for S/HMO and Risk ICF residents who had hospital
stays preceding their ICF stay. This focuses on health
status indicated by medical conditions associated with
secondary diagnosis at the time of hospitalization preceding
the first ICF admission of Risk and S/HMO members during the
study period. This asks whether S/HMO members who were
hospitalized and ended up in ICFs had different illness
patterns from Risk residents.
The following discussion provides a frame of reference
regarding use of hospital discharge diagnosis as indicators
。f health status for ICF residents.
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Hospital discharge diagnosis are not equivalent
substitutes for basic measures of cognitive or physical
disability which cause member ’ s dependency and therefore
need for ICF care. Those measures , such as activities of
daily living measures (Katz ’ s ADL scales) , are not part of
the hospital discharge diagnosis coding system , even though
they may be included in a hospital chart. ADLs were not
。btained for Risk members and therefore not available for
comparison with those known for S/HMO members , in this
study.
Hospital discharge diagnosis do specify the chronic
illnesses which give rise to ADL dysfunction. Related
conditions are otherwise defined by the International
Classification of Diseases , ICD9 codes , and Diagnostic
Related Groups , DRGs.
Discharge diagnosis used in this study are from the
last hospital stay following April , 1985 which was prior t。
the first ICF admission after June , 1986. In some instances
a lapse of over one year occurred between hospital discharge
and ICF admission. Not all ICF residents were hospitalized
before their first ICF stay , although a very high proportion
were hospitalized during the course of nursing home care ,
。ften preceding their death.
Residents already in an ICF at the time of admission
are also excluded because most were hospitalized prior t。
the start-up of S/HMO and TEFRA Risk programs. Therefore ,
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fewer nursing home residents are evaluated in this chapter
than in prior chapters. Hospital discharge may have been t。
an SNF as an intermediate step to lCF’ admission; SNF stay is
considered later in this chapter.
The TEFRA Act allowed some waivers from Cost Medicare
regulations for Risk and S/HMO members. One wavier removed
the requirement of three days hospitalization prior to an
SNF admission. Thus , S/HMO and Risk members could be
evaluated and admitted directly to an SNF’, as well as an
lCF , if their health condition permitted. Therefore , SNF’ 。r
lCF admissions might be ordered following a visit to the
physician ’ s medical office or the hospital emergency room.
Often, patients were held in an Emergency Room (ER) Holding
bed for up to 24 hours to permit evaluation and observation
for changes in health status. No doubt , such waivers
affected hospitalization patterns and therefore availability
。f discharge diagnosis preceding SNF stay if not lCF stay.
One study observed that , in 1985 , the most frequent
location from which residents were admitted [to a
nursing home] was a general or short-stay hospital
(37%) ... elderly residents were more likely to be
admitted from short-stay hospitals (39홈) [than any
。ther location and] ... 38 percent of nursing home
residents had previous nursing home stays ... Several
studies found that prior nursing home residence for
hospitalized patients was associated with a very
high probability of continued institutionalization.
Lewis , Cretin , and Kane found that transfers
between nursing homes and hospitals (in both
directions) occurred in 54 percent of first-time
admissions to nursing homes in the 2-year period
following admission. [79]
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S/HMO and Risk lCF users were no exception. Sixty-five
percent of S/HMO , and sixty percent of Risk first lCF
admissions came from a hospital. During the two year SP , the
largest number of readmissions to lCFs and SNF’s was nine ,
although approximately seventy-five percent of all nursing
home users had three or less nursing home admissions.
Published studies , which employ DRG or lCD codes as a tool
for analysis , are not always explicit about how many and
which hospital stays are used for lCD source data.
Hospital discharge diagnosis may not reflect chronic
conditions leading to a nursing home stay. For example , a
high proportion of last nursing home discharges to the
hospital precede a patient ’ s demise. The primary diagnosis
might be pneumonia as a complication of emphysema. The
patient may have been in a nursing home because of advanced
dementia. Many readmissions are for a procedure , such as
stabolizing a fractured femur , and related secondary
diagnosis that reflect basic chronic conditions which
contributed to the incident , such as diabetes or orthostatic
hypotension , may not be recorded.
。ne the other hand , ADLs may not be the reason for
admission to an lCF. One common cause of first lCF admission
is that a care-giver spouse/relative dies or becomes
disabled , and no alternative care givers are available t。
continue home care of the elderly dependent person.
DRGs and lCD codes are products of a hospital
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discharge. Medical conditions observed during an emergency
room visit are not coded unless the patient is hospitalized.
Nursing homes record the location prior to admission , and it
is common practice to note "hospital" even if the patient
was only seen in the ER but not admitted to hospital.
Thus , tables presented in Chapter VI on location before and
after ICF’ admission may not coincide with numbers in this
chapter.
Primary diagnosis is the dominate factor in selecting a
Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) which best summarizes the
。verall reasons for hospitalization. Computer programs are
used to weight how all associated ICD9 codes contribute t。
the selection of DRGs. [80]
DRGs are selected via an algorithm which considers
primary and secondary diagnosis , age , severity of
conditions , presence of systemic problems or procedural
complications , invasive procedures performed while
hospitalized , and a few other conditional factors such as
length of stay exceeding the average length of stay for a
primary diagnosis. Numerous primary diagnosis are clustered
by DRG. Currently, there are 487 DRGS , which are clustered
into 28 Major Diagnostic Categories (MDC). [81]
Up to eight secondary diagnosis are also recorded upon
discharge. Such information is extracted from documentation
in the medical record which was entered during each period
。f hospitalization by all providers. Secondary diagnosis
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identify other conditions diagnosed and either treated or
consider응d as co-morbidities influencing medical or/and
social decisions regarding the primary condition under
treatment. For each of these nine medical conditions , a code
is selected which best fits the patient ’ s condition during
each hospitalization. Codes used in this study are those
listed in the International Classification of Diseases , 9th
Revision , or IICD9". These codes and related DRGs are stored
in the KP Hospital Discharge data base used for this study.
Secondary ICD9 diagnostic codes have been used in some
post-acute care studies to predict and describe utilization
trends. One study, done at the Rand Corporation, tests the
power of secondary diagnosis to predict which patients
receive care in particular post-acute settings [rehab. , SNF ,
HHA]. This RAND study used all secondary diagnosis available
(4) from hospital billing records which were listed for each
。f five DRGs (DRG 14: stroke , DRG 88: COPD , DRG 127: Heart
Failure , DRG 209: Major Joint Procedures , DRG 210: Hip &
Femur Procedures). These DRGs were selected at Rand because
their were association strongly with SNF and HHA.
The overall findings of that study , regarding
secondary diagnosis is noted. Secondary diagnoses
are quite important in determining how likely a
patient is to use post-acute care in a particular
setting. with the exception of DRG 209 (major'joint
procedures) , secondary diagnosis appear to be more
important than are different primary diagnoses
within the DRG. Moreover , the secondary diagnoses
that are associated with high utilization of post-
acute care are very often apparently unrelated t。
the primary diagnosis. An important determinant of
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whether a stroke patient used SNP’ care , for
example , seems to be whether he or she had a
secondary diagnosis of pneumonia. [82]
In this study , five DRGS are used as measures of health
status among nursing home users because they are known to be
reliable predictors of nursing home admission , based on the
RAND study. However , they did not account for a majority of
discharge DRGs for nursing home users studied.
Therefore , a ranking of the top twenty DRGs is
shown for Model A by Cost , Risk and S/HMO members. If DRGs
were ranked from all hospitalizations associated with each
ICF user , the order of frequency is different than that
presented in Table LI for the last hospital stay before
first ICF study period admission.
TABLE LI
RANK ORDER OF TOP TEN DRGS FROM THE LAST
HOSPITAL STAY PRIOR TO FIRST ICF
ADMISSION IN THE STUDY PERIOD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
m
Rank of Rank of
Risk 훌 。f S/HMO 훌 。f
DRGs total DRGs total
# DRGs # DRGs
127과 5.8% i11E42T70
6.5 훌
5.2% 5.8훌
-때삐 5.2훌 3.9훌4.0% 210 3.9훌
18389 3.5 홈 182 3.2톰2.9훌 19 3.2%
395 2.9훌 39 2.6훌
141 2.3% 174 2.6%
209 2.3% 277 2.6%
280 2.3% 89 1. 9훌
47.4훌 36.2훌
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DRG: 14-stroke , 19-cranial/peripheral nerve disorder ,
39-Removal of eye lens , 89-pneumonia , 121-heart
related circulatory disorder(MI/arrest/hypertension) ,
127-heart failure shock/hypertension , 138-cardiac
arrhythmia fibrillation tachycardia , 140-cardiac
arrhythmia ischemia ro/MI angina , 141-orthostatic
hypotension & syncope(unconscious due to circulation,
174-gastrointestinal hemorrhage/ulcer , 182-digestive
disorder gastrointestinal illness , 187-dental
extraction or restoration , 209-major joint repair or
replacement , 210-hip and femur procedure , 277-injury
infection or wound to skin , 280 open wound or trauma
to skin (decubitus ulcer) , 39S-red blood cell
disorder , anemia , transfusion reaction.
Before summarizing rank order differences in DRGs , it
should be noted that six of these DRGs related to heart and
circulation problems , two related to digestive tract , tw。
related to skin , two related to joints. While exact match-up
。f DRGs shows a 30홈 common listing between Risk and S/HMO
。nly two in each eligibility are different diseases than
found in the other. Similarity of diseases predominates
between the top 10 hospital discharge DRGs for Risk and
S/HMO ICF residents , in spite of the following Ranking
summary.
Within the ten most frequent DRGs for the hospital
discharge prior to first ICF admission in the study period,
three were common to S/HMO and Risk (89 , 127 , 140). Although
not shown , three were common between S/HMO and Cost (89 , 127
182) , and two DRGs were common to all three (pneumonia and
heart failure).
The top ten DRGs accounted for 46훌 。f all Cost , 47 훌 。f
all Risk , and 36훌 。fall S/HMO. Over 60훌 。fRisk DRGs were
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in the top twenty of all secondary diagnosis; about half in
S/HMO.
Three of the top 10 Risk DRGs , and two in S/HMO , were
common to the top five Rand DRGs selected on the basis of
most frequent DRG-linked secondary diagnosis. A case could
be made that the similarity was higher , due to marginal
distinctions between DRGs and related secondary diagnosis.
These observations suggest that a somewhat different
health status existed among Risk and S/HMO members wh。
became ICF residents , the most obvious condition missing
from S/HMO , that is in Risk , is DRG 14 (stroke). Whether
something different was taking place regarding ICF admission
practices for stroke S/HMO members could only be determined
by a careful analysis of stroke patients in both groups.
But , it can be said that the most important difference in
Risk and S/HMO hospital discharge diagnosis is that Stroke
is high in the rank order of DRGs for Risk but is missing
from the top 10 for S/HMO hospital discharges.
DRG 88 (COPD) did not appear in the top twenty of any
KP hospital discharge DRG lists except those for both Risk
and S/HMO SNP DRG rankings for age 65-74. In the Rand study
it was a predominate diagnosis. In contrast , pneumonia was
in the top 10 of every DRG/ICD ranking list.
When the above table (only half of the top twenty DRGs
identified) is compared to the composite of DRGs for all
hospitalizations (before , during and after the study period
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the study period,1.nfor ICF residents1989)through June ,
There were 183976.and S/HMO1 , 282Risk -sum is:the
the first studydischarge beforelast hospitalthefromDRGs
period admission.
not similar t。1. SDRGsThe composite rank order of all
in Risk andtentopthetwo ofOnlytable.the above1.nthat
were common in both lists.and 14)(127S/HMO
DRG rank-order profilethe last hospitalt。In contrast
great similarityICF admission in study period ,firstbefore
last DRG rank-order and first SNF’existed between
below.shown in Table LII ,asadmissions ’
TABLE LII
RANK ORDER OF TOP TEN DRGS FROM THE LAST
HOSPITAL STAY PRIOR TO FIRST SNF
ADMISSION IN THE STUDY PERIOD
Rank order
S/HMO
DRGs
#
。rder
xx
common
DRGs
Rank
Risk
DRGs
#
14
209
210
127
296
89
174
416
96
79
40.0훌 Tot.
x
x
x
x
x
xx
14
209
210
127
89
320
296
39
140
79
tot.DGR
nu
’4
‘‘
『J
A
‘I
RJ
，。
,l
”g
n1
’4
DRG
xx
48.3훌
20)
in the study
topthe。r
last hospital DRGs before first SNF’ admission
(and 13tentoptheseven ofnoted ,As
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period are common to S/HMO and Risk (Cost included 8 of the
top 10 DRGS for Risk and S/HMO combined). As expected, the
DRG rank order is quite different for those age 85+ and
those age 65-74.
Hospital discharge practices had to be similar between
Risk and S/HMO members to produce a ranking of DRGs that is
so similar. That is expected because S/HMO did not intervene
。r interact with the KP managed care process for Medicare
covered services. At least the basis for post-acute care
management was similar for Risk and S/HMO. AT the point when
S/HMO case managers intervene in long-term nursing home
care , there was a reasonably similar health status among SNF’
level residents.
The five Rand DRGs included code 88 which is not an
important health condition for hospitalization in either
Multnomah County, or in KP ICF member care patterns.
Pneumonia is (89) a key illness.
To study differences in discharge diagnosis between KP
members and all of Multnomah County (including KP members) ,
data was purchased from the State of Oregon , Office of
Health Policy , SAS data base for hospital discharges. The
DRGs were ranked , together with number of patients and
total hospital days. The result is reported in Table LIII.
The similarity in the top 20 DRGs between Multnomah
County and KP suggest KP members are not likely to require
different nursing home services , overall , that other
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residents of the county in which they reside. Of course ,
。ther factors than medical condition must be considered
before any conclusions could be drawn.
TABLE LIII
RANK ORDER OF TOP TEN DRGS FROM MULTNOMAH
COUNTY HOSPITALS WHO WERE DISCHARGED T。
NURSING HOMES (SNF’-ICF)
Rank Order Rank Order
1986 DRG 1987 DRG
Mult. Cnty. Mult. Cnty.
1 14 14
2 210 210
3 89 89
4 127 295
5 296 127
6 209 209
7 79 79
8 429 320
9 320 182
10 416 174
-
ICD codes are examined next for patterns in Risk and
S/HMO member use of SNF’s. Given the large number of ICD9
secondary codes available to select from and the fact that
up to eight secondary codes were reported for each hospital
discharge , dissimilarity is expected in comparing Ranked
ICD9 secondary diagnosis. That was not the finding , as Table
LIV shows. Similarities would be expected for primary
diagnosis , since that is the major determinate of DRG codes.
Secondary ICD9 codes are more likely to reflect
chronic conditions.
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TABLE LIV
。F’ TOP FIFTY PERCENT OF ICD9 CODES
LAST HOSPITAL STAY PRIOR TO FIRST
ADMISSION IN THE STUDY PERIOD
RANK ORDER
FROM THE
SNF
Rank Order
S/HMO
ICD9
Codes
Order
xx
common
工CD9
Rank
Risk
ICD9
Codes
401.00
401.90
41. 40
278.00
285.90
693.00
250.00
290.30
331.30
332.00
414.00
428.00
496.00
599.00
600.00
58.0훌 Tot. ICD9
x
x
x
x
x
xx
xx
xx
xx
250.00
401.40
331. 00
401.90
428.00
564.00
578.00
780.30
285.00
298.90
401.10
412.00
413.40
424.10
427.32
50.8훌 tot.ICD9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
m끄끄괴과돼
codes(ICD9)secondary diagnosis15toptheSeven of
codes15topthecommon between Risk and S/HMO members;were
secondary diagnosesallencompassed over 50 percent of
time ofthedischarge prior t。the last hospitalduring
study period.thefirst SNF admission duringtheir
andcare ,reinforces DRG observations about SNFThis
that Risk and S/HMO members who enteredfurther confirms
had similarsubsequently became ICF residents ,and wh。SNFs ,
1nspent substantially f를wer days
health characteristics.
That S/HMO members
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ICFs than Risk members , suggests events other than health
status influence those rates. This provides some additional
basis for recommending hypothesis-based tests of statistical
inference to test the correlation between fewer days of stay
and S/HMO ECB.
In Table LV eleven of the top 20 secondary diagnosis
for last hospital stay before first ICF’ admission were
common to Risk and S/HMO ICF residents; the top 20 codes
encompassed over 50 percent of all secondary diagnoses
(2-9) during the last hospital discharge prior to the time
。f their first SNF admission during the study period. The
are listed below:
Diagnostic name of ICD9 Codes listed: 4l.40-E.Coli Bacterial
Infection; l8s.00-Malignant Neoplasm-Prostate;
198.s0-Neoplasm-Bone, Bone Marrow; 244.90-Hypothyroidism,
unspecified Cause; 2s0.00-Diabetes Mellitus; 278.00 Obesity
and Hyperalimentation; 285.90-Anemia; 290.00-Senile
Dementia/Senile Organic Psychotic Condition; 290.30-Senile
Dementia w/Deliriums; 298.90-Psychosis , Unspecified;
33l.00-Alzheimers; 332.00-Parkinson ’ s Disease;
36s.90-Glaucoma; 40l.l0-Hypertensive Disease;
40l.90-Hypertensive Disease; 4l2.00-Healed Myocardial
Infarction; 4l4.l0-Aneurysm-Heart Wall; 4l3.90-Unspecified
Angina; 424.l0-Aortic Valve Disorder; 427.00-Paroxysmal
Tachycardia; 427.3l-Atrial Fibrillation; 427.69-Premature
Ventricular Contractions; 428.00-Cardiac Heart Failure;
438.00-Late effects of Cardiovascular Accident(CVA) :Aphasia
Dysphasia , other paralysis; 440.90-Arteriosclerotic Vascular
Disease; 443.90-Peripheral Vascular Disease; 492.8-Emphysema
496.00-Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease;
553.30-paraesophogeal/Hiatial Hernia; 599.00-urinary Tract
Infection; 7l5.90-0steoarthrosis unspecified;
。ver 25훌 。fall (736) secondary diagnosis from the last
hospital stay before first ICF admission in the study period
were common to Risk and S/HMO , under Model A in this study.
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TABLE LV
RANK ORDER OF TOP FIFTY PERCENT OF ICD9 CODES
FOR SECONDARY DIAGNOSIS FROM THE LAST
HOSPITAL STAY PRIOR TO FIRST rCF
ADMISS工ON IN THE STUDY PERIOD
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。f S/HMO and code 332 is not listed in the top 50훌 。fRisk.
Such patients require considerable personal care and medical
attention.
To the extent that such differences may exist , it
suggests that some S/HMO members who were in ICFs were very
dependent , requiring continuous assistance. Such patients
commonly become Medicaid dependent.
In 1988-89 , the State of Oregon contracted with the
School of Public Health , University of Minnesota , t。
evaluate differences between Medicaid and private residents
in Adult Foster Care (AFC) homes in Oregon , compared t。
Medicaid and private residents in ICFs. One measurement of
difference included medical problems based on specific
diagnosis identified by the providers. The proportion of ICF
residents with dementia , heart disease , hip fractures , and
bowel and bladder dysfunction was consistently higher than
for AFC residents , but lower for mental illness , and similar
in most other areas of chronic illness dysfunction. Kane ,
et. al. , found the following.
Although some very impaired people live in foster
care homes , foster care residents are , on average ,
less impaired than ICF residents. They also show
that , within the foster care sector , private-pay
foster care residents are more impaired than
Medicaid foster care residents ... In nursing homes
a larger proportion (37훌 Medicaid and 39훌 private
pay residents) needed complete help with 5 or all
6 ADL activities , whereas in foster homes 5% of
Medicaid and 13홈 。f private pay residents need
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complete help with 5 or 6 of those activities.
Note , however , that the data show an extreme level
。f ADL impairments for private pay foster home
residents. (This is consistent with the large
numbers of private pay foster care residents with
dementia as a medical problem) ... on average , ICF
residents had more cognitive impairment than
foster care residents , and that private-pay foster
care residents had more cognitive impairment than
Medicaid residents. [83]
The above tables present some macro level patterns of
chronic illness that suggest S/HMO members may be more akin
to the private-pay group and Risk more akin to the Medicaid
group in the referenced study. This suggests that S/HMO may
indeed be facilitating home based care for persons wh。
。therwise would be found in ICFs.
The proportion of Risk ICF residents was greater than
S/HMO ICF residents who had cardiovascular illness as an
underlying chronic medical problem to there functional
dependency , and chronic diseases associated with cognitive
dysfunction was more prevalent among S/HMO than among Risk
IeF residents.
While these categories measure gross differences , they
。ffer some basis for formulating a model which might be used
to evaluate differences between Risk and S/HMO members in
ICFs and Risk and S/HMO members in home and other community
based settings.
Such comparison is recommended for measuring overall
differences in use of ECB covered services between Risk and
S/HMO. The analysis could include tests for correlation
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between ADL-Cognitive dysfunction scores and hospital
secondary discharge diagnosis , as a method of evaluating the
relationship between chronic disease and location of care.
One study recommendation is to examine diagnostic
characteristics of S/HMO and Risk members who spend down in
。rder to determine the extent to which ECBs deferred spend-
down for such persons. The issue is to develop models of
financing solutions for long-term disabled persons , as well
as shorter term disability.
The model for analysis in this study is based on use of
secondary hospital discharge diagnosis to predict rCF use
rates for Risk and S/HMO members. The model includes 32
independent medical status variables which were selected for
use in predicting nursing home use. They are regressed on
the dependent variable , "days of rCF stay in the SP.II This
model is evaluated first by stepwise regression and then
introduction of age , sex , and SNF status. A linear fit is
not good. The fit is not improved significantly by use of a
squared or log value for the dependent variable. The model
is described below.
rCD9 hospital discharge codes were used to create
thirty-two clusters of rCD9 codes which describe medical
status based during hospitalization. Twenty five of these
clusters describe chronic ,hea1th conditions identified in a
study undertaken by Manton , Liu and Cornelius in 1985
(op.Cit. [79]). Those twenty-five conditions were
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statistically associated with nursing home residents as
derived from the National Nursing Home Survey of 1977. The
authors were called and asked how they selected ICD codes t。
define clusters for such chronic conditions. Korbin Liu and
Elizabeth Cornelius confirmed ICD9 codes were not used
either to formulate the questionnaire or translate answers ,
and that no reference data set of ICD codes existed. Thus ,
all ICD9 codes were assigned to each variable based on ICD9
code definitions. Additionally , seven Major Diagnostic
Categories from the DRG system were usedto create clusters
。f other ICD9 codes not considered by the 25 other clusters.
These 25 chronic conditions and 7 MDCs , together with
age , sex , SNF status and eligibility groups (Risk and S/HMO
。nly) comprise the independent variables in this regression
model. ICF days comprise the dependent variable. A linear
regression model is used to predict which , if any, of these
thirty-two independent variables might be useful in
explaining the variance between groups I , II (S/HMO , Risk)
days of residence in ICFs during the study period.
The number of ICF’ users available for this procedure is
reduced by the criteria of prior hospitalization.
Specifically, their were 789 members who were admitted one
。r more times to an ICF during the study period. Of these
users , only 373 , or 47% overall , had prior inpatient stay ,
(39훌 。f Cost , 49훌 。f Risk and 50훌 。f S/HMO). These
percentages are approximately 15훌 below those given in the
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previous chapter for Risk and S/HM。’ based on nursing home
records regarding source of first ICF admission.
Results of the model , based on the eight ICD9 clusters
selected by the SAS stepwise regression option, include an
adjusted R-Square of 0.1139 for the linear regression. This
is improved only slightly by squaring the value for the
dependent variable , resulting in an R-Square value of
0.1472 , when age and sex and SNF’ are added to the eight ICD9
clusters.
Either the Regression model did not include ICD codes
(clusters) or other variables needed to predict ICF days of
stay, or there is little relationship between those selected
and days of stay. This could also be interpreted as an
indication that the S/HMO ECB was influencing days of stay
and the model did not account for that variable.
Additional experimenting is needed to determine how t。
use ICD9 code information more effectively, with other
independent variables , in order to help formulate hypothesis
testing models which confirm or refute that the ECB and
related case-management is affecting use rates of ICF , and
。ther community-based long-term care services.
Clarification of differences in health status between
Risk and S/HMO members remains an important need to be
considered in follow-up studies. The extent to which ECB
arrangements for home-based formal care facilitates transfer
。f ICF’ level elder care to the community is a matter of
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great pOlicy interest. Conventional understanding about this
interchangeability suggests overlap only at the margins.
Although chronic disease is common in most elderly,
the impact of disease and resulting impairments
distinguish the nursing home resident from the
community-dwelling elderly. Brody and Foley (1985)
report that one-fourth of nursing home residents
are dependent in all six activities of daily living
(feeding , dressing , bathing , continence , using the
toilet , and mobility) , and the degree of dependency
increases with age. Compared with 9 percent of
noninstitutionalized elderly , 93 percent of nursing
home residents require assistance in at least one
activity of daily living. Cognitive impairment
affects over half of nursing home residents.
Behavioral problems are often the most burdensome
aspect in caring for resident with cognitive
impairment ... [However , the] environment provides a
context in which behavior can be adaptive or
maladaptive. [84]
The Kane study of the Oregon AFC-ICF trade-off
reinforces the notion for Medicaid residents that the
interchangeability is limited , but reopens the debate based
。n findings about private-pay, non-Medicaid residents. Prior
studies may need to be revisited in order to re-think and
re-observe what can be done where for the elderly.
POLICY ISSUES
There are several caveats attached to comparison of
Risk and S/HMO secondary discharge diagnosis from the last
hospital stay prior to first ICF admission. On a Macrolevel ,
The limitations of a disease-specific orientation
are well recognized; assessment of disease-specific
treatment and outcomes may indicate relatively
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little about the individual ’ s overall health and
well-being ... the interrelationships of generic and
disease specific approaches are depicted , with
needs for care being determined both by disease and
nondisease aspects of health. The nondisease
aspects may include signs and symptoms that do not
meet criteria for classification as diagnosis (ICD9
-CM) or limitations in function that create needs
for care ... Although relatively little has been done
to introduce health status measurement into the
policy debate , there are areas in which this has
been accomplished and appears to have been
influential ... the three areas of policy application
for health status information around which this
discussion is organized are: 1) identification of
high-risk and high-need populations , 2) assessing
alternative financing methods; 3) evaluating
alternative approaches for organizing health
care. [85]
This reference surfaces two points regarding use of
discharge diagnosis in this chapter. First , used alone , they
are known to be weak predictors of nursing home and other
long-term care requirements. There is increasing evidence
that used jointly with other health and social status
variables , ICD-9 codes may strengthen methods of classifying
LTC users into user groups , including those around whose
needs ECB support systems may be developed to enhance the
prospects of satisfying LTC needs in community based
settings , who otherwise would be in nursing homes.
Second, policy regarding LTC programs must have some
reliable outcome measures of LTC decisions. That involves
preliminary clarification of health status related to loss
。f capacity for independent functioning and resultant
dependency. Assessment of appropriateness of LTC care ,
therefore , must include clarification of underlying multiple
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chronic illness which affects functional well being.
Enhancement of function as an outcome goal within a range of
environmental locations , rather than alleviation of
symptoms , means clarification of severity of disease as well
as clarification of dysfunction. Improvement in the
reliability and construct validity of instruments which
measure enhancement of function against some baseline
condition requires increased use of chronic illness
diagnostic codes to clarify physical and psychosocial health
status. [86]
Measures of functional enhancement should be
considered as one of the outcomes for evaluating ECB
incentive based, managed LTC programs , compared to such
。utcomes for Risk members. The policy research question is
whether ECB , which reduces use of ICF’s and substitutes home
based care , leads to desirable differences in functional
enhancements , as well as patient/resident and family
satisfaction.
There is an increasing body of evidence that LTC needs
。f the elderly increasingly involve significant deficits in
mental status as well as physical functional status. (Op.
Cit. [84] , p. 817). S/HMO members in this study appear t。
have a substantially higher level of cognitive impairment
than Risk members. This raises a question about whether the
S/HMO program was especially attractive to families of
persons concerned about the complications of caring for
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cognitively impaired elderly, and therefore a selection
bias. Some research follow-up is recommended to draw this
issue to a more visible level. It has implications for
policy benefit formulation and policy care solutions which
may be different than for elderly with physiological
dysfunction.
On the other hand , it may not be an issue of enrollment
selection but simply that the cognitively impaired person is
。ften difficult to manage in a home setting resulting in
institutional care as the solution of choice.
It is certain that incentives which influence provider
and consumer decisions regarding use of LTC benefits will be
。f great interest as national pOlicy on LTC evolves , given
the projected demand for LTC services in the next 50 years.
The chronically disabled community resident elderly
population was projected to increase from 5.6 t。
15.4 million between 1985 and 2060. The comparable
population 85 and over is projected to increase
from 1.1 to 5.6 million ... Defining health outcomes
for the oldest old is difficult because of the high
prevalence of c-omorbidity and functional
impairment ... [yet] Clinical studies ... suggest that
disability is reversible for a significant number
。f elderly persons-even at advanced ages ... It is
possible , however , to reduce the impact [of
increased resources required to meet increased LTC
needs] by intervening in what had been viewed as
l ’immutable;" the age rate of physical and
functional decline for elderly individuals. This
has implications , not only for reducing the
aggregate level of LTC demand , but also for
improving social autonomy at the personal level. It
raises the question of whether society is doing all
that is possible to maximize the potential of
individuals at later ages. [87]
CHAPTER X
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Ideological argument is an important and
inevitable part of social and policy inquiry.
However , such philosophical argument and
interpretation would be most suitable for policy
inquiry when it is somehow connected to and
complemented by systematic empirical
study ... [but] Objectivity in social inquiry ... is
less a matter of hypothesis testing or
quantitative measurement than perceptiveness and
。pen-mindedness; an ability to see how other
agents organize their social world. [88]
This study attempts to inform researchers , analysts ,
policy makers and the public about one outcome of the S/HMO
Demonstration project. Specifically, empirical observations
are described regarding differences in ICF use rates and
expenditures between TEFRA capitated HMO members and S/HMO
capitated members whose Supplemental benefit package is
expanded to include limited coverage of nursing home and
formal home-based LTC costs.
Composite observations suggest that in the managed care
setting studied , members who had S/HMO benefits and who were
certified as eligible for ICF care , accessed nursing homes
more readily but limited nursing home stays such that costs
were substantially less than for capitated members who did
not have S/HMO benefits.
These composite observations suggest that nursing home
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use rates can be meaningfully modified by use of home-based
formal services , available through privately financed
Medicare Supplemental Insurance benefits. It als。
demonstrates that such modification can be cost effective.
Based on observations in this study , it is postulated
that the operational effects of the S/HMO ECB significantly
reduce overall nursing home use rates and costs. Therefore ,
it is likely that increased costs of formal home-based care
are a rational and cost-effective LTC policy option in group
practice based HMOs.
However , this study does not directly examine the
。utcomes of S/HMO policy and underlying operational theory
regarding community-based LTC services , except as inferred
by observed differences in ICF use rates and nursing home
costs between Risk and S/HMO members. A comprehensive
follow-up companion study is strongly recommended to assess
that element of the S/HMO concept.
An equally significant observation of this study is
that Medicaid payments to nursing homes for S/HMO members ,
as a proportion of total payments , were substantially less
than for Risk members. If non-nursing home community-based
spend-down and Medicaid dependency were found to be
significantly less for S/HMO than Risk members , that would
further support the S/HMO concept as an important building
block for national LTC policy. Such analysis is needed.
Findings of this study may help formulate answers t。
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questions raised by Grannemann in 1989 [89] about whether
capitated paYment service delivery methods may be applied t。
LTC in the same manner as applied to Medicare and Medicare
Supplemental benefits. This study suggests that to be true.
This study also suggests that while demand for nursing
home level care may be inelastic , COp. Cit. {89}] methods of
satisfying that demand may be altered given the price and
conditions (contract terms) for use of LTC services which
are embedded in the ECB of S/HMO. Observations which lead t。
that supposition need validation by confirmatory evaluation
。f variables not examined in this study.
SYNTHESIS OP STUDY PINDINGS
The overall argument , which evolves from collective
。bservations in this study, is that use of and expenditures
for ICF services by S/HMO members appear to be strongly
influenced by HMO practices and ECB incentives. Conclusions ,
about the apparent influence of the S/HMO program on use of
ICFs , are based on empirical comparisons between S/HMO
members and other capitated HMO Medicare beneficiaries wh。
do not have an ECB.
Collectively, measures used in this comparison suggest
that the S/HMO concept is associated with:
。 greater access to ICP services , based on observations
that S/HMO members had a much higher probability of
being in a nursing home (SNP/ICF) than Risk members;
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。 effective ICF utilization outcomes based on
。bservations that S/HMO residents used substantially
fewer cumulative days of ICF stay across a two year
span of time , than Risk members , including days not
covered by ECB. This was also true of S/HMO members
whose nursing home stay included SNF and ICF services ,
and under conditions where only direct-pay (individual)
Risk member rates were compared with S/HMO rates. Risk
group-sponsored member use rates were lower than
individual Risk member use rates;
。 effective use of the ECB , based on the observation that
S/HMO residents had a higher proportion of ICF days
below the benefit limit (of 100 cumulative days) , as
well as a higher proportion of ICF days below one year
(the point beyond which a majority of nursing home
。ccupants ， generally , become welfare dependent);
。 adherence to the S/HMO goal regarding use of the ECB
for home-based care when possible , based on the
。bservation that S/HMO residents had a substantially
higher proportion of last ICF discharges to home , than
Risk Members;
。 cost-effective outcomes based on the observation that
S/HMO members , as an entire eligibility group , required
fewer financial resources per 1000 members for ICF
services , than Risk members. This was also true for
combined SNF and ICF services , although differences for
SNF’ 。nly services were marginal;
。 lower incidence of spend-down , based on the observation
that S/HMO ICF residents had a lower rate of spend-down
within one year after the study period , than Risk
members;
。 potentially important outcomes regarding governmental
goals for containment of escalating welfare payments ,
based on the observation that Medicaid payments were a
smaller proportion of total nursing home revenues for
S/HMO ICF residents , than for Risk ICF residents.
。 socially important outcomes regarding options t。
nursing home care for very elderly frail females in
that use rates for such S/HMO members were
significantly lower than those for such Risk females.
Findings listed above are derived from the Overall data
set. When nursing home users are removed from the Overall
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data set who had admissions prior to the study period , e.g. ,
(Subset I) , the second finding noted above (cumulative days
used) is shifted to a finding of no statistically
significant difference. However , the elimination of left
censoring effects did not alter the fifth or sixth finding ,
above , i.e. , payments received , and Medicaid payments as a
proportion of total payments were less for S/HMO nursing
home users than for Risk nursing home users.
Since payments include nursing home stays up to one
year after the study period , this observation suggests that
resident use patterns in Subset I data had not sufficient
time to develop into those observed in the Overall data set.
However , a basic change in use of ECB for nursing home care
became effective in January , 1989 , which complicates
interpretation of findings for Subset I financial data.
In this study , numerous measures of utilization were
applied including rates whose denominators made numerator
values relative , and central tendency values which observed
effects of long-term residents on the length of stay means
for the dominant group of nursing home users whose total
stay was short. Even after the long-stay group was removed
from the Overall data set , cumulative days used within the
study period by S/HMO members were substantially less than
those for Risk members.
The elimination of a statistically significant
difference in cumulative days used, resulting from
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elimination of all Risk and S/HMO members with prior
admissions (Subset I) , emphasizes the importance of
identifying rates over a long time period , if not over a
lifetime of use rates. This is especially important when
investigating patterns of spend-down , total nursing home
paYments , and likely effects of renewable LTC benefits on
nursing home use rate patterns.
While this study did not encompass the time span needed
to comprehensively examine life-time nursing home use rates ,
it did encompass a four year period (three for those with n。
prior admissions) for purposes of comparing relative rates
。f nursing home paYment. And , it encompassed a two year
period for comparing probability of admission and cumulative
days used from all admissions. Other methods of evaluation
are yet to be applied to data in this study , such as odds
ratio survival predictions , as a method of resolving effects
。f left and right censoring of use rate data.
However , findings in this study do a reasonable job of
informing policy makers about patterns of nursing home use
for shorter-stay residents (under two years) , most of whom
will not re-enter nursing homes.
This study suggests that over two-thirds of S/HMO
member cumulative days of ICF stay totaled less than 100
days , and over four-fifths totaled less than one year. Risk
member ICF users used more ICF resources than S/HMO members.
This suggests that , during the time period studied, the ECB
266
was providing a reasonable level of protection against asset
depletion and against catastrophic loss of assets , for a
large proportion of research population members needing ICF
and overall nursing home services.
Based on observations summarized above , it appears
that this study establishes part of the baseline needed t。
undertake comfirmatory hypothesis testing of differences
between S/HMO and Risk members enrolled during the study
period , regarding comprehensive use of all formal LTC
services available under the ECB. Such studies could
strengthen policy-maker and public confidence in the S/HMO
concept as a basic component of emerging national policy on
LTC.
LINKING OBSERVATIONS TO PROPOSED THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
"Theory implies considerable evidence in support of a
formulated general principle explaining the operation of
certain phenomena."[90]
The consistency of differences between Risk and S/HMO
member IeF use patterns provides a basis for conceptualizing
the existence of a strong relationship between the S/HMO
program and ICF utilization outcomes. This conceptual
conclusion leads this investigator to the following (two)
tentative theories and related working hypotheses regarding
differences between S/HMO and Risk member use of and
expenditures for ICF services , and spend-down patterns.
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General Theory I: Elderly people and/or family actively use
benefits covering formal in-home care to reduce use of ICF’g
below the level used by people without home care benefits
because , if at all possible , because it is financially
rational to do so.
Program theory , derived from General Theory I , is that
chronically ill , functionally impaired , certifiably
dependent elderly S/HMO members readily access but limit use
。f ICF services by adopting home based care as an
alternative through case manager negotiated use of formal
care givers who assist informal care-givers committed t。
supporting such members at home , when financial incentives
favor that option and when it is medically feasible.
Use rate patterns observed in this study suggest that
continued pursuit of the S/HMO concept is justified as a
widely affordable means of privately financing , limited
coverage , front-end , LTC benefits. If ECB are managed
carefully, in concert with entitlement and Medicare
Supplemental Insurance benefits , to help disabled elderly
persons either remain in a home setting longer than they
。therwise might , or as a means of minimizing nursing home
stays to respite use , then inflationary effects of such a
benefit may be minimized or even avoided.
This theory and study observations lead to a hypothesis
statement about S/HMO as a policy choice for offering LTC
benefits to HMO members on a widespread basis.
Working Hypothesis I: Combined non-entitlement LTC costs
resulting from SNF+ICF’ plus formal in-home services used by
study period S/HMO members certified as needing ICF level
268
assistance , do not exceed total SNF’ and ICF costs of study
period Risk members.
An example of the potential for this , as seen in
Chapter VII , is that savings of $238 per Research Population
member were attributable to S/HMO use of SNF and ICF total
expenditures , over expenditures for Risk members. Assuming
that 238 dollars represented an average savings for lifetime
nursing horne expenditures by members in this study , then
。ver six million dollars ($861-$543-$318 x 19261 pop. -
$6 , 125 , 000 [rounded]) would be available for use by that
population to spend on alternative LTC services , without
increasing expenditures among those 19 , 261 persons. That is:
Actual Cost+Risk+S/HMO Total SNF+ICF’ revenues - $14 , 439 , 000
* SNF+ICF Revenues. Never S/HMO: $861/HPM - $16 , 584 , 000
SNF+ICF Revenues • S/HMO Sometime $543/HPM - $10 , 459 , 000
$238 $ 6 , 125 , 000
*(HPM means $/health plan member x 19 , 261)
Furthermore , instead of spreading the ECB Supplemental
Premium costs over 6317 S/HMO members , conceptually , all
19 , 261 members in the Research Population would have borne
the price of such premiums.
There is considerable reason to believe that it is
possible to successfully market broader coverages of
Medicare Supplemental Insurance which include LTC benefits.
One recent survey indicated that the "second most important
[demand among LTC policy holders and non-policy holders] was
establishment of a governmental long-term insurance program
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for which they [private policy holders] would pay
premiums .... [the author ’ s considered opinion about this
finding was] ... Unless and until the government cl를arly
defines its own role regarding long-term care , consumers may
be reluctant to purchase private insurance. II [91]
A second theory also is surfaced by baseline
。bservations in this study , regarding apparent ECB effects
。n Medicaid dependency patterns.
General Theory II: Maintaining elderly dependent persons at
home with formal assistance , who otherwise would be in an
ICF , is a cost-effect solution to containing welfare
dependency because it reduces the probability of nursing
home induced spend-down.
Program theory for the above General Theory II is that
an HMO managed care benefit which provides consumer
incentives for use of home-based care in lieu of ICF’
services when medically feasible , but which provides limited
coverage of ICF and non-entitlement SNF costs , defers
spend-down related to nursing home costs and reduces the
level of public financing of nursing home costs.
Working Hypothesis II: Medicaid payments , as a proportion of
total life-time costs for both nursing home and formal
community based care , are less for S/HMO members than for
Risk members.
If , as seen in Chapter VIII , fourteen percent fewer
s/HMO ICF users spent down , than did Risk users , and if over
5 percent less Medicaid funds were used to pay for S/HMO
than for Risk nursing home costs , then some kind of
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front-end , LTC policy, prior to Medicaid , may be an
affordable program in the public domain.
This notion may be postulated even more strongly if a
secondary study observation about Risk-S/HMO spend down is
true. It appears that spend-down rates for both Risk and
S/HMO may be substantially less than is widely reported for
elderly nursing home residents. That is , Risk and S/HMO
apparent overall spend-down rates of thirty-one percent and
sixteen percent , respectively , were less than the thirty-
eight percent reported for nursing home users whose stay is
three months , and fifty-eight percent for those whose stay
1. S one year.
How meaningful is it that only sixteen percent of S/HMO
members were welfare dependent? Placed in the context of a
recently (1992) released study by DHHS , regarding spend-down
by elderly , it is an important outcome of the S/HMO
Demonstration. DHHS said:
。 Our review of these studies and methodological
issues ... lead us to believe the following are
fairly safe conclusions:
。 Approximately 1 in 4 persons admitted [to a
nursing home] as private pay stay long enough t。
deplete assets to Medicaid levels;
。 Approximately 1 in 3 persons eventually covered
by Medicaid were not eligible when admitted; and
。 Around 30-40훌 。f Medicaid expenditures for
nursing home care can be attributed to these
asset spend-downers. [92]
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If a S/HMO program were implemented which resulted in
15훌 spend down of all residents who were private pay persons
at the time of admission , rather than a 25% spend- down
rate , that could be a meaningful public policy change ,
relative to current Medicaid payments for true spend down
patients.
Further, a S/HMO program could have an important affect
。n the proportion of persons admitted to a nursing home wh。
already have become welfare dependent due to community-based
LTC costs (7훌 。f such persons are estimated to spend-down) .
Deferring spend-down may be a better target than preventing
spend-down for that portion of the aged population at high
risk of permanent or long-term institutional placement. This
is another reason why data is needed from the State of
Oregon SDSD 360 Medicaid files; it would allow
identification of Risk vs. S/HMO community-based spend-down.
Literature on spend-down data must be viewed with
caution because the basis on which estimates are made may be
at issue and because censoring is very likely to confound
spend-down observations. For example , a recent study on the
Connecticut data base of nursing home users explored why
variation is so great among studies which estimate the
probability of spend-down , concluding that:
Most of the variation between spend down
probabilities reported here , and those found in
。ther studies , probably reflect the greater
degree of censoring in others ’ data. [in
connecticut] ... Of the 41 , 845 people who first
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entered nursing homes as private payers .... one
in five will eventually spend down .... time t。
spend-down decreases with age ... an average of 1.1
years for those age 85 and over. (op. Cit. [76]
pp. 27 , 34 , 54)
In this dissertation study , under Subset I , all nursing
home residents had at least one year , and some had three
years , in which that spend-down could occur , following first
ICF’ admission. Since most studies agree that about 50
percent who spend down do so within one year , it is likely
that this dissertation study identifies a high proportion of
those who would spend down. Thus , spend down rates reported
in this study should not be seriously understated due t。
study period censoring.
However , spend-down does not translate directly t。
savings , since a large proportion of Medicaid recipients pay
part of their bill from SSI or other private sources , such
as probated estates
Hypotheses I and II are recommend for use in research
that is broader in scope than was addressed by this study.
Additional information is needed about use of and payments
for formal LTC services in the homes and at other
community-based locations of Risk members during the study
period , as well as for S/HMO members.
If findings from these hypotheses confirm observations
in this study and expand findings to include difference in
formal community care between Risk and S/HMO members , then a
comprehensive , hypothesis derived, policy statement may be
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presented regarding effects of S/HMO ECB on overall LTC
services and expendatures of HMO members.
There are other considerations for formulation of LTC
policy than those discussed so far in this study. They are
presented next , followed by some observations about how
S/HMO , as LTC policy , holds up under the social criteria for
evaluating LTC policy solutions.
FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR EVALUATING S/HMO FINDINGS
Findings of this study may be evaluated within the
context of how they validate or modify above theory and
related concepts of S/HMO policy.
During the period of time examined by this study , S/HMO
policy allowed use of the total ECB value for nursing home
services not covered by Medicare or KP Supplemental benefit
package. This study concentrates on the outcome of that
specific element of S/HMO policy.
A cluster of strategic theories was advanced by Leutz
and Capitman in 1992 for meeting the needs of highly
dependent frail and/or ill elderly persons in America. (Op.
Cit. [41] , pp. 217) These strategic theories and related
。perational concepts , paraphrased below, assert , that:
。 a substantial portion of initial , formal , LTC
costs can be met by widespread private sector
risk pooling of fixed payments by Medicare
beneficiaries.
。 concomitant adoption of national policy on the
role of government financing of LTC is needed t。
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facilitate private sector involvement in LTC.
。 managed care programs can do more to influence
efficient use of alternative services at early
stages of dependency than after the use of
nursing home care has either commenced or been
adopted as the solution of choice by families of
elderly dependent members.
。 while indemnity and non-HMO service based
insurance policies for LTC are predominately for
nursing home services , formal home based LTC
services are manageable in an environment where
incentives for cost efficient care exist , and
where all levels of care-givers are continuously
available to ensure proper management of horne
based care.
。 early access to formal LTC services facilitates
the opportunity to assist and teach family
networks to maintain members at home;
。 properly coordinated medical and social
intervention at the earlier stages of dependency
may either delay the need for ICF’ level services
。r even prevent it;
。 most elderly who need institutional LTC will not
remain on a prolonged basis , therefore targeting
persons needing shorter term institutional care
and ongoing home based care makes better policy
sense in the private insurance market place , as a
deterrent to spend-down.
。 persons are less likely to become welfare
dependent if maintained in a community based
setting where informal care givers are supported
by formal care giver services.
Certain operational concepts are derived from the above
postulates/theories and adapted for use in the S/HMO
Demonstration setting. These concepts include:
。 merging private financing of widely affordable
but limited LTC insurance with the existing
system of social insurance (Medicare);
。 targeting use of home based formal services t。
encourage and support the role of informal care
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givers in maintaining ADL dependent elderly at
home , as a first line of protection against
nursing home costs , and allowing limited benefits
。r front-end institutional LTC costs which
include incentives for moving to home based care;
。 balancing protection of personal assets with
early access to needed ICF level services , while
protecting the pool of funds for LTC services s。
that many members benefit some , rather than a few
benefiting greatly;
。 using private sector LTC benefits to defer or
prevent spend-down for many, rather than insure
against catastrophic costs of those who exceed
their LTC benefits and personal assets.
How well do observations in this study uphold theories
and operational criteria presented above? The four concepts
are the conceptual underpinnings of the S/HMO program. And ,
there is empirical support in this study for all of the
above theories , including the second listed reference t。
government action supporting the S/HMO theory. Title 18
waivers were granted by congress enabling S/HMO to be
。perationally integrated with other Medicare entitlements ,
and with the Medicaid program.
POLICY PRINCIPLES WITHIN WHICH S/HMO FINDINGS ARE ASSESSED
Two sources are referenced regarding principles for
adopting national LTC policy. They also serve as a frame of
reference for evaluating findings in this study. The first
source is from a working paper to advance "Strategies for
Strengthening Long-Term Care in the U.S. ," funded by the
John A. Hartford Foundation, 1990 by Leutz and Capitman.
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Six dominant goals surfaced in that paper , among those
advanced by the advisory body assembled for clarifying the
lI issues and options for reform. 1I They are to:
Keep public costs low , Ensure equity in access t。
service , Assure efficient and high quality care ,
Protect assets of beneficiaries , Meet a range of
long-term care needs , Provide consumer choices. [93]
Observations and findings in this study suggest that
S/HMO outcomes , regarding use of ECB for nursing home care ,
were consistent with or/and supportive of all but the second
goal. No quantitative evaluation of quality of care was done
in this study.
The second source was published in 1988 , by Rivlin and
Wiener who brought into focus much of the technical
information and concepts about policy options needed t。
。vercome the nationwide problem , noted in Chapter II , of
this study , especially that of not having any risk pooling
system which reduces the impact of long-term care related
catastrophic costs on individuals and governments.
They recommended six principles intended to guide the
development of policy options into a collective solution for
this overarching LTC policy problem.
Those six principles are paraphrased below because , in
addition to guiding national policy formulation , they
provide a social , if not moral , frame of reference for
summarizing how findings in this study might add t。
knowledge , if not understanding , about the role of S/HMO as
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a viable LTC policy option.
These six principles propose that public and private
LTC policy must strive to:
。 achieve scientific breakthrough and lifestyle changes
which help reduce the incidence of chronic illness that
results in profound disability at older ages;
。 treat long-term care as a normal risk of growing old ,
and therefore use risk-pooling as one approach t。
paying for long-term care;
。 require that all financing systems for LTC respect
desires of most elderly to remain at home as long as
possible and to reinforce the efforts of family and
friends to provide informal care in a home environment;
。 encourage the design of new payment mechanisms which
can improve the quality , flexibility , and efficiency of
the delivery system as well as access to it;
。 ensure that both public and private sectors have major
roles in the organized financing of long-term care;
。 encourage the design of payment mechanisms which
。rganize care in a way that increases patient
satisfaction and minimizes institutionalization , such
as social/health maintenance organizations , continuing
care retirement communities , and other alternative
living arrangements. (Op. Cit. [46] , pp. 238-239).
Only the first principle , above , is not addressed by
the S/HMO concept , whether or not they are operationalized
at all sites; obtaining scientific breakthrough is not a
relevent criteria for use in evaluating S/HMo. Empirical
。bservations in this study, or the economic c‘)ncept of s/HMO
support the other five principles.
By design , SIHMO facilitates expansion of the HMO
managed care process to include coordination of LTC services
covered by a range of LTC benefit options. Also , by design ,
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S/HMO Expanded Care Benefits provide social and economic
incentives for members , who are certified as needing ICF
level services , to use formal home care services as a means
。f deferring or precluding admission to an rCF.
Certain operational concepts guide managed care
practices of those HMOs which function as a private domain ,
capitation financed , "closed panel" group practice health
care organization. Such concepts include: a cooperative
contractual relationship between medical group providers and
the health care organization which charges the member or
sponsor at fixed rates for a fixed period of time and
minimizes copayments or other charges; full exchange of
information about the benefit related service commitments t。
a known membership , full sharing of medical information
among providers , division of labor among care givers which
facilitates cost-effective delivery of care, comprehensive
benefits at prices competitive within the market place ,
financial incentives for members to access care in a timely
way , financial incentives for providers to treat member's
health problems in a timely way.
The Social/HMO is a geriatric health policy model which
applies the above concepts to use of selected LTC services
allowed under an expanded Medicare Supplemental benefit.
Such benefits are designed to stimulate use of home-based
services , enhance access to nursing homes as an adjunct
procedure for supporting home-based care. Therefore the
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。perating concepts of S/HMO are added to the above HMO
concepts:
。 provider guided selection of least skill
intensive care suitable for the member ’ s medical
needs available under Medicare and Medicare
Supplemental benefits;
。 coordination of Medicare and Supplemental
Insurance benefits with those available under the
S/HMO ECB , emphasizing community services needed
by elderly persons certified as physically and/or
cognatively dependent due to chronic illness
and/or degenerative health conditions;
。 case-managedmonitoring of appropriateness of
level of care; negotiated use of S/HMO benefits
which substitute formal home based care for
nursing home services when feasible;
。 financial incentives to reside in a home setting
rather than in an ICF for those certified as
eligible for admission to an ICF;
。 LTC benefit limitations on institutional LTC
services , in order to seek a balance between
premium prices which a large cross-section of
elderly can afford , yet which meaningfully shield
a large proportion of members from front-end
expenses of LTC services;
。 an enrollment case-mix similar to a broad
cross-section of the age eligible Medicare
population regarding need for LTC services , s。
that an enrollment policy is needed , to ensure
provision of LTC services within the benefit
price structure , which guards against serious
adverse selection. Cop Cit. [41] p.217)
IDEAS FOR OPERATIONALIZING S/HMO ON AN URBAN SCALE
Assuming that findings in this study were confirmed by
follow-up research , proposed above , some kind of interim
step is needed as a preparatory phase for adopting aS/HMO
model as national LTC policy. That interim step could be an
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adaptation of the Urban Development Assistant Grants (UDAG)
in which federal funds were used to stimulate private
venture capital to up-grade the quality of life in blighted
urban centers.
A few large scale demonstration projects could be
undertaken within selected metropolitan statistical areas
(MSA) to stimulate new arrangements between insurance
carriers , large health benefit service organizations ,
providers , employers , State governments , and Federal
agencies. Such arrangements would ensure that all Medicare
Beneficiaries were covered by a comprehensive , Medicare
linked , Supplemental benefit which included an Expanded Care
Benefit. That benefit could encompass alternative care
concepts in addition to home-based care.
Federal funds would not be awarded until trial MSA
participants merged their interests into organized networks
which comported with Rivlin and Wiener type guidelines.
A few competing organizations could be formed in each
trial MSA which could have variation in their delivery
systems , as long as a floor of service and economic
standards were met. Implementation would require some
。ne-time solutions for Medicare persons already in nursing
homes , hospitals , Medicare Respite and End Stage Renal
Disease status.
Start-up costs could include some form of financial
incentives to both providers and Medicare beneficiaries.
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Beyond initial enrollment , limitations would be required t。
prevent adverse selection resulting from people moving int。
trial MSAs because they knew of their need for long-term
care. Medicaid , or some other pooling concept would be used
to reinsuring long-stay , long-term care persons who used up
their ECB and personal assets. Aggressive , community-based ,
case managed control of such benefits would be required.
Entitlement benefits under Medicare would tied t。
privately paid LTC Supplemental Benefits under capitation
contract which linked defined organizations of physicians ,
hospitals and other providers into a cost-effective system.
If the trial MSA happened to be Portland , Oregon , it
might be anticipated that an initial surge of nursing home
use could occur. There is some indication that nursing home
rates (SNF+ICF) for KP members collectively are higher than
in the community from which the Research Population came in
this study. Risk members were 30 percent more likely than
Multnomah County residents to be in an ICF , and S/HMO
members were 67 percent more likely than the computed use
rates of overall Multnomah County , including KP members.
This information is presented to indicate that both
Risk and s/RNO members probably represent a somewhat
different population of Medicare Beneficiaries in the sense
that all Risk and s/HMO m링nbers are covered by Medicare
Parts A and B and have a comprehensive Medicare Supplemental
Insurance Benefit as well. Many aged do not have such
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coverage , which places them at risk of spend down for costs
that would be covered for KP members. Moving an entire
community to that level of coverage , risks a change in LTC
admission rates. But , if use rate patterns in this study
were replicated in an urban model elderly health services
concept , as proposed , then increased access would not lead
to greater institutional expenses.
Demonstration projects having an entire urban
population as its membership may be required to establish
the S/HMO concept as a basic component of national LTC
policy. This also could activate new behaviors in the
private sector which would respond to LTC problems defined
by this study.
A private sector response within such trial MSAs is
unlikely until State and Federal governments coordinated
their policy position to provide trial umbrella coverage for
catastrophic LTC costs.
Given that environment , private insurance/service
。rganizations could coordinate their marketing of LTC risk
products with some financial confidence. Linking such
products to the rest of the health care system then becomes
the challenge. S/HMO is the logical model for making that
connection. With carefully structured incentives , it may be
possible to integrate a social model of LTC services with
existing entitlement benefits at an affordable cost.
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Kaiser Permanente Northwest Region
Center for Health Research
FACT SHEET
MEDICARE PLUS II 01따iONSTRATION PROJECT
(Social Health Maintenance Organization)
1. The purpose of the demonstration is to expand lonl-te~ community-ba.ed
support options available to Medicare beneficiarie. under a prospective
capitation payment system, and to intesrate th…support services within
managed medical care system.
2. Kaiser Permanente Northwe.t Region i. one of four national demonstration
sites:
。 Minneapolis - Ebenezer/Group Health "Senior. Plu'"
。 New York - Metropolitan Jevilh G.riatric Cent.r ’Elderplan"
。 Long Beach - Senior Care Action N.twork ’ Scan H.alth Plan"
。 Portland - KPMCP ’ M.dicar. Plus II"
3. A con.ortiω‘ composed of the four sit•• and a t... of r…archera at
Brand.i. Univ.rlity dir.ctl the proj.‘:t at a national l.v.l. Th. Health
Care rinancins Admini.tration (HCPA) provid.d .valuation f뻐dl and a"arded
the contract to the Univ.rlity of.California San rrancilco.
4. Medicar. payl Kai ••r Perman.nt. for .ach .nroll.e at the rat. of 100
percent of the AAPCC (i ••• , ·th. avera.e per capita Medicare co.t in the
county wh.re the III빼er live•• adju.ted for …..ex 뻐d other factor.).
Medicare will not pay any other provider. for I.rvice. to th…
demonltration .nroll••••
S. Per Member Per Month Pa~삐nt (.Itimated) z
빼DlCA11/HlDICAID
$500 (1001 Welfare AAPCC)
$175 (fro톨 삐dica1d) +
copay buyout
$675 total !M/!M*
*(lnclude. copa,..nt buyout and
community-ba.ed cart)
6. A. of January , 1993 , the M.dicar. Plu. II pro.raa ha. ov.r ‘, 600 빼빼.ra.
7. Enrollm.nt !11libll1ty requirement.:
must be 65 or old.r:
mu.t have Part A and Part I Medicare;
mu.t relide In Or'lon Countie. of 빼altnOll빼. Va.hinlton or Clack....
SOCIAL HMO SITES:
BENEm’ AND CASE MIX
CHARACTERISTICS: 1991 UPDATE
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Med'carePI빼 IIMf:!퍼톨r Prel펴U빼
301
Year
1985-87
1잊훌
1훌훌
1990
1991
1잊a
M삐thly Premium
s49
57
57.as
75
125
135
뻐m뻐톨1tCowny
Mn1tncmah
배lltftlvnlah
M"ltMmIh~W빼in훌DIl
빼피νYuilln.l"II’~C
빼*l'WuψClaM"톨I
뻐lrI\VubIn.，y，mu
Kaiser Pennanente Northwest Region
Medicare Plus 표
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90
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86
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0% 10% 20% 30%
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80years and older
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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER THREE
The following is a complete presentation of the
research plan originally proposed for this study in 1987.
SAMPLE SIZE ESTIMATES , CALCULATIONS & DISCUSSION
I. BASIC INFORMATION NEEDED FOR SAMPLE
Sampling
The major technical issue affecting study period date
selection had to do with the question of whether to gather
data based on a stratified random sample , or collect data on
all SNF and ICF nursing home residents , who were KP Medicare
members in the study period which fit a predetermined set of
criteria. If sampling was to be used , there were many issues
to consider in determining sample size. These are critical
issues to consider in sample planning for future studies
similar in research design and composition to this one.
These are listed briefly and then some issues are discussed
in detail. A random sample was the preferred approach and
sample size computations were developed after considerable
work was done to estimate variabilty in length of stay. A
summary of that work is included in Appendix x-x.
First , Research Questions I and II prospectively
required different samples. Much more is understood about
this as a result of evaluating the data , than prior to its
collection.
under Research Question I , a sample of the research
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population was required for which data on nursing home
admissions was needed to compute the probablity of becoming
an rCF resident during the study period. Here , the sampling
question of how many population members was conditioned by
not having good historic data on KP member use of ICFs which
could predict the unique number of members likely to become
an rCF resident in one year. A list of the total number of
ICF residents from KP was available , but proved to be
somewhat inaccurate.
Also , at the time this study was operationalized in
June , 1989 there was little data outside of KP to clarify
this question. State of Oregon survey information is based
。n a one day annual determination of Census. The 1977
National Nursing Home Survey overstated the likely number
because rCF was not clearly differentiated from other lower
levels and the 1985 NNHS was not published. Longitudinal
data discussed number of admissions or days per 1000 but
residents per 1000 was vague. The count of members approved
for rCF admission was known for S/HMO members , but not Risk
。 r Cost members.
In retrospect a minimum of 20 percent of the S/HMO
membership would have produced a total of about 25 S/HMO rCF
residents in one year , had the distribution of those using
an ICF been normally distributed over the S/HMO membership ,
which it was not. Of course stratification by gender and age
cohort was required since the greatest proportion come from
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those over age 75 and the ratio of females to males wh。
enter an IeF is at least 4 to 1. Stratification also would
have been needed by new vs converted proportions of the
membership , since their use rates differed.
To do a random sample of the research population ment
knowing who they all were , i.e. , having knowledge of the
cumulative enrollment and disenrollement across the 24
months. As discussed below , this investigator ’ s access t。
that data was restricted to use of year-end files , December
。nly. Measuring attrition between three successive year-end
files seemed a plausable solution to estimating the total
population numbers , but it did not solve the problem of
drawing randomly from all members. Besides , it was shown
after nine months into the study , that a substantial number
。 f Medicare members enrolled and terminated between January
and Novemeber each year. This was a serious problem of
internal validity regarding sample selection bias: those
likely to be missing were those who became members and died
or left often because of spend-down in a nursing home.
Precise identification of the entire membership was
needed and that required waiting until needed information
could be acquired from the comprehensive active and historic
KP Health Plan membership mainframe data base.
F’urthermore , Research Question II was going to
required a complete eligibilty history on each sampled
member in a nursing home to determine days of ICF stay
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attributable to each eligiblity status (Cost , Risk or
S/HMO). Using year end-files assured project failure.
In retrospect , several issues regarding sample procedures
that were not considered in the sample estimate whihc could
have confounded the relationship between dependent and
independent variables.
First , there was a disproportionately high number of
Cost members members who converted to Risk status , who had
commenced their lifetime use of nursing homes before the
study period and therefore were in nursing homes at the
beginning of the study period. There were very few S/HMO
members in nursing homes before the study period. This
difference affected the number of nursing home days for the
。verall data set of ICF residents. Validity of the proposed
sample was doubtful for two related reasons.
First , it did not consider the overall or changing
distribution of the three eligibility groups which should
have been the basis for stratification.
Second , actual variance in cummulative ICF days of
stay was quite different from that used to estimate minimum
sample size. National data from tables in the 1977 National
Survey on Nursing Homes was used in sample size estimates.
Tables in Chapter One initially were built from that data in
1988. National Nursing Home Survey data is complicated use
and some uncertainty exists about length of stay values in
these studies. Regionalized data may not reflect Multnomah
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County experience for many reasons. One reason is the
extraordianry difference in definitions of nursing home as
including or not including SNF , ICF and other custodial
facilities.
In Oregon , patients are discharged from ICFs to other
alternative care facilities , such as Adult Foster Care and
Residential Care facilities , in much greater proportions
than in many states , some of which do not have such services
developed to the extent of the Oregon experience. This fact
appears to reduce the length of stay in Oregon for ICFs ,
which the sample estimate originally prepared did not
consider. Actual cummulative lengths of stay for Cost , Risk
and S/HMO members were much shorter than national data
suggested. Variance of length of stay was great in this
study , however , upon removal of the small proportion of very
long stay patients , variance was much less.
As noted above , it is recommended by this investigator
that sampling of nursing home residents be stratified by
estimates about the proportion of short stay residents and
long stay residents. And , it is recommended that a decision
be made about minimum cell size required for tests of
difference between rates. If balanced cell sizes are needed ,
and if cell sizes need to be a certain minimum size , the
sample size must be enlarged to meet those research terms.
Even with over 1100 total nursing home residents , some cell
sizes in the rate matricies were too small for large sample
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inference.
In order to determine the sample size needed for this
study several preliminary computations were done in the
absence of.true population data and true length of stay
information. Specifically , estimates of the population , the
number of members in ICFs , the mean LOS and the variance in
LOS are needed for estimating sample size for the two key
measures of utilization in this study: use rates per 1000
members in each population subset and LOS of ICF users in
each population subset. The following tables provide the
calculations used to develop estimates for each.
Estimates of Population Subsets
The total number of members enrolled during the period
。f this study for trial and control groups includes those
who were active members at the end of the study period plus
those who were members by terminated.
Since the time frame of this study is over two years ,
composition of HMO population is dynamic. Enrollment changes
in the Medicare subpopulation were especially significant
during the period of time investigated by this study. They
must be taken into account if research of the data at issue
is to avoid criticism on management of risks to validity.
In 1985 Kaiser Permanente , Northwest Region , elected
to become an HMO Medicare Risk contractor , under the newly
passed TEFRA legislation. This set into motion , a process of
converting Medicare Cost Contract Enrollees to Risk
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enrollment status which as inverted the relationship between
Risk and Cost which existed then.
Prior to that time there were approximately 7500
Medicare members enrolled under the experimental capitation
model (outlined in RFP HCFA-78-0PPR-22/PHG) named Medicare
Plus. "The goal of the demonstration project , named Medicare
Plus , was to increase HMO participation in the Medicare
program ..•. that would allow Medicare members of an HMO t。
have prepaid benefits similar to the HMO ’ s younger
members."(Greenlick and Lamb , Final Report , Contract No HCFA
500-78-0078 , p10.) These members did not have LTC Benefits.
In March , 1985 , a program commenced , known as Medicare
Plus II , which extended the concepts of its precedent ,
Medicare Plus , but added the Extended Care benefits. Thus ,
concurrently , new members were entering Medicare status
under both SHMO and Risk categories , prior Medicare members
were shifting from Cost to Risk , in time both Cost and Risk
members were shifting to SHMO.
Because each contract category represented some
selective admission practices and because the dynamics of
patient care management are conceptually different in Cost
than Risk , making comparison of observations about effects
。 f the extended care benefit difficult to translate. Also ,
because members in the Cost group no longer represent a good
cross section of the HMO population , this study excludes ·the
Cost contract group.
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Additionally , Cost membership includes some members
with benefit restrictions; namely Part A only or B only or
not purchasing the supplemental benefit , all of which are
required to be in the Risk Category.
Tables describing this HMO ’ s Medicare composition
during the period of this study follow.
Table 1
320
PORTLAND AREA KAISER PERMANENTE MEMBERSHIP
DISTRIBUTION AMONG MEDICARE S/HMO
CONTRACT CATEGORIES DURING THE
SOCIAL/HMO DEMONSTRATION
PROJECT
YEAR/MONTH
COST T18 RISK T18 SHMO T18 TOT T-18 TOTAL HPM
x
11 x
10
6 ,075 21 ,285 4,983 32 ,323 262 ,949
09 6 ,110 21 ,203 4,941 32 ,154 262 ,896
08 6 ,130 20 ,942 4,938 32 ,010 261 ,854
07 6 ,231 20 ,684 4,922 31 ,853 260 ,935
06 7 ,330 19 ,479 4 ,892 31 ,701 260 ,558
05 7 ,564 19 ,225 4,881 31 ,6701 259 ,563
04 7 ,880 18 ,826 4,843 31 ,549 259 ,233
03 11 ,647 15 ,086 4,369 31 ,337 258 ,161
02 11 ,715 15 ,086 4,349 31 ,150 2257 ,276
01 11 ,782 14 ,907 4,341 31 ,030 57 ,466
Member Months:
82 , 464 186 ,858 47 ,439 316 ,770 2 ,600 ,891
Averag8e Annualized Meinber M。nths:
,246 18 ,686 4,734 31 ,667 260 ,089
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(continuation of Table 1)
13 ,485 4,436 30 ,793 253 ,974
11 12 ,892 13 ,238 4 ,272 30 ,402 253 ,345
10 12 ,950 13 ,038 4 ,261 30 ,249 253 ,686
09 13 ,105 12 ,721 4 ,257 30 ,083 252 ,230
08 13 ,340 12 ,622 4 ,228 30 ,190 252 ,773
07 13 ,387 12 ,331 4 ,119 29 ,837 253 ,354
06 14 ,209 11 ,613 4,146 29 ,968 253 ,878
05 14 ,486 11 ,283 4,144 29 ,913 254 ,245
04 14 ,739 11 ,013 3 ,951 29 ,703 254 ,293
03 15 ,433 10 ,860 3 ,852 30 ,145 254 ,259
02 15 ,422 10 ,371 3 ,315 29 ,288 255 ,588
01 15 ,968 10 ,063 3 ,205 29 ,236 256 ,634
Member Months
168 ,803 142 ,638 48 ,286 359 ,807 3 ,248 ,259
Averag1e Annualized Member M。nths:
4 ,067 11 ,865 4,024 29 ,984 270 ,688
441--·%-2CJ·i-l 「-， i’’‘23 9 ,040 3 ,173 29 , 336 257 ,474
11 17 ,123 8 ,846 3 ,096 29 ,065 257 ,724
10 17 ,053 8 ,646 2 ,952 28 ,291 256 ,477
01 17 ,249 8 ,284 2 ,815 28 ,393 255 ,690
08 17 ,323 8 ,058 2 ,655 28 ,036 256 ,280
07 17 ,614 7 ,836 2 ,306 21 ,756 256 ,284
06 11 ,975 7 ,500 1 ,785 26 ,260 255 ,812
05 18 ,431 7 ,446 710 26 ,647 254 ,637
04 18 ,628 7 ,434 461 26 , 523 254 ,003
03 18 ,199 7 ,486 113 25 ,858 249 ,009
02 18 ,713 7 ,502 o 26 , 215 252 ,907
01 18 ,690 7 ,504 o 26 ,199 252 ,441
Member Months
214 ,166 88 ,849 19 ,826 301 ,288 3,067 ,637
Averagle Annualized Meinber M。nths
1 ,841 7 ,404 1 ,652 25 ,107 255 ,636
Data in this table contrasts SHMO with all Medicare
members enrolled in Kaiser Permanente (including SHMO). T。
develop a model of comparison , in the absence prior data ,
。ccupancy/1000 over-all for the population over age 60 in
the State of Oregon is assumed to equal that of Kaiser
Members. This is developed for use in sample size estimates
322
given in the following table.
Table 3
RESOURCE DATA FOR ESTIMATING VARIANCE BETWEEN SHMO
AND OTHER MEDICARE REGARDING EXPECTED VARIANCE
IN NURSING HOME OCCUPANTS PER 1000 KP
MEDICARE ENROLLMENT POPULATION
AGE NATIONAL OREGON ALL KAISER (1) SHMO ONLY(2)
/1000 /1000 MALE FEMALE All MALE FEM. All
65-74 15* 10.3** 106.8 132.0 238.8 10.2 16.4 26.6
75-84 68 46.9 217.4 314.8 532.2 28.2 47.6 75.8
85 > 216 149.0 126.9 287.4 414.4 흙17-•Oli4놓8 .-6lE6홈5.451 734 1185
AII>65 48 33 32
* Source of per 1000 use rate information are: (I)-National;
J. Ouslander , J. Beck; "Defining The Health Problems Of The
Elderly ," Annual Review Public Health , 1982 , 3:55-83 , p.74.
(2)[data for 1980]. "Data Watch ," Health Affairs , Spring
1987 , p.178.
** Per 1000 data source-State of Oregon
Executive Summary , Oregon Systems Development Project For
Long Term 드혼프븐， State of Oregon,--f.tarch 1981 , p. 4. [data for
1980]
(1) For this estimate , use rate/1000 by all Medicare
Kaiser Permanente Members age 65> is assumed to equal the
State of Oregon. Age specific data the for State of Oregon
is derived by a constant multiplier of .69 [33/48-.69] x the
national use rate by 10 year age cohorts].
(2) For the estimate of SHMO a multiplier of .957 x the
derived use rates for age cohorts. [31.6/33.0-.957 composite
use rate /1000 population.] 31.6 is the true use rate per
1000 YTD 1987.
Linear application of these multipliers unquestionably
compound other errors but , in the absence of any other data ,
and for sample estimate purposes only , these determinations
are use to guide the sample size calculations.
Table 4
RESOURCE DATA FOR ESTIMATING VARIANCE
BETWEEN MEDICARE AGE COHORTS
Age Cohorts Male %. Female 훌 Total 훌
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65-69 5,783 6 ,879 12 ,663
70-74 4,683 5,935 23.181
{65-74} 10 ,366 28 훌 12 ,814 34% 23 ,181 62 훌
75-79 3 ,116 4,231 7 ,347
80-84 1 ,520 2 ,481 4,001
(75-84) 4,636 12 훌 6 ,712 18% 11 ,348 30%
85-89 849 1 ,919 2,768
99-105 3 10 13
{85+} 홈륭흥 2 훌 l ,929 6% 2,781 8 훌
Total KP >65 15 ,854 42 홈 21 ,456 58 훌 37 ,310 100%
Total HPM April 1987 301 ,260
(훌-% Medicare)
April 1987 membership data is assumed to represent the YTD
membership of all members age 65 and over including SHMO
Table 5
RESOURCE DATA FOR ESTIMATING VARIATION IN
OCCUPANCY/1000 MEMBERS
Age Cohorts
65-69
70-74
{65-74}
75-79
80-84
{75-84}
85-89
99 +
{85+}
Total SBMO
Male
477
556
iπ33 21 훌
403
226
용흥흉- 13 훌
119
0
1T9 2 훌
1 ,781 37 훌
Female
798
865
1 ，훌훌훌
645
415
1 ，δ흩δ
340
i
를4I
3,064
35 훌
22 훌
7 훌
63 훌
Total
1 ,275
1 ,421
칸람흩 56 훌
1 ,048
641
1 ，홈홈흉 35%
459
i
I흩1) 9 훌
4,845 100 훌
April 1987 SHMO Enrollment Only (all> age 64)
There is a some what higher proportion of females in
the SBMO than in the total Membership which would lead to an
expected skew in the use rates for SHMO. That Effect is lost
by use of the aggregated rate per 1000. Again , true use
rates will be determined in the study.
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*1987 YTD SNF Risk- days used - 1785
Total Nursing Home days SHMO • 9562 (This is an
understatement by the number of ICF days used by SHMO
emrollees who passed through the ceiling of benefit days.
That number appears to be:
9 , 562/301 ,742 • 31.6 people/1000 total HPM in ICF
IT IS NOTED THAT IN 1986 37 DAYS/10aO OCCURRED
It is appropriate to estimate the number who terminated
and reenrolled to avoid double counting. This number is
quite small; in 1986 a manual , limited effort was made t。
isolate reasons for termination indicating a regional 12
month total of 160 terminations who reenrolled. This number
is too small to merit consideration for computing the
estimated total. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan did not
develop a method for determining the count of active and
terminated members until July 1986 The following data relys
。n such information.
Medicare Plus (control group) Estimates
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Reported Total Northwest Region Medicare Plus Membership:
RATIO OF ACTIVE TO TERMINATED
IN TOTAL RISK MEMBERSHIP
Date Active Active + Difference Rati。
7/85 15941 18500 2549 1. 1605
6/87 24238 30190 5952 1. 2456
6/88 27855 35474 7619 1.2735
Estimated Multnomah County Medicare Plus Membership is:
Date Active Term Ratio Region Risk HPM
7/85 5578 x (a) 1.1605 6473
6/87 8010 x (b) 1.2456 9977
6/88 8688 x (c) 1.2735 11064
The above table is the result of an effort to estimate
the true number of members in the Risk control group. This
was necessitated by lack of access to the KP membership
files at the time such information was needed to prepare
estimated sample size. The above table was need to project
the N (denominator) for the sample estimate formula.
As it was determined in the first quarter of 1992 , from data
regarding the true research population first obtained in
October , 1992 , the cummulative number of Risk Medicare
members which met the study criteria were 11 ,252. The mean
。 f the above three annualized estimates would have seriously
underestimated the size of the Risk population. The above
data underscores the problem of using one month-end file out
。 f 12 month end files per year , to estimate research
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population data. Four months of analysis of month end files
demonstrated the probable proportion of missing Medicare
members was unacceptably high to use for this study.
Table 6
ESTIMATED RISK MEDICARE POPULATION IN MULTNOMAH
COUNTY ICP’s ON AVERAGE DURING EACH OF YEARS
OF THE TWO YEAR STUDY PERIOD
7/86 - 6/87
Age Female Male Total
65-74 24 17 41
75-84 57 33 90
85+ 102 16 118
Total 183 66 249
7/87 - 6/88
65-74 35 23 58
75-84 69 42 111
85+ 123 19 142
Total 227 84 311
Note: Actual total number of Risk ICP’ residents
during study period was 562 which is about the
same as combined number from above two years.
(d] MULTONOMAH COUNTY TOTAL 1987 POPULATION (CENTER FOR
POPULATION RESEARCH - PSU) DIVIDED INTO THE NURSING HOME
(NH) POPULATION (SNP’+ICF) AS DETERMINED BY SAMPLE FOR
SEPTEMBER 30 , 1986 , AGE 65+ BY THE OFFICE OF HEALTH POLICY ,
STATE OF OREGON - NH USE RATE TIMES THE RATIO (5/6-k) OF SNF
TO ICF IN NH FOR KAISER PERMANENTE.
AGE - 65-74:
FEMALE MALE TOTAL
(d1) (e1) (f1)
(k)303/24706-.0102 (k)202/18711-.0090 (k)505/43417 -.0097
(d2) (e2) (f2)
AGE - 75-84:
(k)739/18792-.0327 (k)349/9238 -.0315 (k)1088/28030-.0323
(d3) (e3) (f3)
AGE - 85+(k)1298/6264-.1726 (k)252/3079 -.0681 (k)1550/9343 -.1382
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(d4) (e4) (£4)
Age 65-105
(k)2340/49726-.0393 (k)803/31028=.0216 (k)3143/80790-.0324
[e) ESTIMATED AVERAGE NUMBER OF MULTNOMAH COUNTY MEDICARE
RISK HPM IN ICFS AT THE BEGINNING , MIDPOINT AND END OF THE
STUDY PERIOD BASED ON THE USE RATE OF TOTAL MULTNOMAH COUNTY
POPULATION:
(a-c) (d-
(HPMxActive+Terminated ratio - True HPMxMultC Use Rate-ICFi)
1265 x b톨1468 x el-13 3461 x£1-25
갇86 AGE HPM FEMALE - T
65-74
1717 x a- 1993 x dl=12
MALE - T TOTAL - T
75-84
85+
Total
聽￥4
75-84
85+
Total
6/88
65-74
75-84
85+
Total
1263
395
3375
2633
1653
583
4824
2896
1716
551
5163
48 735
79 172
139 2203
33 1959
67 1024
125 214
225 3197
38 1959
71 1115
121 244
227 3525
27 2319
14 658
54 5578
22 5720
40 3334
18 993
80 8021
24 5720
45 3605
21 1012
84 8688
75
93
193
55
107
143
305
62
116
142
311
The average for the three time periods are used to produce
table [c]. 11064
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Both the Jen방1 of stay assigr‘cd by the II뼈CJ to nursing home
entr빼rs and the mortl피ty status of residents at 마ne of빠며양geare
밟혀 。nes마natcs d해.op혀 by Meineπ and Trapn태 from the 1977
Na다onal Nursing Home Survey and vary by an entrant's age at
admission (ta비eA-s). TheM바len and TrapncJ1 1e맨ths-야~stay prob.
abili다csag홈cgatcd m띠다pie a，마피ssions for pa디ents readmitted to a
nursing home soon after being 벼schar뻗 and were fu빠ler m뼈뼈
tor빼.ca inac:압피.g numbers of nursing home residents by a흙 률om
1969 to 1977.
All nursing home len뱉15 of stay arc assign벼 the midpoint of메e
g마피teo Nursing home앓ign벼 l삐혈15 of stay arc빠벼 on age and
rea파n ∞，nstant over the simulation period. Prcvi()us...nursing h~me i
rcsidenrs reenterAursinsz: homes .a1: the 양me rate 2$ nc:001r who have 1"
n얀단펴힐i꾀힘빼@메zed.
Home CareUse
services in 빼e model include home h헤매 똥rvi업，
and h빼emaker 양rviccs， 야rso떠I c:arc, and m，뼈 preparation
Using data &om the 198~ Na다~naJ Long-Term care Survey
마ronic:a1ly 벼sabl벼 elderly, the model p너ces
people 삐11 living at home into one of four groups: those
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MEAN , STANDARD DEVIATION & VARIANCE OF ICF LOS , BASED
ON MEINER ’ S PROBABILITY MODEL FOR DISTRIBUTION OF LOS BY AGE
FOR ICF ADMISSIONS
(RAVLIN AND WEINER PG 262) Male and female are
combined
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0.5 .137
1. 5 .164
2.5 .197
4.5 .473
9.0 .882
18.0 1. 908
30.0 2.010
42.0 1. 130
54.0 1. 460
66.0 1. 390
73.0*6.130
- 301.0x-1를:흩80 months
* assumes max of 73 mo.
0.5 .1201
1. 5 .1685
2.5 .1438
4.5 .0511
9.0 .9900
18.0 1.7946
30.0 1.8090
42.0 2.2008
54.0 7.6527
66.0 2.4486
73.0 5.3313
301.0x-22.71
.5
1.2
2.5
4.5
9.0
18.0
30.0
42.0
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피iπ
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COMPUTIING SAMPLE SIZE FOR ESTIMATING THE AVERAGE
DIFFERENCE IN RESPONSE VARIABLES BETWEEN TWO FACTOR LEVELS
WHEN THE SAMPLE IS NOT REPEATED. SAMPLE SIZE ESTIMATES:
(1 ) . Determining Sample Size for IeF Users
Statistical tests of significance (measure of the
probability of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis in
favor of the alternative hypothesis) require that the
researcher select a level of power (the probability of being
able to properly reject the null hypothesis when it is
false) appropriate to the study. Since this study is
exploratory in nature , the criteria for avoiding error in
hypothesis rejection is relaxed. A power of 80 훌 is used.
Smaller sample sizes of nursing home users are thereby
permitted. Ability to detect a six month 9ifference in mean
LOS between Risk and S/HMO was a criteria initially used fr。
the computation. Detection of smaller differences required a
larger sample size for Risk and S/HMO groups
Based on the assumptions that distribution of ICF
residents within respective control and trial groups is
asymentrical (not normally distributed under a two tailed
normal curve) , and increments of measurement are not
measured in continuous intervals , the sample size suggested
for the data sets concerned with ICF utilization is shown:
(TO be used for determining the probability of becoming and
ICF resident during the study period.
Computations about variability were performed based on
the Ravlin and Weiner model , shown in the above table. These
computations were done by age cohorts. The computed
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variability in mean LOS is used to estimate sample size
required in each cell.
At .90 power to detect a difference of 180 days between
Mean LOS , and an alpha level of .05 , for age cohort 65-74 ,
the sample size eatimate for Risk ICF residents was 313;
At .80 power to detect a difference of 180 days between
Mean LOS , and an alpha level of .05 , for age cohort 65-74 ,
the sample size estimate for Risk ICF residents was 175.6;
At .80 power to detect a difference of 180 days between
Mean LOS , and an alpha level of .10 , for age cohort 65-74 ,
the sample size estimate for Risk ICF residents was 138;
When the above sample size estimates for age cohort
65-74 were compared to the estimated number of KP Risk
Medicare ICF residents in Multnomah County , (see tables [c]
and [ell in [e] even taken collectively for the three years ,
{75+65+72-212} it appeared that at .80 power and an alpha
level of .10 that a 65 percent sample of residents was
needed; at an alpha of .05 and 83 percent sample was needed.
At .90 power and alpha of .05 only 2/3 the required
resdients were available.
The overall sample size estimate was 2864 under one
calculation. This was even larger than the high estimate
333
done using the Ravlin and Weiner based estimate [table f]
(high • 2438 , low - 1625) was so much larger than table [e]
that they were of questionable use. A decision was made t。
collect data on everyone , since the estimates seemed about
the same size as the sample needed.
As it turned out , there was a total of 395 Risk
Medicare ICF residents in the overall data set. That was
about what was required for the total Risk sample. There
were 820 unique persons in ICFs during the study period.
That was about one-half of the low Ravlin and Weiner
estimate. The total SNF+ICF unique persons was 1160 , or
about 2/3 of the low R & W estimate. It was close to the
estimate in table [e]. It is worth noting that benchmark
studies in this area by Liu and Manton , used Samples of over
6500 nursing home residents.
In retrospect , the variance selected for use in
estimating sample size , and factor (difference in days in an
ICF between groups) of detectability between means (6
months) were both inappropriate. While it is true that
potential variance was the maximum of the study period days
(730) , the problem would have been resolved by focusing on
the shorter-stay IeF residents. This is recommended for
future studies. The ability to detect a difference of 6
months between means was far to large. The problem is that
to detect the small amount of difference in days used
between Risk and S/HMO , that was actually observed , requires
334
a sample bigger than that estimated. Determining sample size
based on the ability to detect differences in mean LOS.
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Formation of utilization comparisons by age
stratification will require some weighting adjustment due t。
the disproportionate distribution. While all Medicare
enrollees in risk and SHMO categories will serve as the
sample , analysis will be done by use of sampling fractions.
If distributions are also disproportionate between age
distribution and sex further weighting fractions will be
developed. Information regarding age and sex distributions
are being developed and were not available for this
document.
Time from enrollment status to time of ICF admission:
It will also be necessary to determine the proper
method of aggregating admissions and therefore this part of
the study must consider time to readmission(s) and the times
to discharge. Thus , total as well as increments of care must
be considered.
The beginning point of this study may need to be
staggered so that the true start of Risk Group is that when
Cost to risk began.
Some testing of the need to delete all prior risk group
enrollees will be undertaken. That is , of the 7500 Medicare
Plus enrollees in risk already , is there a marked difference
in the variables describing them in comparison to the SHMO
group?
The objective is to create comparable states of
stability and change. A measure of this stability will be
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to compare expense variances within the first two years with
those of the third year to see if there is any trend or
change suggest regarding the effectiveness of what SHMO is
doing to attain cost effective LTC services.
In considering that hypothesis analysis concerned with
time of enrollment eligibility to time of ICF admission , a
further threat to validity exists. To help ensure
comparability of the two groups , it is necessary to withdraw
those members in the Risk category who were in a nursing
home (or other facility) at the beginning of this study.
This is necessary because none of the SHMO enrollees could
be in a nursing home (or other facility) at the time of
their application.
The concern is that they could constitute a large
number of days which would skew the results , indefensible
confounding the findings. Since the objective is t。
understand effects of the SHMO program (creating networks
and alternative support groups to be used in lieu of ICF
admission) on ICF use in contrast to no program this
population adjustment is needed. It is feasible that some
members will have been in ICF facilities from prior to the
beginning of SHMO to present.
However , that group of individuals will be examined
independently by use of a survival analysis. A survival
curve will be developed for this subset which will als。
consider their admit time elapsed to discharge. Without this
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separation of ICF’ residents at the start of the study it may
lead to a serious overstatement of what the SHMO program is
doing to reduce utilization.
True data on ICF use rates are not available ,
currently. Obtaining it is one of the required functions of
this study. It will be accomplished by going to each
facility with member names and obtaining correct
information.
Data , regarding the above characteristics of
hospitalized members in each contract category , will be
derived from the automated discharge abstract system for all
hospitalized patients. All of the variables noted above , in
the survey questionnaire , are available from this inpatient
information system data base.
Since some Medicare members included in the study will
have been hospitalized elsewhere , a search of all referrals
during the study period will be done. Likewise , a review of
all SHMO new enrollment forms will be undertaken. Where
information has not been entered into the Kaiser Permanente
Inpatient Information System from Discharge Summaries sent
by those non- Kaiser Permanente hospitals , that will be
undertaken. In addition , the Part A intermediary may be
asked for such information if needed. Consent will be
。btained as needed.
Likewise , analysis of utilization information for all
Medicare enrollees during the study period , who were
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admitted to SNFs is feasible by use of referral billing data
for all SHMO and Risk members.
Expense Data
The time and effort required to collect expense
information greatly exceeds that of utilization data. This
is due to the protocol of providing many services via
parties not employed by the ICF site. There will be multiple
vendors and providers for each person confined in the ICF
unit. For this reason a sample of the population will be
drawn to accomplish an analysis of expenses. Otherwise the
research expense , and logistics of data collection , become
unmanageable and exceed any reasonable funding request.
Therefore , a stratified random sample of all members
admitted to ICFs will be developed from admission and
discharge lists by facility. These lists have been created
and entered into a software program at Kaiser Permanente but
have not yet been tested and recompiled into software
program files. They require validation by on-site
verification at each ICF location. Utilization data will be
confirmed in the process.
The size of the sample in each contract category , as
well as that required for cells within in these category
blocks is described below.
a. Variables which comprise sample cells include the
following.
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(2) Determining Sample Size for Population Subsets
Method One--Normal Distribution
Sample size assuming a normal , two sided distributed
。utcome， usin9 a_.05 level test sample size , n, per group ,
is given by the formula:
2 variance ( Z alpha/2 + Z beta)2
n •
( u l - u2 )-
where:
(a) • (presumed constant) variability ,
(b) ul ' u2 are group means
(c) Z /2. 100 (1 - /2 ) percentile for N(O ,l)
ie , •. 05 , Z /2 •• 025 • 97.5th percentile .1.96
alpha (type I error) .•
beta ( ). type II error , (not rejecting when u1 / U2)
• 1 - power, at 90' power , beta ••10
• ,‘.‘...‘
-
90th percentile or 1.282
Lamda
1 •
rate per 1000 for group one
Lamda 2 • rate per 1000 for group tw。
(Z /2 + Z
‘ +
n •
i - 2
l - n
F。‘’.r • 1 - z /2 -
1 • 2
n • 2 2 ( 3 /2 + 3
e.g. 0.1
• 0.5
-
.10
• 2 (10)2 (1.96 + 1.282)2 • 2102
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For example , ~f the LOS data is normally distributed with a
standard deviation of 200 days than we would have 90
percent power to detect a variance of 20 days per year for
the SHMO group.
Method two--Non-Normal Distribution
An alternate Approach To Estimating Required Sample
Size is to use a poisson distribution which assumes a
non-normal or asymmetrical distribution of variation in use
rates.
Power - 1- 3 /2 -
2
n
(x)- probability n(O ,l) < x
ie a cumulative distribution function
n. 3000 , •. 1
Power - 1 - (-1.91) , - 97'
The asymmetrical distribution is a known characteristic of
utilization in ICls making the latter approach the better
choice. Therefore , a sample size of 3,000 per population
sublet , i.e. , (3 ,000 Rilk) + (3 ,000 SBMO) , will provide 97
percent power , (a톨톨U톨ing a two-tailed .05 level test) for
use in detect differences between the SBMO and Risk study
groups on the order of 0.1 standard deviation.
More formal justifications of sample size , because of
the limited information on variability, is not considered
to be fruitful for this study. Indeed , an important
consequence of this study will be the generation of good
data on the distribution and variation of utilization for
SNF and Icr members of HMOs.
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Research Population Estimate One , (normal distribution)
When estimating the average difference in a response
variable between two groups , and the size of the target
population is not known , using the formula:
2 . , 2 \ __ 2[ n - Z~(variance~l + variance~2)/B~ ]; and ,
Assuming normal distribution of LOS data with a
standard deviation of +/- 200 days (two tailed) at an .05%
alpha level , and using 90훌 power to detect a variance
between trial and control groups of 20 days , then a sample
of 2200 subjects is required. Since it is almost certain
that the distribution of days/1000 will be asymetrical , an
even larger sample is desirable. The number of IeF
residents among Medicare plus members is not much larger
than this number suggests is needed. The SHMO population is
smaller.
Research Population Estimate TWo , (non-normal) suggests:
21 sigma
N - delta to get a 90 훌 power - sample size of 3,000
To predict the variance on .1SD and an alpha level of
.05 (Type I error) is only correct relative to the
perturbation of data in the sample.
using the above guestimate on size of sample (to be
drawn from the total population of each subset for Risk and
SHMO groups) , for the period 6/85 through 12/87 (see chart
two for range of enrollees) requiresd about 3000 per group
to cover all the cells of age and sex in each group of cell.
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With a standard error of .2 and .3 for the estimate , at
a 95% Confidence Interval , and at a +/-6% , the probability
。 f being admitted to a rCF over the life of the study is
between 2 to 3 훌.
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FOR CHAPTER IV
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